As the nuclear talks resume,the P5+1 should note that its failure earlier this month has given hardliners in Iran an opportunity to look for an excuse to quit.
After years of discussion,the major European powers and the United States had finally come up with a promising solution to deal with Irans worrisome nuclear programme. Unfortunately,France blocked the first stage of a nuclear deal with Iran that had support from the US,most of the European countries,Russia and China. French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius said he was preventing his allies from falling into the Iranian trap. According to Fabius,the agreement between Iran and the P5+1 (the US,UK,France,China,Russia,and Germany) did not directly and openly address the Arak heavy water reactor.
It goes without saying that Irans ability to continue with the construction of the Arak nuclear plant is a matter of strategic worry for Israel. As a result,the French diplomatic shift in the nuclear negotiations with Iran clearly echoes the bitter attacks on the negotiating process made earlier by Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu.
On the other hand,despite the mild optimism expressed by the US and Iran after the end of the first round of talks in Geneva,the international media reported the blamegame between the two parties. However,the real blame is coming not only from Israel and Saudi Arabia who have a chance to mobilise against what they consider a failed deal but also from hardliners in Iran,who are now looking for an excuse to quit the negotiations and blame President Hassan Rouhanis administration.
This is not the first time the key parties to Irans nuclear issue have fumbled an opportunity to reach a deal. But as it appears,there is more to the Iran and the P5+1 talks than just a deal on the Iranian nuclear problem. No doubt,all countries involved want to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapons capability,but a new Middle East geostrategic balance is also at play. One of the most commonly cited dangers associated with the post-Arab Spring Middle East is the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran and a widespread development of nuclear weapons by other Islamic states in the Middle East. Historically speaking,reactive proliferation has never happened in the Middle East. But in the context of a post-Arab Spring Middle East and the Saudi and Israeli disapproval of US policies in the region particularly in light of the Obama administrations lack of commitment to Saudi security and its apparent weakness to attack and overthrow the pro-Iranian Assad regime in Syria Saudi leaders fear that nuclear capabilities would empower Tehran to threaten the Persian Gulf region and enable Irans hegemonic ambitions.
We should not forget that the Saudis have long viewed the Islamic Republic of Iran as a regional rival and Tehran has become increasingly central to Riyadhs strategic planning since 1979. As a result,Israel is not the only country in the Middle East to consider Iran its principal geopolitical foe.
As for Iran,the new series of talks on its nuclear armament capabilities are an opportunity to increase its regional influence by striking a deal that lifts economic and financial sanctions,while allowing Tehran to save face by keeping a significant portion of its nuclear programme. As for the US,a nuclear deal will help Washington to reduce diplomatic tensions with Tehran and lessen its dependence on the Saudis and Israelis. As a result,this is the best time for the French government to reformulate and consolidate its existing alliances with Israel and Saudi Arabia,and perhaps find a way to attract Saudi investments in France. As for Netanyahus government,by taking an all-or-nothing approach,it will be left with only two options should the negotiations end in failure: living with a nuclear Iran,or a military strike. Neither of which,in the long run,is a particularly advantageous solution for Israel.
Therefore,it is as yet unclear whether a final agreement with Iran will be limited to the nuclear programme or also concern Irans support for the Hezbollah and Hamas and its role in Syria and Iraq. Another question that remains is whether the US and the major European powers would agree to completely lift sanctions if Iran agreed to make major concessions on the nuclear issue.
Assuredly,the move by the US Congress to add more sanctions at this crucial point in the negotiations will not only seriously jeopardise the fate of the nuclear talks but also perhaps stop the process of normalisation of relations with Tehran. If Irans Supreme Leader,Ayatollah Khamenei,and the Revolutionary Guards arrive at the conclusion that the US is not interested in reaching an agreement and that it is using the negotiations only to stall,while sanctions inflict additional economic damage on Iran,Rouhanis efforts to settle the decade-old nuclear dispute could easily come to an end.
Most importantly,Irans decision to join the concert of nations rather than being a politically isolated pariah would certainly suffer from a were next factor that could dominate Iranian political views. As such,when the Iranian and P5+1 diplomats reassemble in Geneva on Wednesday,November 20,they will have to expect scepticism to emerge on both sides. The reason is simple: even if the old wounds heal easily,it is always difficult to turn the possible into the actual.
The writer is Noor-York Chair in Islamic Studies,York University,Toronto.
