Opinion Trump rattled Colombia on tariffs. He will have a tougher time with others
Non-democratic states, which are hostile towards the US, may not be so willing to cave in when faced with similar threats
US President Donald Trump. On January 27, Colombia, an ally of the United States in Latin America, agreed to accept military plane loads of Colombian citizens of undocumented status in the US. The about-face came in the wake of a threat from US President Donald Trump to impose significant tariffs on the country after it had refused entry to a US military aircraft carrying the Colombian deportees. Colombia exports about $16 billion to the US and the threatened tariffs, if implemented, would have had an adverse impact on its economy.
Trump, no doubt, has won this opening round with Colombia. However, it needs to be reiterated that this victory, through the threat of weaponising tariffs, has worked against a friendly country that has cooperated with the US. In the recent past, it has worked closely with Washington in containing narcotics smuggling, a major US concern. While it does have the fourth-largest economy in Latin America with a GDP of about $425 billion, its size pales in comparison to the economic might of the US whose GDP is nearly $30 trillion. Consequently, it really was not in any meaningful position to brawl with the US without enduring extraordinary economic hardship.
The president and his ardent supporters are, no doubt, chalking Colombia’s backing down as proof of the success of their strategy. It would, however, be a major mistake on their part to infer that this episode is indicative of how the use of the threat of a tariff cudgel will work across the board. Non-democratic states, which are hostile towards the US, may not be so willing to cave in when faced with similar threats. The reasons for their unwillingness to give into American demands are manifold and worth exploring.
If they are already at odds with the US, they are highly unlikely to be consequential trading partners in the first place. Accordingly, the threat of tariffs would mostly lead them to shrug it off. Of course, the administration could threaten them with a range of economic sanctions. Once again, most countries hostile to the US that have faced sanctions, ranging from Cuba to Iran to North Korea, have learned to live and cope with them, albeit with varying costs to their citizenry. Furthermore, authoritarian states, unlike Colombia, have ways of coping with the discontent of their citizenry. Among other matters, instead of acknowledging and addressing the shortcomings of their domestic policies, they are likely to direct the increased frustrations and hardship of their populace towards external actors, and, in this case, the US.
Apart from the limited efficacy of the tariff threat, Trump’s crude pressure on Colombia to accept planeloads of deportees will do little to boost the image of the US in Latin America. The US, both before and during the Cold War, has long had an infelicitous history of widespread meddling in the domestic affairs of these countries. Political leaders in the region may be tempted to invoke and resurrect these memories that may have faded with generational change. Without a doubt, individually these states may not be able to stand up to the US. And even though international collective action is far from easy, the perception of growing American high-handedness may well lead to the states in this region to at least pursue what international relations scholars refer to as a strategy of “soft balancing”. This involves pushing back against an overweening power despite significant asymmetries, especially in the realm of military capabilities. Some scholars had argued that the George W Bush administration’s proclivity for unilateral actions had already generated a degree of soft balancing against the US.
If Trump’s actions during his first week in office are any indicators, he may be pursuing, according to a noted American international relations scholar, Michael McFaul, extreme versions of several approaches that have long existed in American foreign policy — isolationism, unilateralism and realism. None of these, McFaul argues, are likely to serve the US well, Trump’s posturing and bluster notwithstanding.
Some states, that are vulnerable to American economic pressures, may well buckle. However, if the long-standing theory of balancing in international politics has any validity, in either its hard or soft versions, most states, especially those with a modicum of economic and military clout, are unlikely to simply fold their tents and walk away. Instead, they are likely to enhance economic, diplomatic and other ties with like-minded states and try to ride out Trump’s second (and constitutionally limited) term in office. In the process, though Trump’s unilateralist and pugnacious approach to dealing with the world may prevail, it will come at the cost of damaging the global standing of the United States and further shred the weakened fabric of a rules-based international order.
Sumit Ganguly is a Senior Fellow and directs the Huntington Program on US-India Relations at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University