Why did Siraj ud-Daulah lose the Battle of Plassey?

We look at the factors that enabled the East India Company to overthrow the Nawab of Bengal with such remarkable ease.

A heir apparent and his ‘revolting cruelty’

In 1756, Murshidabad was one of only two cities in Bengal still substantially larger than Calcutta. From this thriving capital, Nawab Alivardi Khan governed what was by far the wealthiest province of the Mughal Empire. Of mixed Arab and Afshar Turkman ancestry, Khan had come to power in 1740 through a military coup financed and orchestrated by the powerful Jagat Seth banking family. “The Jagat Seths could make or break anyone in Bengal, including the ruler, and their political instincts were usually as sharp as their financial ones,” notes Dalrymple.

By the mid-1750s, Khan’s health was failing, and the question of succession loomed large at court. To the disappointment of many, his chosen heir was his grandson, Siraj ud-Daulah.

Siraj-ud-Daulah (Wikipedia)

Dalrymple writes, “For some time there was hope that Aliverdi Khan might see sense and appoint as successor his generous and popular son-in-law, Nawazish Khan, who was married to his eldest daughter, Ghasiti Begum, and who according to the consensus of the court would have been the perfect choice; but instead, in 1754, Siraj was formally named his heir.”

Contemporary accounts paint an extraordinarily dark portrait of Siraj ud-Daulah. Citing a memoir, Dalrymple writes: “This young man of average height, aged about 24 or 25 years old …was noted for indulgence in all kinds of debauchery and for his revolting cruelty. The women of the Gentiles [Hindus] are in the habit of bathing in the Ganges. Siraj was informed by his henchmen of those who were of some beauty. He would send his henchmen in small boats to carry them off while they were still in the water. He had been seen many times, when the river was in flood, to intentionally ram the ferry boats to jolt them, or make them spring a leak, in order to experience the cruel pleasure of frightening a hundred or more people…”

The same source concluded: “This thoughtless young man had no real talent for government. He ruled only by inspiring fear, but at the same time he was known to be the most cowardly of men.”

The most damning assessment, however, came from his cousin, Ghulam Hussain Khan, who had served on his staff and later depicted him as both predatory and unstable. “His character was a mix of ignorance and profligacy,” he wrote.

Siraj ud-Daulah’s many enemies

Alivardi Khan died at 5 am on April 9, 1756. That very evening, Siraj ud-Daulah moved against his aunt, Ghasiti Begum. He attacked her palace, killed or disarmed her household guards, and seized her vast stores of cash and jewellery, thereby creating one of his first enemies.

At the same time, his increasingly confrontational stance towards the British alarmed both the English and Khan’s former commander, Mir Jafar.

l-r: Mir Jafar and Mir Miran (Wikipedia)

According to Dalrymple, however, “Siraj’s most serious error was to alienate the great bankers of Bengal, the Jagat Seths.” It was the Seths’ financial and political influence that had helped bring Khan to power, and anyone seeking to govern Bengal effectively needed their support. Siraj ud-Daulah, however, did the opposite.

Many stories of Siraj ud-Daulah’s cruelty, debauchery, and insanity were circulated. “Such is usually the posthumous reward of the vanquished. Whatever their truth, there is little to suggest that Siraj-ud-daula was an appropriate successor to Alivardi Khan,” notes British historian P J Marshall in Bengal: The British Bridgehead (1987).

Scholars argue that the manner in which Siraj ud-Daulah pursued his objectives was imprudent. “Instead of tackling potential opponents one by one,” writes Marshall, “within a year he had built up a formidable coalition of enemies, including most of his own high officials, the greatest zamindars, the Jagat Seths and the Europeans.”

The early challenge to Siraj ud-Daulah inevitably came from the elites he had alienated. He further  remodelled the civilian and military administration, demoting old office holders of Khan in favour of men of his own.

According to historian Ghulam Husain Khan, “the grandees and commanders… now set no bounds to their discontent… chief officers of the army…all the ministers of the old court… and nearly all the secretaries, the writers of the Durbar, and even the eunuchs of the harem were said to have turned against the Nawab.”

By 1757, the Hindu zamindars of Burdwan and Nadia were joined in their opposition by the Muslim Raja of Birbhum. “Merchants and bankers also turned against the Nawab. The head of the house of Jagat Seth was ordered to provide Rs 30,000,000 for the crushing of Purnea. When he demurred, the Nawab struck him. Thereafter the Seths were implacable in their hostility, evidently believing that they would not be safe until Siraj-ud-daula was deposed,” writes Marshall.

A military miscalculation

The East India Company’s expanding control over Bengal’s trade disgruntled Siraj ud-Daulah. Relations deteriorated further when he challenged the Company’s unauthorised fortification of Calcutta and its persistent abuse of tax-exemption privileges. The resulting conflict eventually led to the Battle of Plassey.

On the morning of June 23, 1757, East India Company’s Robert Clive climbed onto the roof of the hunting lodge at Plassey to survey the forces. “In all, Clive estimated that the Nawab had gathered 35,000 infantry, 15,000 cavalry and fifty-three pieces of heavy artillery which was superintended by a team of French experts,” notes Dalrymple.

“They approached at pace,” Clive wrote in his official report, “and by eight began the attack with a number of heavy cannons, supported by their whole army.”

Around noon, however, the weather turned. Dark clouds gathered overhead and a torrential rain drenched the combatants. The Nawab’s artillery fell silent. Assuming that the Company’s guns had been similarly disabled, Siraj’s trusted commander, Mir Madan, ordered an advance. It proved to be a fatal miscalculation. Unlike the Nawab’s forces, the British had protected their ammunition from the rain and were able to continue firing.

At the same time, a large contingent of cavalry on the Nawab’s left began withdrawing towards the banks of the Bhagirathi-Hooghly River rather than joining the battle. Dalrymple writes, “This, it turned out, was Mir Jafar, withdrawing just as he had promised.”

By evening, the battle was lost. Siraj ud-Daulah fled the field and attempted to escape northwards, but he was soon captured. Within days, he was murdered. Mir Jafar entered Murshidabad in triumph and was proclaimed Nawab of Bengal.

While it would not be incorrect to say that much of the blame has been attributed to the personal failings of Siraj ud-Daulah, many accounts of him were written by British writers after their victory and may therefore reflect a degree of bias. In assessing his role in the defeat at Plassey, the betrayal of rivals and British expansionism also deserve attention.