[related-post]
The sad truth, however, is that India’s ambitions haven’t quite been matched by its ability to realise them: past transformational projects, though more modest in scale, are yet to get off the ground. The Kaladan multimodal transport project, which was supposed to link the Northeastern states to Myanmar’s Sittwe port, was supposed to have been operational by 2013. The project is likely to take years to be completed, though. Meanwhile, the cost has ballooned from the Rs 535 crore estimated when it was announced in 2008 to Rs 2,904 crore. There are dozens of similar examples. The India-US nuclear deal was meant to usher in a new age of energy production, but not a single megawatt has yet been generated. In many parts of the world, India has developed a reputation for talking big, but failing to deliver.
The fate of the Chabahar project will depend on successive governments showing sustained resolve in the face of geopolitical hurdles. The potential spoilers are several. For one, relations between Tehran and the West, though vastly improved, remain fraught, with many hardliners in Iran believing the country was short-changed in the nuclear deal that paved the way for an end to sanctions. That, potentially, could lead to tensions — as could differences over Iran’s role in Syria and Afghanistan. Indian governments will also have to incentivise private corporations for using the Iranian route to transit goods to Central Asia, rather than the fast, cheap networks they now use through Singapore and China. Finally, the project can only be successful if Indian manufacturing is globally competitive — no small ask at present. These hurdles can, and must, be overcome. The agreements signed this week are a beginning.
