On September 8, the leaders of the BRICS countries logged into a virtual summit that felt both routine and momentous. Only weeks earlier, they had gathered in Tianjin for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s (SCO) in-person summit, where Chinese President Xi Jinping had invited Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin to underscore solidarity amid mounting geopolitical headwinds. Yet the carefully choreographed “Tianjin triangle” — Xi flanked by Modi and Putin — was dramatically sharpened by events back in Washington. Less than a week earlier, the Donald Trump administration had imposed sweeping tariffs on Indian exports, turning what might have been another scripted diplomatic exercise into a vivid display of shared concerns.
The scale of America’s sudden protectionism was striking. The US–India goods trade stood at $129 billion in 2024, with Washington running a $45.8 billion deficit. When Trump doubled tariffs on nearly two-thirds of India’s exports on August 27, duties affected garments, gems, jewellery, and seafood — effectively rendering 55 per cent of India’s exports to America uncompetitive. Washington justified the move as punishment for India’s discounted Russian oil purchases, but the collateral damage was broad, threatening jobs and denting sectoral growth. It was a sharp reminder of how vulnerable emerging economies remain to unilateral policy decisions made elsewhere.
Washington’s displeasure with the Tianjin summit and the BRICS in general was palpable. US officials downplayed the SCO gathering as little more than a photo opportunity for the authorities. At the same time, Trump derided BRICS as a talk shop for failing economies that could never rival Western institutions. The rhetoric mixed disdain with anxiety, underscoring how both the SCO’s optics and BRICS’ expansion are increasingly perceived in Washington as instruments of counter-Western alignment.
The 2025 BRICS summit felt less like a routine gathering and more like a council of the sanctioned. For India, the unease was amplified by its growing trade deficits within the bloc — most starkly with China, where the gap has widened from about $63 billion in 2017-18 to over $99 billion in 2024–25, with exports falling nearly 14 per cent even as imports surged. While Xi Jinping urged the BRICS to oppose protectionism and defend multilateralism, India’s External Affairs Minister, S Jaishankar, sharpened the debate by warning that supply chains, stretched by wars and pandemics, were now “weaponised” by tariffs. His call for “resilient, reliable, redundant and shorter supply chains” served both as a rebuke of Washington’s coercion and as a subtle reminder of Beijing’s dominance — underscoring that solidarity without addressing asymmetry leaves India vulnerable.
Another theme dominated the summit: The collective push to weaken the dollar’s stranglehold. At the 17th BRICS summit earlier this year, Vladimir Putin, boxed in by sanctions, boasted that most of Russia’s trade with BRICS partners is now settled in local currencies and pressed for an “independent settlement system”. Over time, BRICS welcomed pilot projects such as BRICS Bridge and BRICS Pay, while showcasing progress — Russia’s SWIFT alternative, China’s expanding cross-border payments system, and India’s special rupee accounts for bilateral settlements. The New Development Bank (NDB) has also broadened its lending footprint and membership, offering a sense of momentum.
Yet ambition still outpaces practice. More than half of global transactions are cleared through SWIFT, and the US dollar remains the currency of choice. Xi’s rhetoric on de-dollarisation remains careful, reflecting divisions within BRICS over conceding monetary space to Beijing, while India’s Reserve Bank continues to resist full capital-account liberalisation. Flagship payment platforms are still experimental, and the bloc’s existing financial tools — the NDB and a modest reserve pool — are insufficient to counter the vast trade volumes that BRICS commands. For now, BRICS finance is less an alternative architecture than a collection of experiments, driven by frustration but constrained by asymmetries and caution.
Across BRICS, members are testing local currency settlements, building South–South trade corridors, and piloting digital payments. At the same time, global firms are hedging against disruption by shifting production to Vietnam, Mexico, and the UAE. For India, this restructuring presents both opportunities and risks. Its rise has been tied to integration with Western markets, but the tariff shock revealed the perils of overdependence. New Delhi’s response has been twofold: Diversify through trade pacts with Australia, Africa, the UAE, and others, and insist that BRICS experiments complement — rather than replace — the existing dollar order.
The bloc’s expansion to 11 members representing over 40 per cent of global GDP in PPP terms is a symbolic counterweight to US-led institutions. Yet, enduring divisions — border conflicts between India and China, as well as sanctions on Russia and Iran — render the idea of a common BRICS currency implausible. Instead, attention is shifting to incremental mechanisms: NDB lending, currency swap lines, and regional trade settlements. Whether this evolves into a genuine shift in the global financial architecture will depend less on summit declarations and more on sustained institutional building.
Notably, India has resisted being cast in an anti-Western mould. Unlike China and Russia, which often position the BRICS as a counterweight to the West, New Delhi frames the bloc as a platform for cooperation, rather than confrontation. It continues to emphasise strategic autonomy — balancing ties with the United States and Europe while hedging through BRICS. For India, the challenge is to harness tariff shocks as catalysts for reform and diversification while ensuring BRICS enhances resilience rather than undermines existing partnerships, even under the ongoing tariff pressures.
The optics of the Tianjin summit and the subsequent BRICS meeting add geoeconomic stress on Washington. Trump’s erratic swings — from warning that India risked drifting into the arms of “deepest, darkest China” to proclaiming that he and Modi would “always be friends” — underscore how personal dynamics increasingly drive US trade policy. For BRICS, the tariff crisis offers symbolism, but optics alone cannot substitute substance. Sustainable progress requires addressing contradictions, including the India–China border disputes, sanctions on Russia, and uneven trust among members. The path forward lies in credible institutions, robust financial instruments, and pragmatic management of great-power rivalries.
The writer is a Fellow and Lead, World Economies and Sustainability at the Centre for New Economic Diplomacy (CNED) at Observer Research Foundation (ORF)
EAM S Jaishankar and other BRICS leaders, including Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russia President Vladimir Putin and Brazil President Lula da Silva during the virtual summit. (PTI) 
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