The death of 10 District Reserve Guards (DRG) and a civilian driver in an explosion of improvised explosive device (IED) triggered by Maoists in Dantewada Wednesday is indicative of the fact that the Maoists are not completely decimated and are still active enough to mark their presence in the left-wing extremism-affected (LWE) districts. The blast comes after a lull of about two years.
After receiving an intelligence input of the presence of Maoists in the Darbha division, over 200 security personnel had set out to nab them. A brief exchange of fire took place near Nahadi village in the morning after which two suspects were apprehended. They were being brought to the district headquarters in the convoy when the Maoists attacked it. While the waiting Maoists allowed the first vehicle to pass by, they triggered the IED planted on the road when the second vehicle reached the spot, causing heavy damage to the vehicle and killing 11 persons including the civilian driver.
The huge crater created by the blast and the extent of damage caused is indicative of the massive amount of IED used. The IEDs, estimated to be around 50 kgs, conjectured to have been planted about four months back when the road was under construction.
There are standard operating procedures (SOP) in place for security forces in LWE-affected areas. These are even revised from time to time. But over a period of time, complacency sets in and the SOPs, though not completely ignored, are not strictly adhered to. Much of the responsibility for adherence to the SOPs squarely falls on the commanders on the ground who are in physical control of the security personnel. A little deviation from the SOP can result in devastating results as has happened in Dantewada.
Though most such incidents are attributed to the failure of intelligence, it needs to be borne in mind that pinpoint intelligence is not always forthcoming. In this incident, the intelligence agencies could not have specified that the IEDs had been planted at the specific point where the blast took place. When the road was being constructed, either the security forces should have secured the place round the clock or should have kept the navvies (unskilled labourers) under constant surveillance or the intelligence agencies ought to have planted a mole among the navvies to identify Maoist elements.
A lot of effort is directed towards intelligence collection. The same emphasis is not laid on collecting information about the movements of Maoists. Often, the secrecy of movement of security forces is compromised. Secrecy in communication even among the security forces needs to be given utmost importance. Even casual talks among security personnel in markets or public places can lead to a leak of information.
The Maoists plant IEDs because one or two personnel are enough to trigger a blast from a distance of about 100 metres. One look-out man, positioned about a kilometre away, can alert the hiding Maoists about the approaching vehicles and the occupants so that they can target the vehicle carrying security forces and avoid civilian casualties.
The security personnel are not expected to walk about 75 kilometers after conducting operations in the wee hours. The use of vehicles was the only mode to return to their base. For this, road opening parties (ROPs) could have been activated to cover the entire stretch of the road and the personnel of ROP positioned at various possible ambush points to secure them.
It must have been known to the security forces deployed in LWE-affected districts that the Maoists carry out a tactical counter offensive campaign, better known as TCOC, in the months between March and July, which calls for alertness of a high order. A study of the major incidents in the past indicate that the Maoists inflicted heavy casualties on security forces during these months. Zero tolerance to any violation of SOPs should have been the norm and senior officers ought to have come down heavily on violations of SOPs to avoid such incidents.
That the Maoists are on the back foot, with a large number surrenders and deaths in encounters with security forces in recent times, is an acknowledged fact. The spread of the Maoist network is now limited to a mere 5,000 sq. kms from 14,000 sq. kms a few years back. Violent incidents by Maoists have slid down by 77 per cent in 2022 as compared to figures about a decade back. Last year, there were 509 such incidents – compared to 2,259 in 2009.
By attending the Central Reserve Police Force’s 84th Anniversary parade at Jagdalpur on March 25 this year, Union Home Minister Amit Shah sent a clear message to the country that LWE extremism was on its way out. Development work has begun in earnest in districts which were hitherto deprived of access to the world. CRPF camps have sprung up in 19 places in the interiors of Chhattisgarh with more to be added in the coming months. These camps have cut off the access Maoists had to the villagers and also disrupted their intelligence network. With access to medical care and education, the villagers look up to the security forces for assistance.
With the inter-state borders being manned by security forces and police personnel of these states working in close coordination, Maoists find it difficult to move from one state to another. Some of their top leaders have become too old to play any active role in operations. A few of the top leaders have succumbed to various ailments in recent months. Ailing leaders no longer have access to hospitals or doctors since the security forces have ring-fenced the jungle. With any worthwhile leadership, the rank and file of the Maoist movement are in disarray. Of the 24 members of the politburo and central committee, six are dead and two have surrendered while others have crossed the age of 60 and many are ailing.
However, there can’t be any complacency in dealing with LWE. The SOPs need to be adhered to the last word so that precious lives are not lost.
The writer was Inspector General of Police, CRPF
