Opinion In Pakistan, an all-powerful general, a weak state

There is, in Pakistan, a curious contradiction, a disjunction that has flattened institutional checks and balances on the one hand and, ironically, created more political fragility in its wake on the other. Last month, a civilian regime that all but reports to the army chief, Asim Munir, rammed the 27th Constitutional Amendment through both Houses of the country’s legislature, in what is widely being termed a “constitutional coup”. In effect, the amendment makes Munir a monarch — appointed for life and immune from prosecution. It also seeks to restructure the judiciary and make it more subservient. Meanwhile, the jailed leader of the largest Opposition party was reportedly denied visitors and kept in solitary confinement. After rumours spread on social media that Imran Khan had died, his supporters took to the streets. It was only after protests that the former PM’s sister was allowed to visit him earlier this week, seeking proof of life.

It could be argued that the sorry state of Pakistan’s civilian rulers is of their own making. Khan and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) were propelled to power with the support of the army, which viewed his predecessor, Nawaz Sharif, and his overtures to India with suspicion. Now, it is the PML(N) that holds office through the power of the army, while Khan, who openly attacked the army in the 2024 election campaign, is imprisoned. This is despite the PTI’s impressive performance in the elections, even after its symbol was cancelled and its candidates were forced to contest as Independents. The fact remains that Pakistan’s political class, across parties, has been all too willing to use the army to subvert elections and democratic practices to gain office.

Advertisement

Munir’s triumphalism, however, is hollow. For all the White House dinners he is invited to and his fawning Nobel Peace Prize nomination of the US President, Pakistan today is far from secure. The border with Afghanistan continues to be restive; a fragile ceasefire has not addressed the fundamental dispute over the Durand Line. Internal insurgencies in the North-west and Balochistan continue. Underpinning these challenges is an economy that serves a garrison state, not the people. Democratic negotiations and institutional maturity can help resolve many of these internal issues. But Munir and the army prefer the jackboot.