On March 20, Pakistan security forces thwarted a complex coordinated attack on Gwadar Port Authority Complex in a two-hour-long battle and claimed to have neutralised all eight militants. Two soldiers were killed in action. The Majeed Brigade of the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), claiming responsibility for the attack, stressed that their fighters had targeted Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Military Intelligence facilities. Less than two weeks ago, the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) ambushed a convoy of 10 military vehicles in the Kolwa town of Kech.
The Baloch insurgency in Pakistan has been gaining momentum for the past two years and insurgents can regularly breach the perimeter security of Pakistani military and paramilitary installations across Balochistan in bold, frontal attacks. The Gwadar incident is yet another big-ticket attack that points to the growing capability of armed Baloch groups. Meanwhile, the newly elected “hybrid” government in Pakistan seems to be following the decades-old policy of ruthless repression of Baloch populations, fuelling the insurgency to alarming levels.
Baloch armed groups, including the BLA, BLF, Baloch Nationalist Army (BNA), and the Baloch Republican Guard (BRG) created an operational umbrella alliance under the banner of Baloch Raaji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS) in 2018 to coordinate their actions on the ground. The BRAS have claimed over 612 attacks and over 600 casualties of armed forces in 2023, while the BLA alone has claimed over 247 attacks, including on 23 military installations and big attacks in Turbat and Gwadar. The BLA even briefly captured a facility in Quetta in 2023 and arrested and released troops after giving them a “warning”.
Apart from economic deprivation and lack of political freedom, the burning issues in Balochistan have been the forced disappearances of thousands of men and extrajudicial killings of many of those reported missing. The community has lodged several protests in the past. However, Since November last year, Balochistan has seen fresh public movement on the issue of forced disappearances. This was triggered by the “encounter” of a 24-year-old Baloch man, Balaach Mola Bakhsh. He had been missing since October. Due to public protests and on the basis of a court order, an FIR was registered against counter-terrorism officials, but no action was taken by law enforcement officials.
Mahrang Baloch, one of the most prominent leaders of the Baloch Yakjehti Committee, or Baloch Solidarity Committee, who had lost her own father in an extrajudicial killing became the face of women-led protests in Balochistan. The women’s group marched to Islamabad in December and staged a sit-in at the National Press Club. But, following repeated rough treatment by state actors, it called off the sit-in and returned to Quetta on January 23. In the middle of electioneering, the welcome rally for Mahrang Baloch and team was far bigger than any election rally by national parties. The Islamabad march by women has re-energised the issues in the minds of the population, civil society and armed groups.
The ill-treatment of women has led to a deadly round of violence by Baloch groups, who claimed over 92 small and big attacks between January 28 and February 6. The attacks included unprecedented mobilisation of over 380 fighters who took over control of Mach town and the surrounding areas for two days. They used 12 suicide bombers and claimed responsibility for 78 fatalities to troops in the Mach attacks alone. Calling it “revenge” for the torture of women folk, Baloch groups have now openly expressed readiness to “work with any nation against the common enemy for mutual benefit”.
Balochistan and the Gwadar port are immensely important for Pakistan, especially for the army that has taken on the responsibility of making the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and its end port, Gwadar, a success story for China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Chinese President Xi Jinping has always maintained that CPEC is a part of his “vision”. However, not just in Balochistan but also in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the forces have repeatedly failed to provide fool-proof security to the project for many years. Additionally, in February, after almost a decade, Pakistan approved work on the first phase of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline from the Pakistan-Iran border to Gwadar and has assured Iran of timely completion to avoid a huge penalty in arbitration.
The Chinese may, for now, continue holding the hand of the “all-weather ally” with respect to moving forward on CPEC and Gwadar port. However, in the larger scheme of things in the Indian Ocean region, given the grave security imperatives for Pakistan, the Gwadar port may not be able to compete with the Iranian port of Chabahar for business and trade.
Late last month, Pakistan Army Chief General Asim Munir blamed the Taliban regime for supporting the Baloch insurgency after repeatedly warning it against supporting the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) network. In January, Pakistan retaliated against Iranian airstrikes into Balochistan. Earlier this month, it mounted air strikes into Afghanistan, reportedly killing civilians while claiming the strikes were targeting the TTP. Apart from serious domestic troubles on security, Pakistan does not enjoy good relations with most of its neighbours at the moment. By continuing to point to the “foreign hand” for its own failings in securing the nation, the Pakistan army is an unlikely “partner of choice” for regional or global security considerations. The growing infrastructure for violence in Pakistan does not augur well for the region in the long run.
The writer is a security analyst and former Director General of Police
