There was a flurry of developments in Bangladesh over the last week. The Chief Advisor of the interim government in Bangladesh, Muhammad Yunus first threatened to resign, then relented, and then is reported to have said the country is in a “war-like situation”. The army has chided the government. Protests from government employees have added to the mounting public discontent, and the Chief Advisor had to conduct marathon meetings with various political parties. The Consensus Commission — formed to oversee what reforms could be implemented quickly — reported a disappointing first round of talks, with many key issues being unresolved.
On the face of it, the present mini-crisis in Bangladesh is about one question: Reforms or elections? One side wants to have reforms before the elections, and the other wants to have either elections before reforms or both in parallel. This conflict stems from a deeper concern about what route the state should take in post-revolution Bangladesh, and two camps have formed around this question. This is the split in Bangladesh’s polity right now, and this is the question on which political recruitment and defections are occurring.
In the Reforms First camp are the government, a group of students — mostly from public universities — some civil society opinion-makers, and a section of middle-class funders and mobilisers. In the Elections ASAP camp are the established Islamist parties, conservative sections of the middle class, and the army. Most other social groups in the country are of secondary importance in this scenario.
The Yunus government has misunderstood its mandate, believing itself to be a revolutionary government with a “mandate to change anything”, as his press secretary reportedly said. It lacks a reasonable appreciation of the various interests which converged into the movement against Sheikh Hasina. Businessmen, capitalists and the middle class in general expected a quick upturn in their economic activities, having blamed the Awami League for the stagnation. Other political parties simply wanted to be rid of the Awami League. Islamists, especially, saw it as a chance to remake the state in the way they wanted. Many, including the army, supported the movement simply because it had become too big not to support.
The result was a Dhaka-based government of civil society elites entrusted to minimise mid-flight turbulence — an opinion poll conducted in February dispelled any doubt in this regard, with a plump majority saying they expected this government to manage daily affairs.
All these groups initially supported the Yunus government to further their own particular interests. A few of these interests have been fulfilled, primarily the desire for a stable Bangladesh with no Awami League. Many others have faced deep disappointment, especially the middle class which hasn’t seen its economic desires being met; unforeseen issues such as the collapse of law and order also alienated supporters.
Such groups have gradually and steadily withdrawn support from the government. Almost every major newspaper in Bangladesh now considers the Yunus government to be a partial failure, at least. No one says it has been a success. The social base of the July uprising has been thoroughly depleted.
The Reforms First camp is correct in wanting to institutionalise its gains. But even now, it does not recognise its lack of social base. One student leader made a joke of himself by threatening a Kronstadt-style revolutionary repression against anti-government protests. He seems unable to think who would be willing to carry out such a show of force. The only significant Reforms First political party is the student-led National Citizens’ Party (NCP) — yet to have its own logo or flag, let alone a programme.
In its hurry to bring about changes, such as limiting the executive’s powers, the Reforms First camp has forgotten that Yunus is only a Chief Advisor, not even a Prime Minister. Even worse, it has tried to bestow the powers of a constituent assembly upon various commissions. When this smooth plan for nibbling at state power without a mandate hit the first roadblock, Yunus lost all his confidence and threw a tantrum.
The work of a caretaker government is solely to administer the country till a legitimate government is elected by the people. It is by design transitory — the Yunus government’s and the students’ mistake was to think that by changing the name to “interim government”, they could change its purpose.
The current rulers of Bangladesh fear elections. Their scepticism stems from their view that elections cannot be guaranteed to be fair. They trust their wisdom more than the people’s — and in the name of a fair election, they end up delaying elections, sometimes forever. Their deficiency of trust in the self-healing properties of democracy ends up making dictators out of them.
Delaying elections, as the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the army sense correctly, is equivalent to enacting a protracted caretaker coup. A coup is not necessarily an ouster, it can be merely a takeover smoothly done from the inside. We usually expect the “politically incorrect” to conduct coups because that’s what we are used to. Yunus’s, however, has the novelty of being a “politically correct” coup. His government has tried to keep its attempt wrapped in politically correct speech; the truth has nonetheless slipped out from some of its less sharp sections, such as when the Home Advisor claimed that the “people” want the caretaker government to continue for five years.
There is almost no chance of this coup succeeding. To be a dictator is not Yunus’s calling. He has neither the charisma nor the knack for it. He has neither time on his side nor an efficient authoritarian apparatus. The Reforms First camp would simply have to relent to the growing pressure of the BNP, the Jamaat-e-Islami, the critical middle class and the army. In due course, they might begin to appreciate how Sheikh Hasina was far more successful in her dictatorial ventures than they were.
The best-case scenario for this government’s legacy is to conduct an election and successfully transition to a promised Islamic democracy. Giving the army the opportunity to conduct elections would be good neither for the elections or the army. Whichever way the transition takes place, the revolution will be remembered for throwing the baby out with the bathwater — secular Bangla nationalism along with Sheikh Hasina.
Mathew teaches politics and international relations at the School of Liberal Arts and Management Studies, P P Savani University, Surat. Ramachandran is a research scholar at the Department of Communication, University of Hyderabad
Almost every major newspaper in Bangladesh now considers the Yunus government to be a partial failure, at least. 
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