Opinion A blockade against stability: The true cost of Washington’s new war at sea
The naval blockade of Strait of Hormuz is an act of war that exposes US military strategy to its greatest rivals while eroding last remnants of global support
The Strait of Hormuz seems to have become the centrepiece of the war. However, it is crucial to assess whether without re-working an “acceptable” security architecture for the GCC-Iran universe, any durable options can be found. The fragile ceasefire may have brought the US and Iran back from the brink and opened the way for the Islamabad talks, but in less than 24 hours, the US withdrew from the first round of negotiations, citing irreconcilable red lines. In no time, it announced a naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz from April 13. It appears quite certain that the US wanted to create new, significant leverage during the ceasefire period, before moving forward with the Islamabad process. The naval blockade is an act of war against Iran, and instead of one power, now two “warring” powers would be policing traffic through the Strait of Hormuz for everyone. This not only adds huge risk to the shipping routes across the Strait, but also through the Gulf of Oman and northern Indian Ocean.
The naval blockade also threatens the diplomatic efforts of other global and regional powers currently trying to ensure freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. Although the ceasefire may hold, the naval blockade itself is likely to cause much greater stress to global energy markets, trade and businesses. Moreover, executing a naval blockade is not an easy option even for the US, which has threatened kinetic action against ships that violate its conditions while transiting. The war at sea could further expand if Iran and its allies decide to target the shipping routes through the Red Sea and the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb.
The 12 day Israel-Iran war in June 2025 was perhaps a test run for the war initiated on February 28. The short war was used to check Iranian military capabilities and the state of preparedness. The US targeted three Iranian nuclear sites, which they believed would have been protected by the best conventional defence Iran had. The current war, thus far, appears to have been planned and designed based on the 12-day experience. The mass protests in Iran from the end of 2025 probably dictated its timing.
It is quite clear that Iran had planned a meticulous “asymmetric” war against a conventional, firepower-driven combination of two military powers. But Iran chose not to use it in June 2025, as part of an astute military strategy. The current war has amply demonstrated that Iran had a well-thought-out military strategy of expanding the war quickly and weaponising the Strait of Hormuz to build pressure on opponents. Iran also used a range of asymmetric tools to not get defeated in 39 days against two formidable militaries.
The sophisticated, relentless and sometimes entertaining Iranian propaganda on social media amplified the impact of its military strategy to a global audience. Facing a threat to its “civilisation”, just before the ceasefire, Iran mobilised a large number of men and women to form chains around power plants listed as targets.
The emergence of Pakistan as the mediator of the ceasefire and the host to the Islamabad talks has aroused curiosity. It appears that Pakistan perhaps is the face for China that has played a silent, but powerful role in this conflict. Early on, media inputs suggested that Iran had parked hundreds of millions of barrels of oil in Chinese waters before the war began, for use during a long war. Midway through the conflict, pro-Beijing actors issued a stern warning to Israel against using nukes against any country, including Iran. The warning also indicated who could possibly influence Iran in a “tense” moment. That explains why President Trump has given credit to China for pulling Iran back from the brink and getting it to agree to a ceasefire.
The Strait of Hormuz seems to have become the centrepiece of the war. However, it is crucial to assess whether without re-working an “acceptable” security architecture for the GCC-Iran universe, any durable options can be found. The dismantling of the US-led GCC security architecture began on September 9, 2025, when Israeli forces mounted aerial strikes on a Hamas political office in Doha. The Arab and Muslim nations quickly convened multiple meetings to deliberate over the new threat in the region. It put paid to plans to expand the Abraham Accords that could potentially bring the GCC under a joint US-Israel-led security architecture against the “common” threat of Iran. The genocide in Gaza had already created huge hurdles for any further embrace of the accords. The biggest move was made by Saudi Arabia that turned towards nuclear armed, China-backed Pakistan to stitch together a strategic mutual defence agreement, which also brought Saudi Arabia under Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella. It is pertinent to recall that China had brokered peace between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023.
The situation is fluid. But as a superpower, the US needs to worry about three key points. One, it has exposed its military infrastructure, war strategy and combat to potential adversaries like China and Russia. Second, the strategic intelligence picture it used to initiate the war was flawed. Third, the use of communication strategy “as a weapon” has eroded any global support it had in its war against Iran.
Fighting an existential war, Iran has not shied away from targeting its enemies’ facilities and personnel in the GCC countries and beyond. This has led to a loss of goodwill with at least four GCC countries. Iran will require huge resources and years of hard work to rebuild it. Hence, Iran would need the goodwill of its friends and neighbours more than ever. The global community, which bore an enormous economic cost due to the war, too has a serious role, in pursuing a lasting solution to the quagmire of West Asia.
Gupta, a security analyst and former director general of police is the author of Glocal Terror in South Asia, Tracing the Roots in Geopolitics and the Tragedy of Afghanistan
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