India’s connection with Afghanistan is one of the oldest in South Asia. It began long before modern borders were invented. Yet, this civilisational bond has been tested again and again – by empire, partition, the Cold War, and today’s shifting geopolitics. The recent visit of Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to New Delhi in the second week of October was not just another diplomatic engagement. It reflected how old ties are being reworked in a new regional setting marked by uncertainty and change.
Trade and culture linked the Indian subcontinent and Afghanistan as far back as the Indus Valley Civilisation. Under Emperor Ashoka, the Mauryan Empire extended to Kandahar. His edicts, inscribed in Greek on Afghan rocks, show how these regions once formed part of a shared cultural world. The ancient land of Gandhara, covering parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan, was once a great centre of Buddhist art and learning. The Bamiyan Buddhas, destroyed by the Taliban in 2001, stood for over 1,500 years as witnesses to that shared past.
Islam arrived in the seventh century but did not break these ties. Afghan rulers continued to shape Indian history. The Ghaznavids, Ghurids, Lodis, and Mughals all crossed the passes to establish dynasties in Delhi. Babur ruled Kabul before founding the Mughal Empire in 1526.
British colonial rule changed this dynamic. Two Anglo-Afghan wars in the nineteenth century made Afghanistan a pawn in the Great Game between Britain and Russia. The 1893 Durand Line Agreement, which drew an artificial border through Pashtun lands, left behind one of the region’s most enduring disputes. Afghanistan never accepted this line as final – a position that continues to shape its tense relations with Pakistan.
Afghanistan shared deep sympathy with India’s freedom movement. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the ‘Frontier Gandhi’, led the Khudai Khidmatgar movement, mobilised Pashtuns for non-violent resistance and worked closely with the Indian National Congress.
After Partition, Afghanistan was the only country to vote against Pakistan’s entry into the United Nations. Kabul’s refusal to recognise the Durand Line reflected its sympathy for Pashtun autonomy and its disappointment that the North-West Frontier Province did not join Afghanistan.
Independent India and Afghanistan signed a Treaty of Friendship in 1949, uniting them in suspicion of Pakistan’s Western alliances. During the Cold War, both leaned toward Moscow. India saw the Soviet presence as a barrier against Pakistan-sponsored militancy and an assurance that Afghan soil would not be used for anti-India activities. Pakistan, meanwhile, became the “frontline state” for the US-Saudi-backed jihad.
When Soviet troops withdrew in 1989, Afghanistan slipped into chaos. India, which had invested in the old regime, found itself without influence. But with the Taliban capturing power in Kabul in 1996, New Delhi returned to the game. Alongside Iran and Russia, it supported the Northern Alliance led by Ahmad Shah Massoud.
This support reflected India’s strategic calculation that a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan would essentially extend Pakistani influence to India’s northwestern approaches. India feared that a Taliban Afghanistan would provide sanctuary and support for anti-India militant groups. Those fears were realised in 1999 when an Indian Airlines flight was hijacked to Kandahar.
Once the Taliban was removed from power in 2001, India emerged as one of Afghanistan’s biggest regional contributors. The $275-million Afghan-India Friendship Dam, formerly known as the Salma Dam, and the Zaranj-Delaram highway connecting Afghanistan to Iran’s Chabahar Port were symbols of this partnership.
But the 2008 Kabul embassy bombing, as well as assaults on Indian consulates, highlighted the peril of operating in an area where Pakistan’s intelligence network remained strong.
The US departure in August 2021 restored the Taliban to power. India closed its embassy and flew out its diplomats. Two decades of investment appeared to be lost overnight. Pakistan leaders rejoiced, confident their influence was intact. But the Taliban quickly let them down. For India, this provided a small but significant diplomatic window.
By 2025, both sides were experimenting with a new relationship. Afghanistan required partners to ease its economic difficulties. India wanted to regain its foothold through development, trade, and humanitarian activity.
Amir Khan Muttaqi’s visit to New Delhi marked the highest-level contact since 2021. India’s outreach to the Taliban is not a seal of approval but a pragmatic necessity. It is a response to unfolding realities. Afghanistan and India have been bound together for centuries by geography, commerce, religion, and culture. These ties have endured empire, id1eology and invasion. But they have also been influenced – sometimes distorted – by the politics of the time.
The road ahead remains uncertain. The track record of the Taliban when it comes to women’s rights and minorities is grim. Security risks persist. What, however, is certain is that the India-Afghanistan narrative is not yet finished. It has merely moved to a new chapter – one in which old bonds and new realities have to coexist.
The author is the Director of the MMAJ Academy of International Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi
