Last week, India and the Philippines undertook a joint naval exercise in the West Philippine Sea — waters that fall within the broader South China Sea and are claimed by China. Though widely reported as a first, this wasn’t the maiden India-Philippines patrol in the region; the two navies last conducted joint drills in the West Philippine Sea in 2021. Extensively covered in the international press, the latest exercise came on the eve of Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr’s state visit to India, lending the event added political weight.
To some observers, the move suggests a meaningful evolution of India’s maritime posture. New Delhi has long avoided entanglement in Southeast Asia’s territorial disputes. Despite its support for freedom of navigation in the regional littorals, India’s naval engagement there has remained measured and largely symbolic. But as proponents of Indian force projection in the Indo-Pacific see it, last week’s engagement suggests more than a subtle shift in Indian strategy — an indication of growing resolve in New Delhi to operate in Beijing’s strategic backyard.
Yet, it is plausible that this is not a geopolitical escalation by India. The exercise could well have been part of a routine overseas deployment to the Western Pacific — a gesture of solidarity rather than a major recalibration of maritime strategy. To start, the initiative appears driven not by India but by the Philippines. Facing mounting pressure from Beijing in its maritime backyard, Manila has, in recent years, deepened security ties with the United States, Japan, Australia, and France. Bringing India into the fold appears intended not so much to challenge China frontally, but rather as part of a broader hedging strategy to deter growing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea.
This interpretation aligns with the official Philippine framing of the exercise. In an interaction with the press last week, Philippine Armed Forces Chief General Romeo Brawner described the joint sail as a step toward deterrence, citing the need for coalition-building with friendly nations to uphold the maritime order. While Manila has ramped up joint patrols with the United States and other partners, its rationale for naval engagement with India seems somewhat different. India is not a treaty ally; it neither stations forces in Southeast Asia nor seeks to contain China in the Western Pacific. For Manila, cooperation with India is valuable because it signals support for Philippine sovereignty beyond its traditional alliances.
While China’s maritime disagreements extend across the region — from Vietnam and Malaysia to Brunei and Taiwan — its friction with the Philippines is particularly fraught. Beijing views Manila’s efforts to internationalise the South China Sea dispute, particularly its hosting of US forces under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, as deliberately provocative. Even Manila’s recent decision to sign a defence pact with Lithuania, ostensibly to “build a coalition against aggression,” was viewed in Beijing as an affront. Not surprisingly, Chinese ships reportedly shadowed Indian and Philippine warships last week, although no untoward incident occurred.
Crucially, India approaches the region with a different calculus. As a proponent of a rules-based maritime order, New Delhi has consistently advocated freedom of navigation and peaceful resolution of disputes in the South China Sea. Indian planners recognise the importance of presence, but deployments are still carefully calibrated, emphasising partnership over provocation. This reflects a clear strain of geopolitical pragmatism. New Delhi realises it is not a party to the regional disputes and avoids involvement in matters that do not directly affect its strategic interests.
While Indian policymakers acknowledge China’s propensity for coercive behaviour, they also recognise its significant military edge in the region. Indian naval strategists understand that the People’s Liberation Army Navy has developed formidable infrastructure on artificial islands and exercises effective control over key waterways. They know Beijing retains the capacity to impose costs on foreign navies operating in contested spaces.
Importantly, India and China have long sought to preserve a delicate balance in the Indo-Pacific. While rivalry persists — particularly along the Himalayan frontier and in the Indian Ocean — the two Asian powers have steered clear of actions in the maritime commons that could be construed as overt containment. The calculus is straightforward: by avoiding military posturing in each other’s near seas, both sides aim to keep their red lines intact. That logic has broadly held for the past decade, even as Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean has steadily expanded. Beijing’s growing footprint west of Malacca is a concern, but not yet a crisis. Crucially, China has refrained from challenging India in South Asia, where New Delhi’s strategic equities are strongest and its deterrent posture most credible.
Meanwhile, India’s defence relationship with the Philippines has grown significantly — most visibly through the sale of BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles — even as New Delhi has been careful to project itself as a credible security partner, not a China antagonist. With a substantial share of Indian trade passing through the Malacca Strait, New Delhi has largely framed its presence in terms of economics, connectivity, and regional goodwill. To be sure, should China cross certain thresholds — say, by militarising the Andaman Sea or establishing permanent military facilities in the Indian Ocean — India would almost certainly revisit its South China Sea posture. Until then, however, a strategic shift east of Malacca remains unlikely.
The recent sail with the Philippines is best seen as a gesture: One that signals India’s interest in regional stability and support for a partner under pressure, without upending its longstanding policy of cautious engagement in the South China Sea. It is a diplomatic message wrapped in maritime symbolism — a demonstration of solidarity, not a sabre rattled in warning.
The writer is a retired naval officer and former Head of the maritime policy initiative at ORF, New Delhi
