Decode Politics: PM Modi says he would have ‘taken’ Kartarpur gurdwara in 1971. Could India have?

How did the battle in the Dera Baba Nanak sector proceed?

The Army’s Jalandhar-headquartered 11 Corps was responsible for the defence of the area, right from Dera Baba Nanak enclave in the North to south of Anupgarh in Rajasthan. The Amritsar-headquartered 15 Division was responsible for the defence of Dera Baba Nanak enclave, and 86 Infantry Brigade was deployed in the area.

Kartarpur Sahib Gurdwara in Pakistan. (Wikimedia Commons)

The task given to 86 Infantry Brigade was to contain any Pakistani threat from Kassowal enclave, a portion of Indian territory across the Ravi River which could provide a ready launchpad to the Pakistan Army to attack Indian defences in the area. In addition, the brigade was to hit Pakistani defences in the Jassar enclave, so as to protect the rail-cum-road bridge and defeat any potential Pakistani threat.

Was capture of the Kartarpur Sahib Gurdwara part of the plans?

There is no literature on the battle available which suggests that capture of the historic gurdwara was a military objective for the Dera Baba Nanak Brigade, which was focused on the two strategically important enclaves north and south of the Ravi, belonging to India and Pakistan respectively.

The Indian Army was able to overwhelm the Pakistanis in the Jassar enclave, which was defended by troops of the paramilitary force Pakistan Rangers. Their commander was not present at the company headquarters when Indian troops launched their attack on the intervening night of December 5-6, 1971.

Brig Gauri Shanker, the Commander of 86 Infantry Brigade, who was responsible for operations in the area, was ordered to eliminate the Pakistani Jassar/Dera Baba Nanak enclave by the morning of December 6.

This task was accomplished by troops of 10 Dogra and 1/9 Gorkha Rifles, supported by tanks from 71 Armoured Regiment and Artillery.

No attempt was made by the brigade to continue beyond the capture of the enclave to take the Kartarpur Sahib Gurdwara, which was well within the grasp of the Indian troops.

Writing on the battle in Indian Defence Review, Maj Gen Sukhwant Singh (retd) noted, “On the face of it, this operation seems to have been one of ‘crushing a peanut with a sledge hammer’, but in view of the strategic importance of the enclave, the Indian planners could not take a chance”.

He too made no mention of any intention to capture the gurdwara.

What would capturing the gurdwara have entailed?

Given the fact that the Indian forces had eliminated the Pakistani threat from the enclave near the gurdwara, it was just a matter of moving ahead by 1 km or so to capture the shrine. There existed no Pakistani forces between the gurdwara and the captured enclave. But operational plans only dealt with capturing the enclave.

The capture of the gurdwara could most likely have extended the war. India did not retain any territory of Pakistan that it captured during the war, except some disputed areas in Jammu and Kashmir.

How and why did the gurdwara end up on the Pakistan side in Partition?

The Punjab Boundary Commission, which drew the border between India and Pakistan during Partition, divided the four tehsils of the then Gurdaspur district between the two countries on the basis of Hindu/Sikh and Muslim populations. The Shakargarh Tehsil in which the gurdwara fell was awarded to Pakistan while Gurdaspur, Batala and Pathankot tehsils were awarded to India. The Congress made a representation before the Punjab Boundary Commission and demanded the inclusion of Kartarpur in Punjab, along with Nankana Sahib, the birthplace of Guru Nanak, and Sacha Sauda, another gurdwara associated with Guru Nanak, in Sheikhupura. However, this demand was disregarded by the boundary commission.