The mass killings at Pahalgam on April 22 carried out by Pakistan-sponsored terrorists have been seared into the Indian consciousness just like the host of massacres before it— at Chittisinghpura in 2000, Kaluchak in 2002, Mumbai in 2008, Uri in 2016 and Pulwama in 2019, to name a few .
Significantly, General Asim Munir was the DG, ISI, when Pulwama took place and is the Army Chief when Pahalgam has taken place. His three-year tenure was to end in November 2025 but it has been extended to 2027. Fingers are being pointed at his blatantly communal speech on April 16 to the Pakistan Overseas Convention where he referred to the “two-nation theory” and said Kashmir was and is Pakistan’s “jugular vein”.
The Pahalgam killings have led to pan-India anger since the victims came from different parts of the country. The killings themselves apart, their communal nature — wherein the victims were asked to divulge their religion and those who could not recite the Kalma were shot dead — has multiplied the anger. It is this intense countrywide anger, seeking retribution, that the Government of India has to assuage.
What Pahalgam demonstrated is that the pain India had inflicted on Pakistan after the Uri and Pulwama attacks did not last long. Hence, for Pahalgam, the pain has to be long-term and decisive. As the PM articulated ominously, the consequences will be unimaginable.
Several reasons account for why Pakistan had the attack carried out. These would include the army’s and Munir’s declining popularity among the people, especially in its bastion of Punjab, thanks largely to the damage former PM Imran Khan has inflicted. Despite being in jail and despite everything the army has thrown at him, he continues to be the most popular leader in the country. The diaspora, especially in the US, has rallied solidly behind Khan and against the army, and expressly against Munir. Their lobbying in the US Congress has resulted in a bill that targets Munir directly. Then, of course, the security situation in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) is out of control, making the army lose credibility. There is a growing awareness that in Kashmir, Pakistan has lost the narrative and its relevance.
For these and other reasons, the army badly needed a diversion. In its playbook, ratcheting up tensions with India is the best ploy to divert attention from domestic turmoil. There is a view in Pakistan that the attack in Pahalgam was ordered by Munir himself. His motivation appears to have been to provoke an Indian retaliation that could rouse public opinion in his favour.
In his limited imagination, Munir probably expected a conventional Indian response on the lines of what happened after Uri and Pulwama — controlled strikes — the fallout of which could be managed. In its initial retribution, India chose the non-kinetic route, throwing Pakistan off balance. By holding the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in abeyance, India has underlined that the sanctity of treaties and Pakistan’s continuing sponsorship of terrorism cannot go together. Prime Minister Narendra Modi had declared on September 26, 2016, in the wake of the Uri attack, that blood and water can’t flow together. Hence, it has been emphasised that the IWT will be held in abeyance until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably renounces cross-border terrorism.
The IWT had divided the six rivers of the Indus basin between the two countries. India received the three eastern rivers (the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej). Pakistan received the three western rivers (the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab) that accounted for almost 80 per cent of the shared basin’s water. However, India can use these western rivers for “non-consumptive” purposes like irrigation, hydro-power and navigation.
Pakistan was not expecting such a blow. The Indus is Pakistan’s lifeline — it is dependent only on this one river system, which meets more than 80 per cent of its irrigation needs. The disruption of water supplies will worsen the existing water scarcity and have a cascading effect on crop yields and food security. The real impact will be felt in Pakistan during the dry season, when the availability of water is low, and hence, the timing of flows becomes more critical. Together with several diplomatic measures such as withholding visas, India has redefined the rules of engagement with a terror-sponsoring Pakistan. This is only the starting point.
In retaliation, Pakistan has announced the suspension of bilateral accords, including the Simla Agreement, trade and airspaces with India, apart from replicating diplomatic measures announced by New Delhi. It has also warned that any attempt to stop or divert the flow of water belonging to Pakistan as per the IWT will be considered as an act of war and be responded to with full force across the complete spectrum of national power.
Pakistan will take some comfort from the fact that India does not have the infrastructure to store the water of the western rivers, especially during the high-flow season. India’s run-of-the-river projects have limited storage. However, it will be worried that India will not now have to share hydrological data, giving it control over the scheduling of flows into Pakistan, that is, delay the release of the water and hence create unpredictability.
Pakistan has two other problems: It has developed only three major water storages at Tarbela, Mangla and Chashma, with a cumulative storage capacity of 14.10 MAF or 9.7 per cent when constructed against average water flows of 145 MAF annually through the three Indus rivers. The international average is 40 per cent. Second, there has been massive groundwater depletion because of the presence of over a million tubewells. Satellite data indicates that the Indus basin aquifer is now the second-most stressed in the world. This rapid depletion of the aquifer means that Pakistan does not have much groundwater in reserve that can be used as the river system becomes more stressed.
The blame for the Pahalgam misadventure is slowly falling on Munir, who has pushed Pakistan towards the abyss.
In the meantime, the non-kinetic measures are only India’s opening salvo.
Devasher is an author and former member, National Security Advisory Board. Views are personal
