It is now well known that US President Donald Trump has outlined a 20-point plan for peace and reconstruction in the Gaza Strip. The 15th point in Trump’s plan to end the Gaza conflict specifies the establishment of an International Stabilisation Force, or the ISF, which would facilitate humanitarian access, the flow of goods, support for a newly trained Palestinian security force, and help with reconstruction of the region. European states such as France and the United Kingdom have publicly affirmed their support and are preparing with a draft United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution to authorise the creation of the force, giving it an international legal mandate.
Though no full commitments have been publicly confirmed, there is some speculation over which states would be willing and able to pledge troops to the ISF. Given its regional status and involvement in the Israel-Hamas talks, Egypt is widely expected to take a significant role, but it has emphasised that this mandate must clearly define the scope, duration, and leadership of the force. Reportedly, the US itself may provide support but without directly deploying troops in Gaza. Countries like Indonesia, Azerbaijan, Turkey and even Pakistan have indicated their willingness to deploy troops, conditional on a UN mandate. However, Israel’s opposition to Turkey’s participation in the force, and the fact that Pakistan and Indonesia have no diplomatic ties with Israel, could complicate the effective deployment of their troops in Gaza.
Within this debate, India’s potential contribution to the ISF has only been mentioned en passant. India has long been engaged in the wider Israel-Palestine conflict through the provision of humanitarian aid to Gaza. However, New Delhi has not publicly pledged troops to the ISF. Nevertheless, Vishwesh Negi, a Joint Secretary at the Ministry of Defence has kept the possibility of deploying Indian peacekeeping forces under a UNSC mandate open. India has historically been one of the most prominent players in deploying peacekeeping troops for UN missions and has also recently hosted the UN Troop Contributing Countries’ Chiefs Conclave. What is less known, however, is that India’s long-standing contribution to UN peacekeeping began in the 1950s in Gaza and the Sinai.
India was one of the first and largest troop contributors to the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) established in 1956 after the Suez Crisis, following the tripartite invasion of Egypt by Israel, Britain, and France. Its mandate was to supervise the cessation of hostilities, ensure the withdrawal of invading forces, and serve as a buffer between Egyptian and Israeli forces, primarily around Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula. The Indian contingent of around 1,300 troops, known as the Indian Peacekeeping Contingent (IPKC), formed a key infantry battalion within UNEF. In the Gaza Strip, Indian troops supervised the Israeli withdrawal after the Suez conflict, patrolled ceasefire lines, and facilitated refugee resettlement in coordination with the UN Relief and Works Agency. Lieutenant General K S Thimayya also served as Force Commander of UNEF in 1959 and became one of the most respected UN peacekeeping officers of that period.
In 1967, at the request of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the UN Secretary General ordered the withdrawal of UNEF I, and Indian troops were asked to withdraw alongside before the Six-Day War in June 1967. However, some Indian troops were killed in the initial crossfire between Israel and Egypt. After the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the UN created UNEF II to supervise the disengagement between Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Sinai. India did not contribute a full combat contingent to UNEF II but remained involved through military observers and staff officers. By that time, India’s peacekeeping troop commitments had shifted toward UN operations in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and Congo (ONUC).
More recently, India has also been a major troop contributor to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) since its establishment in 1978, following the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon. The Indian battalion, which has continuously been of around 900-1,000 troops, has operated primarily along the Blue Line between Lebanon and Israel. The contingent has conducted patrols, provided medical assistance, and participated in de-mining operations. The participation in UNEF and UNIFIL has demonstrated India’s neutral peacekeeping professionalism, balancing relations with both Arab states and Israel. UNEF deployments have also illustrated early international cooperation efforts in Gaza, showing how India contributed to stability in the same region that are now under discussion for a new stabilisation force.
However, there are some lessons from the past peacekeeping experiences that need to be borne in mind when considering another deployment in Gaza. Despite significant troop contributions, India had little influence over the UNEF mandate and further Arab-Israeli diplomatic negotiations. The Force’s rapid withdrawal in 1967 also revealed the fragility of UN peacekeeping mandates that rely entirely on host-state consent, a lesson that shaped India’s later insistence on stronger legal frameworks. Finally, Indian troops faced logistical and communication difficulties in desert conditions, and the UN provided limited infrastructure or support compared to later missions.
Building on this experience, India should condition any troop commitment on a fully agreed-upon legal framework and an appropriate UNSC resolution, including precise mandate language and a clear chain of command with a strong Indian leadership role. As the nature of the ISF is still ambiguous, India will also need to closely monitor what type of oversight, rules of engagement, and international legal standards will be in play.
Also, the question of the withdrawal or presence of Israeli forces would need to be clarified. Israel insists on retaining certain zones or buffer areas, which could conflict with the Force’s mission or mandate. In addition, disarming Hamas and ensuring the training of a new Gaza security governance will prove to be extremely challenging. Without credible disarmament and governance arrangements, any stabilisation force may struggle. Finally, India must be attentive to the resource commitment (whether troops or funding) from other contributing states given the need to coordinate activities and roles in a multinational force.
While the situation is volatile and India’s participation remains contingent on further diplomatic, legal, and operational clarity, New Delhi’s positive ties with both Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA), its impeccable reputation of deploying peacekeeping forces (notably in the West Asian region) make it an ideal candidate to participate in the ISF. A public commitment to play an important role could also be a useful signal from India to the Trump administration at a time when bilateral relations are strained.
Blarel is associate professor of International Relations at the Institute of Political Science, Leiden University in The Netherlands. Ganguly is a senior fellow and directs the Huntington Programme on strengthening US-India relations at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University
