5 min readNov 4, 2024 03:47 AM IST
First published on: Nov 4, 2024 at 03:47 AM IST
As the US prepares for its next presidential election on November 5, the future of American foreign policy is under close scrutiny. Both state and non-state actors are keenly watching one of the closest presidential races in American history. At the heart of this anticipation are the potential shifts in America’s approach to its bilateral relations as well as to the global order, depending on who takes office in 2025. Broadly, there are three different strands of policy consideration which could inform a policy prescription for India’s engagement with America under the next administration. The first is the bilateral conduit, which has sustained an upward trajectory in the last two decades. The second concerns the way in which US relations with other critical powers, especially China, Russia, Japan, Australia, the UK and Israel, are impacted under the next administration and the resulting churn. The third could be the changes that the next administration enforces on the global order with its own recalibrations to multilateral institutions.
Regardless of who takes the Oval Office, there seems to be a consensus that India-US bilateral relations are likely to continue without much hiccup. The political capital spent on bilateral ties by either side, together with successive strategic upgrades, has made the India-US relationship structural, transcending the partisanship in DC. Driving a bipartisan consensus in Washington, especially in an era of unparalleled political divisiveness, may itself be counted as a feat.
The India-US security and strategic partnership is the engine driving this. The new framework for defence cooperation, the four foundational agreements, India’s Major Defence Partner status along with the US Department of Commerce’s decision in 2018 to upgrade India to the Strategic Trade Authorisation (STA) Tier 1 list have all been significant steps in future-proofing the bilateral tie. These have been further reinforced by mechanisms such as the 2+2 dialogue and the Quad. The strategic interplay of the bilateral defence and security partnership between India and the US today forms the operational mainstay in the Indo-Pacific, ushering other like-minded partners like Japan and Australia into the fold. The expanding mandate of the Quad has entrenched the group’s purpose and intent in the region, while also underscoring the role of minilaterals in ensuring a secure and stable Indo-Pacific. While the drivers of India-US security and strategic partnership are likely to continue unimpeded, there could be a difference of approach depending on the new administration, with knock-on impacts on various aspects concerning bilateral ties.
In the area of bilateral trade, a Trump administration could prioritise US economic interests, which may involve renegotiating trade deals to reduce the trade deficit with India. Furthermore, Trump could push India to open its markets to US tech and agriculture. Alternatively, India may find opportunities under a Harris administration to scale up cooperation in green energy, health, digital infrastructure, renewable energy, climate finance and clean tech.
Externally, one of the primary questions is how the next US administration approaches China. There is little consensus that Harris’ campaign promise of her administration being “different” from the Biden administration will apply to China. The bipartisan consensus on a hawkish China policy in the Congress may not provide her administration the manoeuvrability for slackening on China. Stepping on the gas on China will close the last few doors of a modus vivendi which the Biden-Harris administration had been looking for. As for a likely Trump administration, high tariffs on China could sharpen the repositioning of supply chains from China across Southeast and South Asia. How the next US administration responds to China could enforce recalibrations among its partners, including India. From consumer durables to critical and emerging technologies, the benefits for India depend on its internal capacity to absorb the sectoral opportunities which present from those shifts.
At the multilateral level, while a Harris administration would likely recommit the US to multilateral frameworks, aligning with India’s own interest in global rules-based order, Trump may downplay US involvement in global institutions. This could cut both ways for India, while ushering in opportunities to step up in global institutions like the UN to fill the consequential void but without much clarity on how bullish the US would be for a UNSC reform with its own indifference to the UN.
As both Harris and Trump approach their campaign denouements, the barometer of their India embrace remains fairly stable under both candidates. If the recent speeches by Trump are any indication, his de-hyphenation of India and China when talking about tariffs, unlike earlier, may be just the positive indication that India is looking for. As for Harris, a deliberate prioritisation of her Jamaican identity over her South Asian one may be a calculated domestic political move, but a win might just present her the opportunity to engage South Asia more directly, one she did not have as vice president.
Finally, in the backdrop of the multiple global crises, particularly the Russia-Ukraine war, there is a sense in Washington that India may have received a level of attention comparable to, or even surpassing, that of some US allies. It remains to be seen how this perception will resonate with the next US administration, if at all.
The writer is Visiting Fellow ORF America and deputy director, Strategic Studies Program, ORF
Regardless of who takes the Oval Office, there seems to be a consensus that India-US bilateral relations are likely to continue without much hiccup. 
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