The reluctance of the US to convene a Quad summit, the decision in Washington to revert to a Pacific Command from the Indo-Pacific Command, and the Trump administration’s desire to reestablish a possible G2 with China have generated concern across the Indo-Pacific. These raise questions about the future of the Quad and the broader vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).
Yet, this may be the moment for India, Japan, and Australia to step forward.
The Quad was not intended to be solely an American project. While Washington provided strategic weight and military capacity, the intellectual foundations of the Indo-Pacific concept were laid largely by Japan, particularly through the vision articulated by Shinzo Abe. India, through its Act East Policy, SAGAR, IPOI, and Australia, embraced the idea because it reflected a shared interest in preserving an open, rules-based maritime order stretching from the eastern coast of Africa to the Pacific Ocean.
If American attention fluctuates, the responsibility for sustaining that vision increasingly falls upon the region’s leading middle powers. PM Modi’s upcoming meetings with Japanese PM Takaichi in India and with Australian PM Albanese in Australia provide an opportunity to demonstrate that the future of the Indo-Pacific does not depend exclusively on Washington’s enthusiasm. Rather, it depends on whether the region’s major democratic powers possess the political will to sustain cooperation.
Japan signalled its intention to assume a greater role. Marking 10 years since Shinzo Abe first outlined the FOIP concept, PM Takaichi reaffirmed its continuing relevance. In a speech in Vietnam, the FOIP was posited alongside ASEAN’s own Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), showing that both concepts had common aims.
The evolution of Japan’s FOIP ambit is not limited to maritime security. Tokyo’s updated FOIP focuses on three pillars: Economic infrastructure for the age of AI and data, resilient supply chains for energy and critical materials, and security cooperation. These are akin to India’s own aims pertaining to strategic autonomy, dependable technology and economic resilience.
Japan’s proposed FOIP Digital Corridor, which includes submarine cables, Open RAN, satellite communications, and advanced optical networks, provides opportunities for collaboration with India and Australia. Tokyo’s new POWERR Asia initiative on energy and resource resilience manifests the growing understanding that economic and national security are now intermeshed.
Australia, too, has transitioned from dependence on alliances. Its growing defence cooperation with Japan, including the procurement of a multi-role frigate emanating from Japan’s Mogami-class design, shows how regional powers are building networks of interoperability that reduce reliance on any single external power.
For India, these developments are particularly important. New Delhi has long indicated that the Quad is not an Asian NATO and has resisted efforts to transform it into a formal alliance. Strategic autonomy remains central to Indian foreign policy. However, strategic autonomy should not be confused with strategic passivity. The current global situation indicates that India could secure its independence while assuming a larger regional stature. A robust India-Japan-Australia trilateral framework would allow them to collaborate on maritime security, critical minerals, supply chains, cyber resilience, emerging technologies, and infrastructure financing without depending on an alliance system. India need not be involved in any Taiwan crisis. It can play a bigger role in the Indian Ocean.
China remains the unstated aspect encouraging such cooperation. Beijing’s growing naval strength, economic coercion, aggressive territorial claims, and weaponisation of critical supply chains cause anxiety across the Indo-Pacific. Simultaneously, many ASEAN members remain wary of having to choose between China and the United States.
This creates a window for India, Japan, and Australia. Unlike Washington and Beijing, they are often perceived by ASEAN and Pacific Island states as partners rather than rivals. Through infrastructure funding, technology security, maritime capacity building, and development cooperation, they provide alternatives without seeking alignment.
The economic aspects are similarly important. If the Indo-Pacific is to remain free and open, it should be supported by economic integration.
This raises a question: Could India apply for the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)?
India withdrew from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations in 2019 due to concerns about market access and Chinese domination. CPTPP provides a varied opportunity. It is a high-standard economic agreement covering Japan, Australia, Canada, Singapore, Vietnam, and others. It excludes China while promoting rules-based trade, investment protection, digital commerce, and supply chain integration.
Membership would require serious reforms. Strategically, it would place India firmly within the Indo-Pacific economic architecture and reduce dependence on a plethora of bilateral trade arrangements. It would augment India’s current FTAs with Australia, New Zealand, the European Union, and the United Kingdom.
The importance of the CPTPP membership is strategic rather than merely economic. If India looks for a larger role in shaping the regional order, it should participate beyond security engagements by engaging with frameworks that mould trade, investment, technology, and standards.
The writer is a former ambassador and author of The Durian Flavour: India & ASEAN after a decade of the Act East Policy
Speaking at an informal press conference in Tokyo before leaving for New Delhi, Japan PM Sanae Takaichi (left) said she intends to “advance concrete cooperation” with Prime Minister Narendra Modi (right). (Photo: X/Narendra Modi) 
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