Are India-China relations in a state of reset? Strategic circles have been rife with speculation since Prime Minister Narendra Modi travelled to Tianjin last month to attend the SCO Summit and met with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines. This was the second meeting in less than a year between the two leaders, who were not on eye-contact terms after the incidents at Galwan in Ladakh in early 2020. In October 2024, they met on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit at Kazan in Russia after a gap of four years. The meeting was more than an icebreaker — the two leaders had agreed to “prioritise” peace along the border.
At Tianjin, Modi and Xi went a step further to declare that India and China were not “rivals” but development partners. Several important changes happened between Kazan and Tianjin. The return of Donald Trump in the US and his subsequent tariff wars with a number of countries, including China and India, have created turmoil. Coming in the wake of the changed global scenario and the unexpected tensions between traditional friends — India and the US — the bonhomie between Modi and Xi is being interpreted variously.
It may be worthwhile to understand that, as a policy, India doesn’t look at its ties with any country through the prism of a third country. Efforts to restore normalcy between India and China should be seen from the perspective of India’s strategic autonomy. India always strove to build good, neighbourly relations with China. It views the relationship as stemming from a long history of religious and civilisational contacts — it’s much more than a 75-year-old diplomatic engagement.
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s overtures after Independence were a result of that thinking. Sadly, what India got in return was a war in 1962, which set the relationship back by several decades and destroyed popular goodwill. Yet, the Indian leadership continued its efforts to engage. Successive prime ministers extended the olive branch to China, ignoring past disappointments, believing that India’s gestures of goodwill would help improve bilateral relations. This continued despite China’s continued support to Pakistan and its blocking of India’s attempts at world forums to dismantle that country’s terror infrastructure. Border incursions became an almost everyday reality, with the Indian defence establishment recording over 600 “transgressions” — or border violations — between 2010 and 2013.
When leadership changes happened in both countries in 2013 and 2014, new hopes arose. PM Modi decided to invest in the relationship once again by going out of his way. With Xi, too, responding positively, the two leaders broke protocol during their first-ever meeting in Ahmedabad in 2014. The leaders began a new series of informal meetings — first at Wuhan in 2018 and later at Mamallapuram in India in 2019. Despite these sincere efforts, Galwan happened in June 2020, leading to the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers. In Indian public opinion, Galwan became the 1962 of the 21st century.
Now that Modi has taken the initiative once again, the Chinese leadership should get the message right. It has to decide whether it is willing to build a relationship between sovereign equals, understand and respect India’s sensibilities and respond appropriately, or look at ties as a sovereign-vassal relationship.
China prefers not to talk about Galwan. It insists that we should have a “new beginning” based on the Kazan and Tianjin spirit. How can there be a new beginning every time? How can the past incidents be brushed under the carpet in the name of a new beginning? The letter and spirit of Kazan and Tianjin was to manage the border peacefully. That requires greater military-to-military dialogue. After 2001, the militaries of the two countries have not had any such direct engagement, except the occasional commander-level talks at the border. It is time there were higher-level talks between the two.
On the border question, several outstanding issues like a detailed policy on patrolling, a control regime for military exercises, and an overall LAC control mechanism need to be mutually agreed upon. On its part, India has modified its border policy to “proactive diplomacy together with strong ground response preparedness”.
On the economic front, China should not make the mistake of assuming that India has become vulnerable after the US sanctions. China, too, faced 150 per cent US tariffs. But a call between Xi and Trump brought it down to 30 per cent. India, too, will resolve the matter, soon to mutual satisfaction. India’s China initiative is not because of any compulsion but based on conviction.
Beyond bilateral matters, there are issues pertaining to the region where the two countries have overlapping interests. In the last five years, China’s penetration into South Asia has grown substantially. It supports several countries with military aid. It also faces accusations of debt traps and corrupting leaders in some of those countries. The net result is acute instability in several of these countries. There is a need for some mechanism for the two countries to exchange notes on issues pertaining to the South Asian neighbourhood.
At the global level, India and China work together through platforms like BRICS and the SCO. India desires to build genuine multipolarity in the world, whereas China’s effort is seen by many as replacing American exceptionalism with Middle Kingdom supremacism. While India desires that global multilateralism be reformed to accommodate the needs and aspirations of all countries, China is busy with its own brand of multilateralism through initiatives like BRI, GCI, and GSI, offering them as a fait accompli to other nations.
For the new engagement between the two countries to succeed, it is important to address these issues sincerely. Trust can only be built by understanding India’s initiatives correctly.
The writer, president, India Foundation, is with the BJP. Views are personal
