The first and the largest phase of the 2024 Lok Sabha elections has registered an underwhelming voter turnout of around 66.1 per cent, which is a drop of nearly four percentage points compared to 2019. There is a decline in turnout in 19 of the 21 states, which had one or more seats going to polls in this phase.
To enable us to arrive at a few distilled facts, we group the states in three categories: Hindi-speaking states, East and Northeast states and The Rest of India (Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra and the Union Territories). (See Table 1). This grouping draws on certain common characteristics: For instance, in most of the Hindi-speaking states, the BJP has traditionally been strong with deep networks. In 2014, it won 35 out of the 36 seats from this group that went to polls in the first phase. In 2019, it won 29 out of 36.
In Eastern and Northeastern States, the BJP had little presence pre-2014, but in the past decade, through acquisitions and partnerships with local parties, it has become the decisive force in the 18 seats that went to polls in the first phase. It and its coalition partners in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) won 16 of the 18 seats in 2019.
In the Rest of India, the BJP/NDA is relatively weaker: it won just 10 out of the 48 seats in 2019 in these regions. The opposition is either a dominant force (Tamil Nadu) or a serious challenger (Maharashtra).
We observe that the decline in turnouts in the first phase of 2024 is the highest in the Hindi-speaking states, followed by East and Northeastern States, followed by the rest of India. In fact, if we consider East and Northeast states without Nagaland, which faced an extraordinary situation of a poll boycott in six of its districts, the decline in turnout is the least (2.1pp).
If we consider turnouts in this same set of seats longitudinally from 1999, we arrive at Table 2.
It is salient that the trend in every successive election from at least 1999 has been an increase in combined turnout in these seats. 2024 breaks this trend. The trend for each group is also worth noting. For East and Northeast states, there has been an increase in turnouts every election, irrespective of the incumbent gaining or losing power. For the Rest of India group, the period when the United Progressive Alliance was voted into power — the 2004 and 2009 elections — the turnouts increased by a huge 12.4 pp. After 2009, both increases and declines in turnouts have been small.
In Hindi-speaking states, the turnout declined in the two elections the UPA was voted into power, but it increased by a massive 14.2 pp in the two elections the NDA was voted into power. However, perhaps unexpectedly, the Hindi-speaking states have the highest decline in turnouts in the first phase of 2024: The BJP’s strongest suit seems to display weakness at least as far as turnouts are concerned.
This observation is buttressed when we compare the turnout figures in seats where the NDA won in 2019 versus the seats where the Opposition INDIA bloc won in 2019. In 2019, the NDA won 50 out of 102 seats. In these seats, the turnout has dropped by 5.1 pp. The INDIA bloc won 49 seats in 2019. In these seats, the turnout has dropped by less than half of that in the NDA seats — by 2.4 pp.
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There does seem to be a steeper drop in enthusiasm for voting in seats where the BJP has been strong.
This observation is further supplemented by the data on the impact of the so-called double-engine sarkar on turnouts. In 2018, the BJP lost state elections in Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. In the 18 Lok Sabha seats from these states which have gone to polls in Phase 1, turnout percentages in the 2018 assembly elections were customarily high: 77.5 per cent in Madhya Pradesh and 76 per cent in Rajasthan. In the Lok Sabha elections that followed, turnouts dropped by just 2.6 pp in MP and 12.6 pp in Rajasthan, and the electorate who voted for the Opposition at the state-level decisively voted for the BJP in nationally. In 2023, the BJP won state elections in Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. But in these 18 seats, turnouts have dropped by a massive 17.6 pp in Rajasthan and 13 pp in MP.
The double engine seems at least unable to energise the voters to turn up for the so-called “national-level” issues.
Further, if we compare constituency-wise declines as compared to 2019, there are higher than average declines in turnouts in constituencies like Ganganagar in Rajasthan, which was a nodal constituency for farm protests, Jhunjhunu (with a high proportion of young army aspirants disappointed with Agnipath scheme), Sidhi in MP, which is one of the poorest constituencies in the state and Shahdol where tribal and Dalit percentage of the population exceeds 50 per cent.
It is too early to tell if these are indications of disenchantment of three of the four “castes” posited by the Prime Minister — farmers, youth women and the poor — but a mass of observations pointing in a similar direction can be worrying signs for the BJP.
In the crucible of the Ram Janmabhoomi movement, the Hindi-speaking states, the one centrepiece which much of the BJP leadership’s campaign gravitates towards: The Ram Janmabhoomi temple does not seem to have yet had the effect the ruling party had banked upon — mobilising the swing voters to turn up. This third time, there does not seem to be any observable wave for the BJP. Whether this decline in turnouts will also translate into a shift in outcomes, it is too early to tell, but these are straws in the wind.
The writers are researchers associated with the Bharat Jodo Abhiyaan
A woman, carrying her daughter, casts vote at a polling station in the border village of Zokhawthar in Mizoram’s Champhai district. (Reuters) 
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