Opinion The US should know by now that drones cannot establish democracy
Democracy needs to be based on legitimacy, patience, and internal political agency if it is to entail more than just overthrowing a ruler
With Trump having wrecked the WTO and now ready to risk the future of the long-standing Western military alliance, NATO, and break up with the European Union on his claims to Greenland, Delhi should take Trump’s plans for a new global peace and security mechanism seriously Also written by Jyot Shikhar Singh
Democracy, at its core, is meant to be an expression of popular will, which is rooted in a messy and often contested political agency of citizens. It is not expected to arrive overnight, accompanied by executive declarations from foreign capitals. However, the assertions and declarations that surfaced from Washington on January 3 have raised an old and unsettling question: Is democracy still democracy if it originates from an abduction?
To be clear, this is not an argument in defence of authoritarian rule in Venezuela. The Maduro government has presided over democratic erosion, economic collapse, and a humanitarian crisis that has displaced millions. Elections have been widely criticised for lacking fairness, opposition leaders have faced repression, and institutions have steadily hollowed out. Acknowledging this, however, does not absolve external actors from scrutiny when they claim to act in the name of democracy while bypassing its most fundamental principles.
In his press conference on January 3, Donald Trump framed the US military operation in Venezuela as a decisive intervention to “restore order” and “return democracy,” confirming strikes, special forces activity, and the capture of President Nicolás Maduro. The rationale emphasised drug charges and state failure, but the following action didn’t conform to international agreements or multilateral procedures.
A clear political roadmap or transitional mechanism, based on domestic consensus, was conspicuously lacking in Venezuela. Further, Trump’s proposal that the US might “run Venezuela” for a while is at odds with democratic standards, which are based on self-determination rather than foreign rule.
Equally revealing was the prominence given to Venezuela’s energy infrastructure in the same address. References to oil stabilisation and economic recovery through US involvement suggest that strategic calculations are deeply entangled with democratic rhetoric. This complicates the moral clarity of the action, but it does not dispel valid worries about authoritarian control. Democracy risks appearing conditional rather than universal when expressed alongside guarantees of energy access and geopolitical leverage.
This would reinforce long-standing scepticism, especially in the Global South, that democratic language is selectively mobilised where strategic value exists. The democratic claim underpinning such interventions rests on the promise of restoring rights, elections, and constitutional order. However, democracy as a process needs civic engagement, contestation, and a sense of legitimacy. Democratic agency is essentially outsourced when regime change is predominantly achieved by coercive force.
This raises the question: Where do Venezuelans stand in this process? Despite her widespread popularity and worldwide reputation, the marginalisation of domestic opposition leaders, such as María Corina Machado, undermines claims that the main goal is democratic transformation.
History offers sobering lessons about using force as a tool for establishing democracy. A leader may be overthrown by military action, but the fundamental institutional and societal divisions that underpin authoritarianism are rarely fixed. Iraq and Libya continue to serve as warning examples: Elections were held after intervention, but democratic consolidation remained difficult, and legitimacy was contested. Compliance may be forced, but consent is necessary for democracy.
The ensuing order is nonetheless brittle and susceptible to nationalist backlash when political authority has its roots in external force. The implications for international law are equally troubling. The forcible removal or detention of a sitting head of state without multilateral authorisation undermines the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention enshrined in the UN Charter. The rules-based system becomes optional rather than mandatory if powerful states reserve moral exceptions for themselves.
These precedents are not unique. Other powerful nations, such as China and Russia, will use them, either overtly or covertly, to defend their own actions, frequently with far less pretence of democratic results. The greater danger, then, lies not only in what unfolds in Venezuela but in what such actions signal globally.
Democracy runs the risk of being reduced to a rhetorical device that is invoked when convenient and suspended when troublesome. External military engagement may even be detrimental to societies battling authoritarianism, enabling governments to conceal repression under myths of nationalist resistance.
Democracy needs to be based on legitimacy, patience, and internal political agency if it is to entail more than just overthrowing a ruler. When democracy arrives through drones rather than deliberation, its foundations are already compromised. Removing a ruler is not the same as empowering citizens – and if democracy cannot survive the manner of its arrival, one must ask whether it ever truly arrived at all.
Manhas is Special Advisor for South Asia at the Parley Policy Initiative, Republic of Korea, and Singh is a PhD Candidate at the Jindal School of International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global University, India. Views expressed are personal

