US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s recent visit to India, Secretary of War Peter Hegseth’s speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue that briefly referenced India, and US Ambassador to India Sergio Gor’s energetic diplomacy have raised a central question: What does India want from the US, and what does the US want from India? The answer is that India’s wants have remained stable. America’s have changed. As a result, the special relationship with the US is over. Looking ahead, the India-US agenda will be far more modest and transactional.
For 30 years, India looked to the US for strategic balance against China, for cooperation against terrorism, for its market and investments, for the “export” of skilled Indian professionals, and for military equipment. Broadly, the US would help make India more secure and powerful.
US interest in India was a mirror image. India was a balance against China, a partner against terrorism, a market for exports and a destination for investments, a source of human talent, and a client for American arms. India was not seen as an ally but instead would be strengthened as a “strategic partner” in Asia.
The special relationship has withered because America has changed its view of India. The economic wants are much the same — India as a destination for US products (now including energy), investments, and arms. Against this, American worries about immigration have overridden the demand for talented Indians. More importantly, cooperating with India against terrorism and, crucially, partnering with it in Asia, has diminished in importance.
To appreciate the US’s changed strategic outlook towards India, we must understand its geopolitical view of Eurasia — from Europe, at one end of the supercontinent, to Japan, at the other end. Over the last 30 years (indeed, going back earlier), America has wanted to contain three challenges in Eurasia: Russia in Europe; Islamic radicalism in the energy-rich Gulf, and China in Asia.
For the US, India potentially had a role in all three theatres. With its close Russia relationship, it might act as a diplomatic brake against Russian adventurism in Europe. Given its proximity to the Gulf, its energy dependence on the oil powers, and its military power, it might be a force for stability in the region. And given Delhi’s quarrel with Beijing, its growing economic strength, and its naval forces, it was a putative balancer against rapidly rising Chinese power in Asia.
The war in Ukraine demonstrated to the US that India would be no brake on Russia. Indeed, with its neutrality in the conflict and its purchases of Russian oil, it seemed to play the opposite role even if that was not New Delhi’s intention. In the Gulf, India embarked on a larger strategic role, particularly in the past 10 years. Prime Minister Narendra Modi built deeper diplomatic, economic, energy, and even defence ties with the Gulf including Saudi Arabia, and was positioning India as a security provider.
However, when the US’s war with Iran moved towards termination and a deal had to be struck on Iran’s enriched uranium and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the Trump administration saw Pakistan and not India as the intermediary. Pakistani influence with the Iranians and with the Saudis (culminating in the defence agreement of September 2025) was a key asset for Pakistan. Its military power, its long-held relationship with the US defence establishment, and even its closeness to China were additional factors in the turn to Pakistan.
The third Eurasian theatre is centred around China. The US had hoped that India would begin to catch up with China and play a larger balancing role against it. But despite India’s economic growth of roughly 6-7 per cent per annum over 30 years and China’s economic slowdown, the absolute GDP gap between the two countries was growing, not reducing.
In addition, in the Indo-Pacific, India’s contributions were uncertain. India had underlined that it was averse to a common front against China in the Quad. Australia, Japan, and the US, therefore, gradually thickened strategic ties amongst themselves and with Korea and the Philippines. In addition, India’s military was not geared to project force into the South China Sea and East China Sea in the foreseeable future. At best, in a US-China confrontation, the US-India foundational defence accords such as LEMOA might be triggered, but this was by no means a given.
More fundamentally for India-US ties, under both Joe Biden and Donald Trump, America’s China challenge has changed. It is less about Taiwan and the security of Asia against China and more about economic and technological competition in commerce (the trade deficit), chips, computer software (AI), and critical minerals. In the US view, India is not a crucial player in any of these four Cs. It cannot replace China as an exporter to the US (indeed, India is now a trade worry). Nor is it a big player in chips, AI computer software, or critical minerals.
Whether the US is right or wrong in its view, India is no longer seen as a power to be strengthened. It is instead a destination for US products, investments, and arms. Despite Rubio and Gor’s and most recently Hegseth’s attempts to inject some spark into the erstwhile special relationship, the future is cold-eyed transactionalism. Opportunities but also stern challenges are ahead of us as the special relationship founders. Indian diplomats will have their hands full.
The writer is visiting professor, International Relations, Ashoka University, and emeritus professor, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore
More fundamentally for India-US ties, under both Joe Biden and Donald Trump, America’s China challenge has changed. (File Photo) 
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