The Maldives, especially when seen through the eyes of its Indian Ocean neighbours, and past and prospective allies, is a study in contradictions. An archipelago of nearly 1,200 islands, it is a specimen of small states that paradoxically managed to maintain relative independence from European colonisation throughout the colonial period, in contrast to large South Asian territories. A constitutionally Muslim nation, today, Maldivian culture is rooted in Buddhism, which once informed the nation’s script, language, architecture, culture, and manners. This was prior to the adoption of Islam in 1153 AD.
Owing to its strategic location in the Indian Ocean, the Maldives attracted the gaze of Portuguese, Dutch, and French explorers in the 16th and 17th centuries. It came under British economic and strategic influence, which culminated in a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that the nation signed with the British in 1887. While the Victorian administration became the de facto handler of Maldivian foreign affairs, the nation retained its internal political sovereignty. During the Second World War, the Maldives was a British naval base, and continued as a British protectorate until its independence in 1965.
As an independent state, the Maldives became a member of the UN in 1965 and began developing robust ties with India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, especially with the last, though India was the first nation to launch a resident mission in Male, in 1976. In 1978, the Indian International Airport Authority was awarded a tender to expand the Hulhule airport runway.
Indo-Maldivian bilateral relationship was formalised with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship in 1981. Nevertheless, Maldivian foreign policy under President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom took a lukewarm turn towards India, despite India’s aid in preserving his regime during a coup attempt. Most Indian troops had to leave the Maldives once stability was restored, leaving only a small contingent to protect the president for a year.
As the Maldivian democratic movement gained momentum, Gayoom attempted to leverage China over India. Recognising China’s emergence as a global power with significant strategic interests in the Indian Ocean, the President visited China in 1984 and then again in 2006.
In the late 20th century and early 21st century, China played a significant role in infrastructural development in the Maldives, most notably constructing the Foreign Ministry building, besides extending assistance to the island nation during the devastating tsunami of 2004.
Indo-Maldivian ties saw an upward swing with President Mohamed Nasheed coming to power in 2008, following a campaign that was critical of Gayoom’s Sinocentric policies. However, during his presidency, the Maldives confronted economic challenges in its tourism industry amid the global recession.
The opportunity was seized by China, which negotiated agreements with the Maldives to contribute to its tourism sector, eventually outweighing traditional tourism contributors like the UK. Even under Nasheed, China-Maldives relations were enriched, as the Chinese opened an embassy in Male, on November 8, 2011, with the only hiccup being the public disclosure of a Sino-Maldivian agreement for Chinese supply of military hardware and training to the Maldives — a plan that was eventually shelved amid public concerns of security in the Indian Ocean.
In October 2011, Nasheed attempted to alleviate Indian concerns at the CHOGM in Perth, reaffirming his ‘India first’ foreign policy. During the interim presidency of President Mohammed Waheed, from 2012 to 2013, the Maldivian approach towards India soured once again as the Chinese stronghold on the Maldives infrastructural projects resumed. Along with the Maldivian Minister of Defence and National Security, Waheed visited Beijing, where he lauded the Chinese foreign policy on small nations and purported non-interference in the internal affairs of Indian Ocean territories in contrast to the stances of other influential countries. In return, he secured Chinese aid via infrastructural and military aid agreements. Chinese influence in the Maldives found an additional fillip through China’s establishments in Sri Lanka.
In the subsequent Maldivian regime led by President Abdulla Yameen, the half-brother of Gayoum, Male seemed to further distance itself from Western and Indian influences while strengthening ties with China. Arguably, Yameen’s pro-China policy was more rhetorical than executive, as he chose India as his first overseas destination after assuming office. When his successor Ibrahim Mohamed Solih assumed office in 2018, it was more pragmatic for him to use the ‘India first’ plank. Into the second decade of the 21st century, the Maldives, under President Mohammed Muizzu, remains an important Indian Ocean neighbour to India, both as a strategic and trade partner and a tourism destination for India’s surging middle classes.
Nevertheless, the challenges that confront Indo-Maldivian relations are seen to overlap with the challenges confronting the Maldives—the increasing Islamisation of Maldivian society and anxieties of the subsequent economic hollowing out of the littoral state. It will be interesting to see the impact on Maldivian domestic politics of geostrategic forces revolving around the Chinese ‘string of pearls’ strategy at play in the Indian Ocean region.
The writer teaches at OP Jindal Global University and is the author of The Great Indian Railways (2018), Indians in London (2021) and Adam’s Bridge (2024)
