India stands at a geopolitical crossroads. It must make difficult choices about where to take its relationship with Beijing, which is experiencing a detente; with Moscow, which is warm but under serious US pressure; and with Washington, which is in deep crisis.
Continued rapprochement with China is wise. Despite last October’s deal restoring border patrols, the disputed frontier remains fraught. The threat of future border provocations is real, even as Beijing continues to project power in India’s neighbourhood and maritime backyard. Fewer tensions with China make these challenges more manageable. Pursuing detente is also a prudent hedging strategy, because Washington’s future willingness to partner with New Delhi to counter Beijing is uncertain. The US President, after all, has signalled a desire to explore a detente with China.
Also, India, facing 50 per cent US tariffs, will naturally want to capitalise on Chinese markets. This, along with a potential new trade deal by year’s end with the EU — like the US, a top Indian export market — could help India blunt the US tariffs damage to some extent. But the economic rationale for more engagement with China goes beyond market access. More Chinese investment in critical and growing Indian sectors — from manufacturing to electric vehicles — could boost overall growth. India’s own chief economic adviser has called for increases in Chinese FDI. Fewer India-China tensions can reduce mistrust and create the diplomatic — and, in India, political — space needed to justify easing restrictions on new Chinese investments, which have been limited since the Ladakh conflict.
As for Russia, India doesn’t turn on its close friends, and few are closer than Moscow. Russian oil and arms imports are meant to bolster India’s economy and security, not a Russian war machine that New Delhi, through its repeated calls for peace, rejects. To pull back from Russia — especially under US pressure — would be politically unthinkable, and contrary to India’s core interests and foreign policy principles.
Then there’s the US. While some may argue Delhi must move quickly to avert a complete collapse in ties, now may not be the right time. A multifaceted partnership is facing a multifaceted crisis. If trade talks resume, Washington would likely demand further concessions from India that New Delhi, for political reasons, would be hard pressed to make. New proposed Trump administration immigration rules and concerns about possible changes to the H1-B visa programme threaten to sour people-to-people ties. Even the partnership’s strategic soundness has come into question, as India, and possibly the US, look to ease tensions with Beijing. And the much-ballyhooed Narendra Modi-Donald Trump bromance is on the rocks.
There’s no immediate off-ramp in sight. Given how tense ties are, it’s likely too soon to expect a Modi-Trump meeting at the UNGA this month, if Modi even travels to New York. A better opportunity would be a Trump visit to India this fall for the Quad summit — but he reportedly won’t be making the trip. There’s always the option of simply picking up the phone to clear the air. But recent reports suggest Trump has tried that, to no avail. Their last call, back in June, didn’t go well.
Some may say, “It’s time to move on. We could never trust the US anyway.” But that would be a big mistake. Certainly, with relations at an impasse and with the US having squandered so much goodwill, the coming weeks could be rough. In a worst-case scenario, cooperation on strategic and defence issues, which requires especially high levels of trust, could even grind to a halt.
But Delhi simply can’t afford to lose the US. India can’t easily replace its largest export market and third-largest investor. Additionally, India’s detente with China can only go so far. The LAC remains a source of mistrust. And, at a time of severe India-Pakistan tensions, China’s alliance with Pakistan remains rock solid. During the next India-Pakistan conflict, Pakistan could well use Chinese weaponry again. Like India, the US — despite Trump’s signalling — isn’t about to fully recalibrate relations with Beijing. Consequently, partnership with Washington remains essential — from intelligence-sharing that preempts Chinese border incursions, to tech collaborations meant to reduce Chinese dominance of global supply chains.
Admittedly, the most propitious moment to try to patch up ties could still be far off. US officials appear content to keep insulting India. Confidence-building measures — even a partial trade deal — remain elusive. And Russia is unlikely to end its war anytime soon.
But that’s okay. India’s strategic autonomy, which gives it maximum policy choices and flexibility, is made for moments like these. In the meantime, despite everything, the relationship has continued to limp along. The two sides recently launched a joint satellite. US law enforcement has apprehended Khalistan supporters. There were even 2+2 talks last month.
Lord Palmerston famously said that there are no permanent friends, only permanent interests. And yet, friends lost can be friends regained.
Here, history is instructive. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, US-India ties flourished, with the two united in their desire to counter China (sound familiar?). 1971 changed everything — until the partnership reconstituted itself several decades later.
This time around, such a rapprochement need not take nearly as long. US-India ties may be experiencing their worst crisis in the 20 years of the current strategic partnership. But the relationship is still in much better shape than it was in the 1970s and 1980s. For now, India has the luxury of being able to wait out the US-India crisis while looking to repair relations when the timing is right — even as it pursues an ongoing detente with Beijing, and maintains its ties with Russia. It’s all about keeping calm, carrying on, and playing a long game.
The writer is a Washington DC-based South Asia analyst and columnist for Foreign Policy magazine
