By Udayan Das
The recent visit of Prime Minister Modi to Male marks a significant turnaround in India-Maldives relations. While the two states held wide-ranging talks on cooperation across sectors, it was less than two years back that President Muizzu won elections on an emotive ‘India out’ campaign. However, Delhi’s consistent efforts since then, primarily in the field of developmental assistance, allowed it to regain a firm ground in the island nation.
Has India managed to turn the Maldives away from the Chinese orbit? Is this “reset” assuring of the Maldives’ reliability? These are difficult questions to answer. While the upswing in ties is a welcome shift for New Delhi, it cannot get complacent about the region. South Asia hasn’t changed much and India’s longstanding concerns still remain.
India’s size and pre-eminence looms large in the region and the asymmetry makes it inevitable for the smaller neighbours to invite external intervention. Small states feel threatened and since they can’t match up to a stronger neighbour by themselves, they borrow support to counter and deter an impending or a possible threat and develop alternatives to avoid overdependency in matters of aid and trade. India’s identity linkages and episodic involvement in domestic affairs further complicates its relations with the small states. They find it much easier to deal with external actors who are comparatively distant and agnostic. For reasons of structure and identity, India will never be able to rule out influential extra-regional actors when configuring its South Asia policy.
It would be a folly for India to expect allegiance in exchange of developmental assistance from its smaller neighbours. For instance, the Maldives reaching out to India should not be seen as a rejection of China. India’s support to Sri Lanka after its financial crisis has worked well for bilateral relations and yet, it would be immature to assume that Colombo would snap ties with Beijing. Every state has the prerogative of autonomy in foreign affairs. When looked at from the small state’s perspective, the region is also much more than the false dichotomy of “India’s gain is China’s loss” and vice versa.
India’s approach to South Asia oscillates between contrasting visions of alarmism and generosity. At one end, it believes in peace through strength. This yearning for military strength has legitimate roots as neighbouring states in the past have often fanned insurgencies into India. The Chinese foothold in the region has multiplied India’s fears of encirclement. However, this view has alarmist tendencies for three reasons. First, no South Asian state is capable of being an impending threat to India. Second, the probable low-intensity punctures can be assuaged through the fear of retaliation or diplomacy. Thirdly, despite Chinese forays, small states remain wary of turning their territories into arenas of big-power contestation. Rather, the show of strength might end up being counterproductive by raising insecurities against the bigger state.
The other approach advocates for peace through generosity. The Gujral Doctrine is its most articulate exposition where India does not expect reciprocal relations with its smaller neighbours and is ready to provide benefits in good faith and trust. However, this policy is difficult to sustain for two reasons. First, a long-term policy of conceding unilateral benefits is likely to cement frustration as big states are naturally more inclined to reap advantages commensurate with their structure and size. Secondly, India has serious deficits in capacity and service delivery in providing one-way benefits to the South Asian states. The challenge is to find a pragmatic path amidst the South Asian quagmire.
A pragmatic South Asia policy starts with five aspects. First, New Delhi has to work with whoever is in power in the regional states to ensure stability of relations. Learning from the lessons of Dhaka, it cannot be seen or identified with a regime, political party or personality.
Second, it should have mutual arrangements of security with the smaller South Asian states where the other state’s territory is not used to advance any security threats. The presence of China does not automatically compromise this arrangement. Again, the better lessons of Dhaka show during the Hasina regime, security ties developed with Delhi despite Dhaka and Beijing getting closer.
Thirdly, India should initiate economic integration and connectivity wherever it can be mutually beneficial and feasible. This does not mean that being the bigger state it has to provide unilaterally unsustainable benefits or cooperate in all avenues. It can take the lead in selective and preferential areas where it can use the arrangement to its advantage and simultaneously provide incentives to smaller states.
Fourthly, it has to carefully navigate between assisting but not intervening in these states. Sri Lanka and now the Maldives are showing that India has performed well in this part.
Finally, India has to work on its advantages of socio-cultural affinities and enhance people-to-people linkages. It enjoys connections of kinship, language, culture and proximity which could translate into educational, medical and tourism ties. India’s heft in South Asia would grow if its society and polity are more accepting and inclusive of South Asian communities.
India’s approach in South Asia has to be accepting of the complications of structural asymmetry and the presence of extra regional actors. This needs an ever-adapting pragmatic approach, and not occasional resets, that stays clear of alarmism and rhetoric. There is no one-time formula for India to maintain functional ties with neighbours but rather an everyday recipe.
The writer teaches at the Department of Political Science, St. Xavier’s College (Autonomous), Kolkata and a Visiting Fellow at Asian Confluence, Shillong
