Written by Yanitha Meena Louis
In the lead-up to the much-awaited 47th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, the announcement from Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim that PM Narendra Modi would be attending the meet virtually was perplexing. Given PM Modi’s track record of attending most ASEAN-India Summits since he assumed office in 2014, observers, even at the start of the year, would have said that his physical attendance was never in doubt. While some quarters still contend that his virtual participation is just as impactful given the circumstances, PM Modi’s physical presence carries enough symbolic heft to leave a void when he chose not to travel to Kuala Lumpur.
PM Modi’s trip to Kuala Lumpur was supposed to, in many ways, solidify the progress made in Malaysia–India ties — especially after PM Anwar’s maiden visit to New Delhi last year, where bilateral relations were upgraded to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. After PM Modi’s visits to Brunei Darussalam, Singapore, and Laos at the end of 2024, it reinforced the belief that a much-needed Modi–Anwar Summit was imminent on the sidelines of ASEAN.
Despite the missed opportunity, PM Modi’s approach to the 22nd ASEAN-India Summit demonstrated a distinct intent to synergise the ambitions of India and ASEAN in a complex geopolitical landscape. It was notable that he cited the ASEAN Community Vision 2045 and the goal of Viksit Bharat 2047 as anchors for a shared future. He also lent further currency to India’s efforts in Southeast Asia by reiterating India’s continued efforts as a First Responder in times of crisis in the neighbourhood. At face value, this can be taken as a conscious and deliberate articulation of India’s intended long-term role in the region — a significant step for India–ASEAN ties.
PM Modi’s key announcements reflecting Malaysia’s ASEAN Chairmanship theme, “Inclusivity and Sustainability,” were thoughtful and built on past initiatives. They did not, however, follow the older format of introducing 10- or 12-point proposals and plans as in Indonesia in 2023 or Laos last year. The focus next year is decidedly on maritime cooperation, designated as the “ASEAN–India Year of Maritime Cooperation” — quite significant, considering that the Philippines will be the ASEAN Chair in 2026.
All said and done, it would be naive to think that an “optical” reinforcement is not necessary at this stage for ASEAN–India ties to complement the various initiatives announced. After all, optics, personal proclivities, and camaraderie form the bedrock of relations. In this context, a state visit by PM Modi to Malaysia and thereafter to the Philippines, even before the 49th Summit, would greatly reaffirm the value India accords to its ties with ASEAN.
Next, on the slow progress being made in the review of the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA), ASEAN and Indian policymakers must move beyond rhetoric and weigh minor short-term inconveniences against long-term gains. If India wishes to be a consistent First Responder, then it must be a holistic one in every sense of the word, beyond just “physical” disasters for Southeast Asia.
Track 1.5 discussions at the 1st India–ASEAN Strategic Dialogue, which took place just a week and a half before the ASEAN–India Summit, revealed that there is growing acknowledgement of India’s indispensable role in the region. ASEAN and India share similar norms and values but are still perhaps determining and internalising the value they have for each other. This must happen swiftly and purposefully to ensure continuity and reciprocity in ties, especially given the progress made thus far in a relationship spanning more than three decades.
The writer is an analyst at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia
