In recent years, India has demonstrated remarkable diplomatic dexterity by recalibrating its foreign policy to accommodate emerging geopolitical realities. This transformation is exemplified by its outreach to the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) in Sri Lanka, a group with which it has historically had antagonistic relations, as well as its engagement with the Taliban in Afghanistan, against whom India previously supported an armed opposition. These shifts highlight India’s evolving strategic posture, shaped by changing regional dynamics.
The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in August 2021 disrupted two decades of India’s carefully cultivated ties with the elected Afghan republic. Long regarded by India as a proxy of Pakistan’s security establishment and a patron of anti-India terrorist networks, the Taliban presents a unique strategic challenge that involves navigating this engagement without undermining its principles or compromising its security.
India’s strategic calculus is adapting to the widening rift between the Taliban and Pakistan. This divide, primarily driven by disagreements over Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), has opened new strategic possibilities. The Taliban’s unwillingness to curb the TTP—a group allegedly responsible for ongoing deadly attacks within Pakistan—has significantly strained its formerly symbiotic relationship with Rawalpindi. Pakistan’s retaliatory airstrikes within Afghan territory and the Taliban’s bold response have further highlighted the divide.
This divergence presents a subtle opportunity for India. For years, Indian policymakers regarded the Taliban as a proxy of Pakistan’s military-intelligence establishment. However, the current tensions imply that the Taliban is asserting greater independence, influenced by Pashtun solidarity, nationalist sentiment, and its own survival imperatives. If Kabul is indeed distancing itself from Islamabad, even if cautiously, India may find room to reduce the group’s traditionally hostile stance toward it.
Still, India’s room for manoeuvre remains narrow. Despite the fallout with Pakistan, the Taliban has not transformed into a democratic or inclusive force. Its repressive policies toward women and minorities persist, and a rift with Pakistan does not equate to alignment with India. Therefore, while geopolitically significant, the Taliban-Pakistan estrangement offers no guaranteed basis for partnership. India must approach engagement cautiously, ensuring that a perceived opportunity does not turn into a strategic misstep.
India initially responded to the Taliban’s takeover with caution, withdrawing its diplomatic staff and suspending direct engagement. However, as time passed, New Delhi realised that a policy of complete isolation was untenable. By mid-2022, it cautiously reopened its embassy in Kabul with a limited “technical team” to support humanitarian efforts, while engaging in backchannel talks with the Taliban to seek assurances that Afghan territory would not be used for anti-India activities. These discreet diplomatic efforts culminated in an unprecedented public meeting in January 2025, when Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in Dubai — marking the highest-level official contact between the two sides to date.
India’s ongoing humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan under the Taliban regime was underscored during the United Nations Security Council session on Afghanistan on March 10, 2025. Since August 2021, India has delivered 50,000 tons of wheat, 40,000 litres of pesticides, 27 tons of relief materials, and over 300 tons of medical supplies. Additionally, it has partnered with various UN agencies in health, food security, education, sports, and capacity building, executing more than 500 projects.
The statement reflects a strategic posture—assisting Afghans without endorsing the Taliban. So far, India has refused to allow a Taliban-appointed envoy to take charge of the Afghan embassy in New Delhi, thereby maintaining diplomatic ambiguity. In doing so, India aims to convey that its engagement is driven by moral obligation and regional stability rather than political approval. It represents a tightrope walk between principles and pragmatism. Additionally, it allows New Delhi to counter Pakistan’s narrative and sustain a role in Afghanistan’s reconstruction. This balancing act—aid without acceptance, presence without partnership—is at the heart of India’s strategic dilemma.
It is a dilemma because disengaging would yield ground to Pakistan and China, while full engagement risks undermining India’s moral standing and alienating former Afghan allies. India has chosen a middle path—sustaining limited but meaningful engagement without formal recognition. This approach keeps communication lines open and helps prevent Afghanistan from becoming a sanctuary for anti-India terror groups.
However, this balancing act comes with costs. Domestically, India’s outreach to the Taliban may attract criticism from political opponents and civil society concerned about legitimising an illiberal regime. Internationally, it risks complicating relations with Western allies, who maintain a tougher stance against the Taliban. Regionally, if the Taliban continues to give space to groups hostile to India, the current strategy could backfire.
What makes India’s policy particularly complex is the opacity of the Taliban regime. The Taliban has not presented a unified front; various factions compete for influence, and its promises—especially regarding counterterrorism—have been inconsistently fulfilled. The threat of terrorist spillover remains real. India’s options are limited. It cannot dictate terms to the Taliban but can influence outcomes through conditional engagement—providing economic incentives in exchange for security assurances. However, it remains uncertain whether the Taliban will respond.
Looking ahead, developments on the ground will challenge India’s cautious engagement. If the Taliban moderates—both in governance and by distancing itself from terror networks—India might deepen cooperation and possibly even consider establishing consular ties to facilitate trade and humanitarian efforts. If not, India may pivot toward containment, strengthening border security and coordinating with global partners to isolate the Taliban leadership.
In either case, New Delhi must remain vigilant. The goal is not to embrace the Taliban, but to ensure that Afghanistan does not turn into a geopolitical vacuum exploited by hostile forces. This necessitates continuous recalibration, informed intelligence, and a willingness to adapt as regional dynamics evolve.
The writer is Professor, MMAJ Academy of International Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi
