A warning from history: What League of Nations can teach UN in the Trump era

In light of these shifts, one is compelled to look back to the era of the League of Nations—the UN’s predecessor—and examine the reasons for its ultimate failure.

The birth of the League

The League of Nations formally came into existence on January 10, 1920, the same day the Treaty of Versailles came into force. Headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, the League was established with two principal aims. First, it sought to maintain peace through collective security: if one member attacked another, all members were expected to act together to restrain the aggressor through economic sanctions or, if necessary, military force. Second, the League aimed to promote international cooperation in order to address economic and social issues.

As British historian Norman Lowe explains in Mastering Modern World History (2013), “The main function of the League was meant to be peacekeeping. It was intended that it would operate in the following way: all disputes threatening war would be submitted to the League, and any member which resorted to war, thus breaking the Covenant, would face collective action by the rest. The Council would recommend ‘what effective military, naval or air force the members should contribute to the armed forces’”.

Although the League is often described as being the brainchild of US President Woodrow Wilson, other powers—notably, Britain, France and South Africa— were also strong advocates of such an organisation. Wilson’s most significant contribution was his insistence that the League Covenant (the rules governing its operation), would be incorporated into each of the post-war peace treaties. “This ensured that the League actually came into existence instead of merely remaining a topic for discussion,” notes Lowe.

At its founding, the League comprised 42 member states, a number that rose to 55 by 1926, when Germany was admitted. It had five main organs: the General Assembly, Council, Permanent Court of International Justice, the Secretariat, and a range of commissions and committees, says Lowe.

Limited success

Many of the League’s committees achieved tangible successes and contributed significantly to international cooperation. One of the most effective was the International Labour Organization (ILO), led by French socialist director Albert Thomas. The ILO aimed to improve working conditions by promoting fair wages, reasonable working hours, and safer labour practices.

Another notable success was the High Commission for Refugees led by Norwegian explorer Fridtjof Nansen. It dealt with the problem of thousands of former prisoners of war stranded in Russia at the end of the First World War; approximately half a million were eventually repatriated. After 1933, the organisation also provided crucial assistance to thousands of people fleeing Nazi persecution in Germany.

The League of Nations Health Organization, likewise, performed good work in investigating the causes and spread of epidemics in the era.

The League also succeeded in resolving some political disputes. In 1921, when Germany and Poland clashed over rival claims to the industrial area of Upper Silesia, the League stated that the territory should be partitioned between the two. Similarly, when Greece invaded Bulgaria following a series of shooting incidents on the frontier, the League intervened: “Greek troops were withdrawn and damages were paid to Bulgaria,” writes Lowe. He, however, reminds us that “none of these disputes seriously threatened world peace, and none of the decisions went against a major state that might have challenged the League’s verdict”.

Infinite ambition but limited determination

The fate of the League changed in the 1930s. Lowe notes that the authority of the League was challenged several times. Ironically, one of the main reasons for its failure was the absence of the United States. In March 1920, the US Senate rejected both the Treaty of Versailles and the League, depriving it of a powerful state whose engagement would have provided crucial financial and psychological support. Other major powers were also missing. Germany did not join until 1926, while the USSR became a member only in 1934, when Germany left. Lowe notes, “So for the first few years of its existence the League was deprived of three of the world’s most important powers.”

The League also had no military force of its own, and although Article 16 expected member states to supply troops if necessary, a 1923 resolution allowed each state to decide for itself whether to fight. As a result, collective security depended on the willingness of states that were often “not prepared to uphold” it. In practice, the League became what Lowe calls a “French/British affair,” yet even the British showed limited enthusiasm.

The situation deteriorated rapidly after the onset of the Great Depression in 1929. Economic hardship contributed to the rise of aggressive regimes in Japan, Italy, and Germany, all of which exposed the League’s weaknesses. In 1931, Japan invaded Manchuria. Although the League condemned the action, no sanctions were imposed, and Japan simply withdrew from the League in 1933.

Things got worse in 1935 with Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia. While the League imposed economic sanctions, these excluded vital resources such as oil and steel, allowing Italy to complete its conquest. Britain and France, unwilling to alienate Mussolini, abandoned the sanctions in 1936, further undermining the League’s credibility.

During Germany’s later disputes with Czechoslovakia and Poland, the League was not even consulted. It ceased to meet after December 1939 and was formally dissolved in 1946, having failed in its primary aim of preventing war.

As Lowe concludes in his book: “The real explanation for the failure of the League was simple: when aggressive states such as Japan, Italy and Germany defied it, the League members, especially France and Britain, were not prepared to support it, either by decisive economic measures or by military action.”

He adds: “How could it possibly have been expected to deal with aggressors when it had no army of its own and no mechanism to compel member states to provide their troops?” The parallel with the UN’s current challenges is striking.