By Muqtedar Khan
Since Operation Sindoor, Pakistan has gained a diplomatic windfall of sorts. Its global image — long tied to instability, economic fragility, and regional isolation — appears to have undergone a rapid transformation. Western governments, Gulf monarchies, and Asian powers are once again treating Islamabad as a strategic partner. Multilateral institutions have become more accommodating, and US President Donald Trump now praises Pakistan’s leadership. He has hosted Field Marshal Asim Munir twice in the White House, and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has endeared himself to Trump by announcing his intention to nominate him for a Nobel Peace Prize a second time. More importantly, Trump included Pakistan at the big boys’ table, inviting it to play a critical role in the Gaza peace process.
What triggered this reversal of fortunes? Before Operation Sindoor, Pakistan’s influence in South Asia had waned, its economy was near collapse, and its ties with Gulf countries — once a reliable source of aid — had cooled dramatically. Despite historical, cultural and religious ties, Pakistan’s relevance and importance to the Gulf nations had receded as India’s strategic partnerships and trade relations with them became increasingly ascendant. Even China, Pakistan’s most consistent strategic partner, began expressing quiet unease over the future of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Growing insurgencies in Balochistan jeopardised the safety of Chinese engineers and investments, forcing Beijing to rethink its commitment. India, meanwhile, had successfully pursued a campaign to marginalise Pakistan in international forums such as the UN.
This began to change after Operation Sindoor. The military conflict spawned two other conflicts, a war of words and a war of diplomats. Pakistan took hits on the battlefield, but unexpectedly, it gained the upper hand in the war of narratives. India’s objectives were clear. It wanted to portray Pakistan as a sponsor of terrorism, isolate it internationally, and justify its military action. But the global response was more ambivalent than India had anticipated. Rather than uniting behind New Delhi’s position, most countries called for restraint and de-escalation. Major powers avoided taking sides. Turkey, Azerbaijan, and China openly voiced support for Pakistan — diplomatically, rhetorically, and materially.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi sent an all-party parliamentary delegation to several countries to present India’s case. The missions argued that Pakistan, which had long sponsored cross-border terrorism, was behind the Pahalgam attack, and that nations must speak out against terrorism and support India’s zero-tolerance policy toward it. At the same time, Pakistan dispatched a smaller team to the Middle East, Europe and the US to promote its version of events. Despite India’s larger outreach, Pakistan’s effort appeared more effective in shaping global opinion.
Even as the fighting raged, India attempted to block Pakistan’s bailout from the International Monetary Fund. The IMF disregarded India’s objections The decision set the tone for what would become a cascade of international endorsements for Pakistan. Within weeks, the World Bank announced a $40-billion loan package, the Asian Development Bank extended an $800-million credit line and Pakistan won election to a coveted UN Security Council seat.
What was intended to be Pakistan’s isolation had turned into its rehabilitation.
For years, Pakistan’s relationship with Arab monarchies had cooled, as India’s economic rise drew the Gulf’s attention. But after Operation Sindoor, regional perceptions seem to have shifted. Kuwait lifted visa restrictions that had been in place for nearly two decades. The United Arab Emirates followed suit and aid began flowing from Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states. China continued to shield Pakistan diplomatically, blocking attempts by India to re-list it on the FATF grey list. The most dramatic shift came from Saudi Arabia, which signed a mutual defence pact with Pakistan. Pakistan went from being marginal to pivotal as a defence partner to one of the Muslim world’s most important nations.
For India, the emerging US-Pakistan partnership should be especially troubling. India is working hard to label Islamabad as an enabler of terrorism while the US has on more than one occasion applauded Pakistan as a valued partner in counterterrorism. At the same time, New Delhi and Washington are not on the same page over trade, tariffs and the purchase of Russian oil.
Pakistan’s relations with Russia, too, are improving, as indicated by the recent acquisition of advanced jet engines for its JF-17 fighter jets. Pakistan, therefore, is in an enviable position — it enjoys good relations with all the major powers, the US, China and Russia. The once-clear strategic geometry of South Asia — with India aligned to the West and Pakistan to China — has become more fluid and unpredictable.
Whether this revival endures will depend on Islamabad’s ability to stabilise its economy and manage domestic unrest. Its inability to deal with the threats from insurgent groups such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and the Balochistan Liberation Army can easily undermine Pakistan’s recent diplomatic gains.
New Delhi aspires to play a major role in global governance but Pakistan’s revival will make it difficult for India to dominate South Asian geopolitics — the alignment of Pakistan and Bangladesh with China clearly outweighs the emerging India-Afghanistan nexus. At the same time, the growing friendship between the US and Pakistan presents challenges for India on the global stage.
The writer is professor of International Affairs at the University of Delaware and a senior nonresident fellow at the New Lines Institute
