Written by Siddhant Bajpai
In the first week of July, multiple reports stated that the Indian government is considering proposals to modify the Agnipath scheme. The scheme deals with recruitment at non-officer levels in all three services of the Indian armed forces and was introduced in June 2022. Apart from protests staged by aspirants, several veterans had then criticised the government for tinkering with national security and rolling out the scheme hastily without enough public deliberation.
The latest development follows reports of several recruits (Agniveers) from the first batch leaving the training prematurely for various reasons, including having found better jobs. The two key modifications under consideration are: Increasing the permanent retention quota from 25 per cent to 50 per cent after four years of training; raising the maximum age limit of recruitment from 21 to 23 years.
The ongoing deliberations suggest that the government is considering adjustments to be operationally prepared to deal with national security challenges. News reports cite the current and projected vacancies (non-technical and technical) in the forces as the key reason behind the government’s rethink. The mounting challenges at the territorial front with China, teething problems with the existing provisions of the Agnipath scheme, and slow-paced modernisation seem to have pushed the government to urgently address personnel shortages in the armed forces.
The three services currently face a shortfall of approximately 1,55,000 personnel, with the Army having the highest number of vacancies at 1,36,000. More than 90 per cent of these are of non-officer combat ranks that the Agnipath scheme aims to fill. Due to the pandemic, vacancies experienced a significant increase in 2020 and 2021 because only 30 per cent of the planned recruitments could be completed during this period. In such a situation, letting go of 75 per cent of the trained recruits after four years of service would have been a wasteful expenditure.
Projected requirements are unlikely to decrease in the short to medium term due to two significant factors.
First, the evolving threat perception along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) since 2020 has necessitated increased force levels along territorial borders. The breakdown of “peace and tranquillity” at the borders with China means India now needs higher force levels to keep a check on China, Pakistan, and insurgents in Kashmir. This mismatch is evident because of the reorientation of some of the Rashtriya Rifles (RR) units, previously involved in counterinsurgency operations, toward the China front. The government is now deploying more paramilitary personnel (CRPF) in Kashmir to replace army units. Additionally, it cannot overlook emerging security challenges, such as the current Manipur crisis, where the army serves as the go-to force for managing the situation.
Second, India’s slow-paced military modernisation limits opportunities to reduce personnel without affecting the overall capabilities of the armed forces. Improving the teeth-to-tail ratio involves not only reducing personnel but also replacing them with intelligent machines, automation, and advanced technologies — a crucial part of the modernisation process, as demonstrated by other major militaries such as the PLA.
Moreover, the mid-course exits in the training phase of the first batch of the Agnipath recruits show that the current provisions may have reduced the appeal of the armed forces as an employment avenue. Public service in the Indian armed forces has traditionally provided economic security, social prestige, and self-fulfilment for citizens. But now, with the provision of only 25 per cent retention, the cognitive bias of loss aversion would make a candidate more aware of the 75 per cent likelihood of failure and the consequent loss of economic security and social reputation rather than the 25 per cent of success. Increasing the permanent retention rate to 50 per cent will likely address this issue to an extent.
If approved, the modifications will be a tacit acknowledgement of the problems in the scheme’s conception. It did not address the requirements of the workforce in the short to medium term and prioritised the long-term objective of reducing costs on salaries and pensions.
Faced with the triple threats of China, Pakistan, and insurgents, the government’s proposals indicate a recognition of the critical importance of maintaining strong numerical strength (addressing personnel shortages) in the armed forces, particularly the Army. This emphasis on the workforce comes in light of pandemic-induced shortfalls, unpredictability at the LAC, new recruits dropping out from the training, and the slow progress in automation and technology adoption.
By raising the age limit and permanent retention quota to 50 per cent, the government expects to attract committed and skilled individuals, ensure the armed forces’ operational readiness and achieve a balanced mix of youthful enthusiasm and experience. The modifications under consideration, if approved, will be a welcome course correction by the government to ensure that the armed forces can effectively downsize and modernise over time without compromising their overall operational readiness.
The writer is a researcher at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research (CSDR), New Delhi. His research focuses on security studies, great power politics, and India’s foreign policy
