Kargil Vijay Diwas is celebrated on July 26 every year to commemorate India’s victory in the Kargil conflict. The soldiers who fought the battles are, rightfully, remembered and their valour praised. Since it was a border clash, or more accurately, along the Line of Control (LoC) — the enemy had invaded and occupied territory on our side of the LoC — eviction by action on the ground in conjunction with operations from the air, took precedence. It is, therefore, no surprise that the actions of the Army with occasional mentions of the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) contributions have been recalled and celebrated. Most people are unaware of the role that the Indian Navy played in the conflict.
Amongst the three forms of military power — land, maritime and air — the Air Force can launch into operations fastest, with the Navy a close second. Some naval ships are always at sea, engaged in a variety of missions. One of the most significant features of navies is that, unlike land and air power, they are not constrained to remain within territorial limits or airspace even in peacetime. Thus, they have the advantage of being at or near potential hotspots. In addition, being in international waters allows them to seamlessly transition into their warfighting role, if necessary.
It was this inherent flexibility that the Indian Navy (IN) exploited during the Kargil conflict. First, it shifted the location of its annual exercises from the Eastern seaboard to the Western one. This entailed warships from its Eastern Fleet sailing into the Arabian Sea. While the nation, media and much of the international community were focused on Kargil, the Navy was in business. It was ready for any eventuality and launched “Operation Talwar”.
Operation Talwar involved protective activities such as bolstering our coastal defences and jointly conducting maritime patrols along with agencies such as the Coast Guard, Customs and police. Warfighting assets such as ships, submarines and aircraft fully armed were deployed. This was an important element of the operation that signalled our serious intent to the enemy. In addition, the Navy was also engaged in ascertaining the dispositions of enemy warships and submarines that could be a threat to their own ships. This was done through enhanced surveillance of the Gujarat/Saurashtra coast. Maritime Reconnaissance (MR) aircraft played a huge role in this. They undertook the protection and escorting of their own high-value merchant ships. Special steps were taken by the Navy in tandem with the IAF to protect Bombay High.
As the tempo of operations in Kargil increased, so too did naval activities at sea. The IN resorted to aggressive patrolling in the Arabian Sea. In a classic example of “gunboat diplomacy”, at one point over 30 IN ships were operating just 13 nautical miles (24 kilometres) outside Karachi harbour – that is, less than 2 km from Pakistan’s territorial waters. The Saudi Gazette reported that the IN was preparing for a naval blockade. The Pakistan Navy (PN), meanwhile, had also commenced MR sorties to ascertain the location and strength of Indian naval forces. To its horror, the PN realised this was no “Fleet Review” by the IN but a clear indicator of the destruction it could cause to Pakistan if challenged. Unlike its counterparts on land, the PN was prudent and went into a defensive mode, warning its vessels to “keep well clear of IN ships”. Pakistani oil tankers and major warships were relocated further west from Karachi to the Makran coast to protect against a sudden attack by India. The remaining Pakistani warships in Karachi were also ordered not to leave the port to avoid direct confrontation with Indian ships. This was a great psychological victory for India. Attempts by friends of Pakistan to supply it with arms were also thwarted. In one such operation, the Navy intercepted a North Korean cargo ship carrying missile spare parts (speculated to be from China) for Pakistan. Since India’s lone aircraft carrier, INS Virat was under refit at the time, the Navy undertook trials of the Sea Harrier fighter aircraft for operations from container ships.
The Navy’s actions, however, were not confined to the seas only. Its Electronic Warfare (EW) aircraft operated along the LoC as a force multiplier to the air operations there. India’s special hydrographic survey teams were embedded with the artillery units of the Army to pinpoint enemy gun locations.
Seen from a larger perspective, despite the IN not having to resort to kinetic action, such was the impact of Operation Talwar that Pakistan was literally squeezed from the sea. The unofficial “blockade-like situation”, and its dependence on sea for its imports meant that the noose was tightening around Pakistan. It was not so much a question of “if” but rather “when” would it capitulate. The IN was ready to open the maritime front, in which it held a significant advantage. Alongside the successive defeats that Pakistan was facing in the Himalayan heights, the writing on the wall was clear. Then Pakistan Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, who was in a hopeless position, begged for peace. Sharif later disclosed that Pakistan was left with only six days of fuel if a full-fledged war broke out.
Operation Talwar was a classic example of successful coercive diplomacy in the Kargil conflict. The decisive role of air and maritime power in such a crisis is clear. Many useful lessons should have emerged for our strategic community but were unfortunately forgotten a little over two years later during Operation Parakram. Our war-fighting platforms in the air and maritime domains have the inherent flexibility, lethality and reach that can best ensure deterrence, coercion and compel the adversary. Operation Talwar proved once again that credible maritime power can effectively safeguard national interests.
Twenty-four years after the Kargil conflict, our threats in the maritime domain have only increased. Both the Chinese and Pakistani navies have expanded significantly. Chinese naval presence in and around the Arabian Sea is more frequent. Its naval base in Djibouti and possible use of Gwadar port make the PLA Navy a clear and present danger. The only way to counter the Chinese acting singly or in collusion with Pakistan is to significantly enhance our naval power in all three dimensions — surface, air and sub-surface. This calls for the nation in general, and our strategic community in particular, to overcome its traditional “sea blindness”.
The writer served in the Indian Air Force. Views expressed are personal
