Opinion West Asia holds its breath as Iran and US return to talks

It is important to recall that Prime Minister Netanyahu played a decisive role in persuading the first Trump administration to withdraw unilaterally in 2018 from the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), which was successful in imposing substantive restrictions on Iran’s nuclear engagement. He also initiated an attack on Iran in June last year, soon after the IAEA reported Iran’s non-compliance with its nuclear safeguards obligations and later pushed the second Trump administration to strike Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities — an action that brought the 12-day war to a close. From this perspective, Netanyahu’s strategic confrontation with Iran remains unfinished business.

Because Israel does not share a border with Iran, it is less exposed to the immediate physical consequences of another war or of internal collapse within Iran. That geographical distance shapes its risk calculations. But the Arab Gulf states hold a more complex view. While they would welcome any development that diminishes Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities and curtails its support to Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, they are deeply concerned about the immense damage they could suffer if the United States launches a major attack on Iran. They understand that any existential threat to the Iranian regime could set the entire region ablaze, severely undermining their economic progress and stability.

Oil and gas installations across the Gulf could become targets. Gulf governments have publicly stated that they would not allow their airspace to be used for attacks on Iran, but they are equally aware that such declarations may prove meaningless if strikes are launched from the Arabian Sea or routed through Syrian and Iraqi airspace, where defences are limited. Iran has repeatedly warned in recent months that any direct attack on its territory would trigger a broader regional war.

These concerns have been forcefully conveyed to Trump by close regional partners such as Qatar, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman. The US president is also mindful of the sentiment within his MAGA political base, segments of which are increasingly critical of what they see as an “Israel First” policy — especially with mid-term elections due next year. Unlike the operation against Venezuela, any military action against Iran would almost certainly be messy, prolonged, and risk drawing the US into yet another open-ended conflict.

Despite President Trump’s claim that Iran’s nuclear capability was obliterated following the bunker-buster bomb attacks on Iranian enrichment sites, serious unresolved questions remain for both the United States and Israel. Chief among them are the whereabouts of Iran’s 408 kg of 60 per cent enriched uranium and the need for a permanent halt to all uranium enrichment activity, along with the full restoration of IAEA safeguards inspections, which Iran has limited to the Russian-assisted Bushehr nuclear power plant.

Iran’s own position has evolved under pressure. Immediately after the 12-day war, Tehran declared that it would not engage in talks unless the US guaranteed that it would not launch further attacks and agreed to compensate for war damage. However, the full resumption of UN sanctions last September, followed by further tightening of US sanctions, dealt a severe blow to Iran’s economy. This economic strain triggered protests by merchants in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar in late December 2025, which expanded into unprecedented nationwide anti-government demonstrations and were met with violent suppression. These developments have compelled Iran to reconsider its stance and accept renewed talks with the United States focused on the nuclear issue.

Following the visit of Qatar’s Prime Minister to Tehran and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s visit to Turkiye, Iran formally conveyed its readiness to resume dialogue with Washington. Both sides have since stated that talks are scheduled for this Friday (today). The initial US proposal was to hold the discussions in Istanbul with participation from several Arab and Muslim countries — including Qatar, Turkiye, Egypt, and even Pakistan — in a format somewhat resembling the grouping associated with Trump’s 20-point Gaza plan. Iran, however, was keen to keep the scope limited strictly to nuclear matters and to exclude regional players in order to avoid complicating the negotiations. According to the latest reports, the talks will now take place in Oman at Iran’s request.

The expected participants include Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner (Trump’s son-in-law), and Araghchi. In many ways, this meeting represents a continuation of the five rounds of US–Iran talks held from April last year until Israel launched its strike just 48 hours before the sixth round scheduled in Muscat.

What can reasonably be expected from these talks? Iran’s principal bargaining chip remains the 408 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in its possession. Its opening position will likely be firm, insisting on its right to uranium enrichment under the NPT. Yet its ultimate objective is sanctions relief, which may be the only viable path toward easing economic hardship and calming domestic unrest.

The compromise it may ultimately have to accept could involve transferring the 408 kilograms of HEU to a third country. Both Russia and Turkiye have offered to take custody of this material. Iran may also have to either voluntarily suspend enrichment — while maintaining that it retains the right — or agree to enrichment through a regional consortium operating in a third country, but with Iran’s involvement. The talks are expected to focus on establishing a broad political understanding before moving into detailed technical negotiations. At this stage, Iran appears likely to show flexibility and go beyond the obligations it accepted under the 2015 JCPOA.

The writer is Former Governor of India to IAEA, Vienna