British colonists would famously state, “Rule the Punjabis, intimidate the Sindhis, buy the Pashtun, and honour the Baloch.” After the “forward policy” of the British Crown came a cropper with the decimation of the British Raj forces in the humiliating 1842 retreat from Kabul, they instead took to a combination of signing treaties, paying generous allowances, creating blockades, triggering inter-tribe rifts etc., to control the two particularly restive and outlying ethnicities — the Baloch and the Pathans. They respected (feared) their warlike irreconcilability and counterintuitively enrolled them as “martial castes” with designated Regiments, that is, the Baloch Regiment and the Pathan Regiment (later merged with the Frontier Force Regiment). The masters of divide-and-rule recognised the tribalistic undercurrents of these two broad ethnicities and the fine differences between the two. While both ethnicities were bound by their unique and inviolable codes of societal conduct, the Pashtun was additionally given to a deeper degree of religious fervour, while the fidelity of the Baloch was to his land, tribe, and ultimately to his tribal chieftain or Sardar.
The British were relatively more successful in handling the Baloch than the Pashtun lands, owing to sharp insights and calculated punts like selectively valourising the likes of the Khan of Kalat to “control” other Baloch Sardars in the region. Geography and lack of infrastructure also helped as the vast (often unreachable) swathes of Balochistan were sparsely populated with isolated areas given to individual tribes. As long as a sense of tribalistic independence prevailed with an element of “honour” bestowed, the Baloch continued their ways. From leaving large tracts unadministered, giving generous grants, to even tactically weaponising their ranks, the constantly calibrated British approach of carrot-and-stick ensued. However, many fiercely independent and rival Baloch Sardars of tribes like Marri, Bugti etc, remained forever edgy and testy. But then a certain level of dissonance and unrest in the region was the historical norm for eons.
Independence of Pakistan in 1947 undid the formulaic approach of the British, as the Pakistani experiment in democracy ushered in new dynamics, priorities and disdain. Even the relatively inefficacious banner of Baloch nationalism under initial forums like Anjuman-e-Ittehad-e-Balochistan and later Kalat State National Party, got a fillip as many Baloch started imagining a surrender of their “honour”, perceived independence, and subservience to Pakistan. Vagueness in the language of the Standstill Agreement signed by the Khan of Kalat and the State of Pakistan seeded suspicion for posterity with the line, “The Government of Pakistan agrees that Kalat is an independent State, being quite different in status from other States of India”. Thereafter, the signing of the Instrument of Accession led to the first armed Baloch insurgent movement (1948-50) led by Prince Abdul Karim and his band of Baloch militia under the banner of Dosht-e-Jhalawan.
As the “idea of Pakistan” matured and the collateral diminishment of the Baloch Sardars ensued, policies like the “One Unit” scheme led to more rebellion by the Sardars. The ruling Punjabis of West Pakistan were trying to create the image of a united West Pakistan to counter the possible domination by the numerically bigger East Pakistan (Bengalis). In this melee, the already bruised emotions of the Baloch were further brushed aside. Adding to the insult of the Baloch sensibilities was the brazen abuse of its natural resources with little or no share of revenues or investment in Balochistan. The proud Baloch who was once singled out for “honour” by the British, was now perceiving “plunder” by Pakistan.
The organically spurred insurgency movement metastasised with groups and militias like Popular Front for Armed Resistance (PFAR), Parrari, Bugti Militia, Balochistan Liberation Force et al, that also reflected the divides within the Baloch ranks. Today, the more inclusive (from the perspective of various Baloch tribes) and relatively secular formation of Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) is the foremost group that is leading the insurgent attack on the Pakistani State. The attacks led by the BLA grew a staggering 119 per cent in 2024 over the previous year with an estimated 225 fatalities (as compared to about 300 by the Pashtun predominant Tehreek-i-Taliban-Pakistan), as per the Pakistan Security Report, 2024. The BLA’s most persuasive and resonating accusation of “enforced disappearances” and economic exploitation seems to be indefensible for the Pakistani State. There is an unaddressed crisis of “honour” and equity in Baloch imagination, and the Pakistani guns only worsen it.
The “Trainjacking” of the Jaffar Express by elements of the BLA was a continuation of upping the ante. Counter claims of rescue-versus-release of women and children hostages is also true to the rote script with each side blaming the other. The targeted enemies of the Baloch are the Pakistani Military (many soldiers were travelling in this train), the Chinese working on the China Pakistan Economic Corridor projects, Punjabis (last month seven passengers in a Punjab bound bus were killed), and any “outsider” perceived to be besmirching the Baloch “honour”, something that has been ignored in the Pakistani calculus since 1947.
Pakistani propaganda of “foreign power” (once a euphemism for India, and now, Afghanistan) is increasingly unbelievable. International borders around Balochistan are with Iran (which has sectarian disconnect) and Afghanistan (with ethnic disconnect) and very little support from its diaspora or the Arab Sheikhdoms (given the lack of religious angularity), so it is truly homebred and nurtured by neglect and oppression from the Pakistani side itself. The “trainjacking” will have a bloody end, but not before extracting the global attention sought by the BLA. Pakistanis will further blow the simplistic trumpet of “terror”, be it in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or Balochistan, without ascribing any blame on itself.
Delusionary denialism on top of the self-inflicted injuries, diminishments, and creating Frankenstenian monsters is the norm in Pakistani discourse and governance. Unless Pakistan addresses the root causes, it will be a case of a bus yesterday, train today, and a plane tomorrow. History is instructive of the Baloch sensibilities, but then acknowledging and accepting history has never been Pakistan’s strength.
The writer is a retired lieutenant-general and a former lieutenant-governor of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Puducherry
