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How the Tenth Schedule regulates political defections

The 52nd Constitutional Amendment introduced the anti-defection law through the Tenth Schedule in 1985 to curb political defections. More than four decades later, why does the law continue to generate intense political and constitutional debates? See infographics for key insights.

anti-defection law, political defections, India

The Anti-Defection law applies to both members of Parliament and state legislatures. (Representational Image)

8 min readNew DelhiJun 4, 2026 12:11 PM IST First published on: Jun 2, 2026 at 07:06 PM IST

— Akanksha Sharma

In 1967, “a Haryana MLA Gaya Lal changed his party thrice within the same day”, as per PRS Legislative Research. The infamous episode popularised the phrase ‘Aya Ram, Gaya Ram’ in Indian politics to describe turncoats and defections. The following decades saw frequent defections, horse-trading, and the collapse of elected governments.

But defection is not just a matter of changing a party. It involves questions of political morality, judicial review, constitutional governance, legislative autonomy, and deliberative democracy. How does the Anti-Defection Law seek to address these issues?

Rationale behind the anti-defection law

The 52nd Constitutional Amendment introduced the anti-defection law through the Tenth Schedule in 1985 to curb political defections. In his book Anti-Defection Law and Parliamentary Privileges (1993), constitutional expert Subhash C Kashyap describes defection as the “abandonment of loyalty, duty or principle, or of one’s leader or cause.”

The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act stated: “The evil of political defections has been a matter of national concern. If it is not combated, it is likely to undermine the very foundation of our democracy and the principles which sustain it.”

The Tenth Schedule, therefore, aimed at establishing constitutional mechanisms to discourage such unprincipled practices, protect the stability of government, and preserve the integrity of the electoral mandate.

India's Anti-Defection Law — Explained

CONSTITUTION — TENTH SCHEDULE

When can a legislator be disqualified? Who decides? And what have the courts said? Three key dimensions of the Anti-Defection Law, introduced in 1985 to curb political horse-trading.

When is it defection? The Speaker's role Courts step in

THE TENTH SCHEDULE

Four grounds for disqualification

Under the Anti-Defection Law, a legislator — whether an MP or state MLA — can be disqualified on any of the following grounds. The law applies to both Parliament and state legislatures.

①

Voluntarily gives up party membership

Need not file a formal resignation — the Supreme Court ruled in Ravi S Naik (1994) that conduct alone, such as holding positions in another party, can constitute voluntary exit.

②

Votes or abstains against party direction

If a member votes contrary to their party whip without prior permission, and the party does not condone the act within 15 days, disqualification follows.

③

Independent joins a party post-election

An independently elected member who joins any political party after winning their seat is liable to be disqualified.

④

Nominated member joins a party

A nominated member must not join any political party after six months of taking their seat in the House.

The one exception: merger

EXCEPTION TO DISQUALIFICATION

Two-thirds merger is protected — but splitting is not

A legislator escapes disqualification if at least two-thirds of their party's legislators agree to merge with another party. The original law also allowed a one-third "split" exemption, but this was widely abused for mass defections. The 91st Constitutional Amendment (2003) removed the split exception entirely. The same amendment also barred defectors from holding ministerial offices until they are re-elected.

PARA 6(1) — TENTH SCHEDULE

The Speaker decides — but is the Speaker neutral?

The Tenth Schedule vests the power to decide disqualification petitions in the Presiding Officer — the Speaker of the Lok Sabha or the state Assembly, or the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha. Their decision was originally declared final, reflecting constitutional faith in the Speaker as an impartial authority above party lines.

⚖

Sole authority on disqualification

Only the Speaker (or Chairman in the Rajya Sabha) can decide whether a legislator has defected and must be disqualified. No other body has original jurisdiction.

◆

Neutrality concerns in practice

Speakers are typically elected members of the ruling party. Allegations of political bias — particularly in deciding petitions against their own party's rivals — have repeatedly raised questions about institutional independence.

★

Timing as a political tool

Speakers have been accused of deliberately delaying decisions on disqualification petitions — keeping legislators in limbo and allowing governments to survive floor tests. This timing question prompted direct Supreme Court intervention.

JUDICIAL EVOLUTION

From "no review" to a three-month deadline

The Tenth Schedule originally barred courts from reviewing the Speaker's decisions. The Supreme Court has since dismantled that shield through a series of landmark rulings spanning three decades.

1992 — Kihoto Hollohan vs Zachillhu

Judicial review restored. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Anti-Defection Law but struck down the bar on judicial review. The court held that the Speaker acts as a Tribunal under the Tenth Schedule, and judicial review is part of the basic structure of the Constitution — it cannot be bypassed.

1994 — Ravi S Naik vs Union of India

Conduct can equal defection. The court ruled that a formal resignation from a party is not necessary for disqualification. An inference of voluntary exit can be drawn from a legislator's conduct — such as joining positions in a rival party — even without a written resignation.

2016 — Nabam Rebia vs Deputy Speaker

Speaker cannot act under a cloud. The court held that a Speaker facing a pending notice of removal cannot decide on disqualification petitions. This ruling significantly constrained the Speaker's power during moments of political crisis — the very moments when defection cases most commonly arise.

2020 — Keisham Meghachandra Singh vs Speaker, Manipur

Three-month deadline recommended. The court recommended that Speakers ordinarily decide disqualification petitions within three months. The ruling acknowledged that prolonged inaction on petitions had become a mechanism to subvert the Anti-Defection Law itself.

Prelude to the enactment of the law

The period between 1967 and 1971 is usually referred to as the “Era of Instability”, during which 45 governments were formed and collapsed across various states because of frequent defections by legislators.

Following the decline of one-party dominance after the 1967 general elections, defection became a strategic tool to capture or topple governments. Legislators often shifted their allegiance, not necessarily because of ideological disagreement, but to secure ministerial offices or other material benefits. The resulting defections brought unprecedented political instability and weakened public faith in representative democracy.

In this context, the Y B Chavan Committee on Defections (1969) documented the extent of the problem and recommended several measures to address it. The committee defined defection as the voluntary giving up of allegiance to a political party on whose symbol a legislator had been elected, except when such action resulted from a decision of the party.

Later, the Anti-Defection law was envisaged as a mechanism to ensure that elected representatives remain accountable to the political mandate on which they were elected. To achieve this objective, the law specifies grounds on which legislators may be disqualified for defection.

What constitutes defection under the Tenth Schedule

The Anti-Defection law applies to both members of Parliament and state legislatures. Under the Tenth Schedule, a legislator can be disqualified on the following grounds:

1. If a member of a House voluntarily gives up membership of their political party.

In Ravi S Naik vs Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court held that voluntarily giving up membership does not necessarily require a formal resignation by a legislator to be disqualified under the Anti-Defection Law.

The apex court observed: “Even in the absence of a formal resignation from membership an inference can be drawn from the conduct of a member that he has voluntarily given up his membership of the political party to which he belongs.”

In other words, if a legislator does not tender a formal resignation from their party, but involves themselves with another party (such as holding positions in another party), that would amount to voluntarily giving up membership and be grounds for disqualification.

2. If a member votes or abstains from voting in a house, contrary to the directions of their political party, without prior permission, and such voting or abstention has not been condoned by the party within 15 days.

3. If an independent member joins a political party after elections.

4. If a nominated member joins a political party after six months of taking their seat.

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Exception to disqualification

The principal exception to disqualification under the Tenth Schedule is merger of parties. A legislator is protected from disqualification if at least two-thirds of legislators of a party agree to merge with another political party.

Originally, the Tenth schedule also contained an exemption for a “split”, whereby one-third of legislators could break away without attracting disqualification. But this provision was abused, leading to mass defections under the guise of internal factionalism.

The Constitution (Ninety-First Amendment) Act, 2003 addressed this issue by removing the split exception entirely and retaining only the exception for mergers. The same amendment also inserted Articles 75(1B), 164(1B) and 361B to prevent defectors from being rewarded with ministerial offices and remunerative political posts until re-elected.

However, the effectiveness of these safeguards significantly depends on the institutional mechanism responsible for their implementation. This draws attention to the role of Presiding Officers.

Role of the Speaker

Para 6 (1) of the Tenth Schedule vests the power to decide disqualification petitions in the office of the Presiding Officer (the Speaker or the Chairman) of the House, and their decision shall be final. This reflects constitutional faith in the office of Speaker as an impartial constitutional authority capable of acting in a non-partisan manner.

But practical experiences and allegations of political biases have, at times, raised concerns regarding the neutrality of Presiding Officers. Therefore, the effectiveness of the Tenth Schedule depends largely on the institutional integrity and political independence of the Presiding Officer.

In addition, the timing of decisions on disqualification petitions has become a matter of political scrutiny. The Tenth Schedule initially barred judicial review of the Speaker’s decision.

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Judicial review of Speaker’s decision

But in Kihoto Hollohan vs Zachillhu (1992), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Anti-Defection Law while saying that the Speaker’s decisions are subject to judicial review. The apex court observed that the Speaker acts as a Tribunal under the Tenth Schedule, and judicial review remains part of the basic structure of the Constitution, which cannot be by-passed.

In Nabam Rebia vs Deputy Speaker (2016), the Supreme Court held that a Speaker should not decide on disqualification petitions while a notice seeking his or her removal is pending. This ruling significantly influenced disqualification proceedings.

Also, the Court has repeatedly emphasised the need for timely decisions in defection cases. In Keisham Meghachandra Singh vs Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly (2020), the Court recommended that Speakers ordinarily decide disqualification petitions within three months.

Such judicial interventions reflect growing concerns surrounding the timely resolution of disqualification proceedings and their implications for political stability.

Post read questions

What were the circumstances that led to the enactment of the Anti-Defection Law? Discuss its objectives and constitutional significance.

What constitutes defection under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution? Explain the grounds of disqualification and the exceptions thereto.

Why was the split exception under the Tenth Schedule removed by the Constitution (Ninety-First Amendment) Act, 2003? Explain its implications.

The Anti-Defection Law was enacted to curb the ‘evil of political defections’. To what extent has it succeeded in achieving this objective? Examine.

The office of the Speaker has become the focal point of constitutional disputes under the Tenth Schedule. Discuss with the help of relevant judicial decisions.

(Akanksha Sharma teaches Political Science at University of Delhi.)

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