One of the most significant developments in recent years has been the formation of the so-called “alliance without limits” between Moscow and Beijing. Announced by Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping in February 2022, just before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, this alliance emphasises their commitment to strategic cooperation across security, economic, and political domains, without restrictions on their collaboration.
While strategic ties between Moscow and Beijing have strengthened since the early 2000s, the February 2022 declaration marked an unprecedented level of anti-American solidarity. A year later, Xi remarked on the historic changes he was setting in motion with Putin: “Right now there are changes — the likes of which we haven’t seen for 100 years — and we are the ones driving these changes together.” The conviction that the US-dominated world order is crumbling has been a long-held belief for both leaders, particularly since the 2008 global financial crisis, fuelled by a surge of “declinist” literature in America and apparent political dysfunction during the Obama and Trump administrations.
The growing global interest in BRICS and the perceived rise of the Global South seemed to confirm the decline of the US-led international system. However, these assessments of American decline appear a lot less convincing today. The US economy has shown remarkable resilience, outpacing both the European Union and China in growth and technological innovation. The US continues to attract significant investment, maintaining a dynamic business environment, while Europe faces structural challenges such as declining population, high unemployment, and slower economic growth. China’s economy, though still growing, is decelerating due to demographic shifts, rising debt, and trade tensions.
The prospect of China overtaking the US in GDP terms now seems unlikely in the near term. Projections for 2024 estimate the US GDP at $29 trillion, compared to China’s $19 trillion and the Eurozone’s $16 trillion, with Russia lagging at around $2.5 trillion.
With America rebounding as an economic power, the return of Trump will impart vigorous new political will to Washington in challenging Sino-Russian ambitions for a post-Western order. Although the Sino-Russian alliance appears positioned to challenge the US across Europe, the Middle East and Asia, their coordinated efforts have not yielded the expected results. Instead, they have prompted a reassessment of US priorities in these regions.
What began as Russia’s brief “special military operation” in Ukraine is approaching its third year. Despite some recent territorial gains in eastern Ukraine, Russia has suffered significant losses in personnel and resources; its political and economic position in Europe has taken a big dent. It seems increasingly unrealistic to believe Russia will emerge stronger from this conflict. As a hard-boiled realist, President Putin may have less inhibitions than his supporters in recognising the necessity of a reasonable settlement with the West.
In the Middle East, Iran, a key partner in the Sino-Russian alliance, is now on the defensive. Iranian proxies in Gaza and Lebanon have suffered setbacks, and Bashar al-Assad has fled to Moscow for refuge. Israel has battered Iran’s much-feared “axis of resistance”. The narrative has shifted from Iran’s ambition to overthrow US dominance to concerns about the survival of the Islamic Republic amid significant adversity.
In Asia, Beijing’s efforts to displace the US and assert dominance have suffered setbacks. The US has revitalised its alliances, formed new partnerships, and established institutions like the Quad and AUKUS. Trump is poised to intensify economic pressures on China, which, coupled with its slowing economy, will force Beijing to reconsider its strategies towards its neighbours and Washington. Engaging the US in bilateral negotiations has always been part of China’s strategy and may now acquire a new urgency.
Within the Republican foreign policy establishment, there are strong sentiments advocating an emphasis on countering China in Asia rather than expending valuable military resources in Ukraine. Some suggest a deal with Putin on Ukraine. During his presidential campaign, Trump frequently spoke of “un-uniting” Russia and China and referred to the natural contradictions between these neighbouring powers. His nominee for national security adviser, Mike Waltz, has proposed strategies to achieve this goal in an article published last month in The Economist.
A stronger America, led by Trump, wants to tempt both Russia and China into seeking separate agreements with Washington. This dynamic might allow Trump to exploit divisions between Moscow and Beijing. However, sceptics question the feasibility of this approach, pointing to the deepening economic ties and shared interests of Moscow and Beijing in countering the West. To be sure, there is continuing anti-American bravado in both Moscow and Beijing. Nonetheless, it is realistic to assume both Putin and Xi will prioritise their bilateral interests with the US over the building of a unified front against Washington.
It will be intriguing to see which of the two leaders — Putin or Xi — will be the first to betray the “alliance without limits.” Betrayal is inherent in statecraft, where self-interest often supersedes alliance commitments. The ancient text “Mitrabhedam” from the Panchatantra explores the complexities of friendship, trust and betrayal in the relations between sovereigns. Regardless of the outcome, Trump will undoubtedly attempt to fracture the Russia-China alliance.
Historically, Russia and China have oscillated between alignment and betrayal over the past eight decades. In the 1950s, they were ideological allies against American imperialism, but by the 1970s, both sought separate deals with the US, accusing each other of betrayal. By the late 1990s, they had rekindled their partnership to counter Washington.
The question remains: Does Trump possess the diplomatic acumen to divide the alliance between Russia and China? Delhi is not in a position to influence the outcome of the new efforts by Trump to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing. Any deal that the US might want to make with Russia or China will involve the resolution of many complex issues. But does Delhi have a preference? Yes, of course! India would be pleased to see a reconciliation between Moscow and Washington on European security issues. That will make it easier to construct a “multipolar Asia”. But India has no reason to want a US-China deal that might produce a “bipolar Asia”.
The writer is contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express. Views are personal.
