To protect farmers and their produce, India’s GI tag needs reform

The GI Act, 1999, provides three months for inviting objections to the application, with notice published in the GI journal. However, the language and source barriers prevented the Rajasthan producers from objecting within the prescribed period. After registration, the aggrieved party is forced to opt for a slow and costly cancellation process under Section 27 of the GI Act. This challenge has not raised a normal border dispute; it has exposed a deep systemic failure that needs correction.

Bureaucratic obstacles

India currently has 724 GIs registered, which is 0.52 GIs per million population. In contrast, Hungary has 7,290 (2023) GIs, yielding 751 GIs per million citizens. One of the factors behind the difference is the EU’s unified registration system. In India, the registration process generally takes years. As a result, only 46 per cent of the applications have passed so far, leaving the remaining balance either trapped in indefinite delay or withdrawn, refused, or completely abandoned by frustrated applicants. This isn’t just about numbers. It’s about who gets left behind. Small farmers in Rajasthan, Punjab, and Madhya Pradesh are left behind while well-funded entities like Unjha APMC thrive.

Whenever cross-border friction erupts, the parties must approach civil courts to resolve the dispute, entangling themselves in a sluggish system. The Basmati rice saga is still trapped in this slow-paced system. In a 2021 judgment, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Madras High Court. However, it has not yet resolved Madhya Pradesh’s claims for geographic inclusion. Similar multi-year stalemates have plagued iconic products like Mysore Pak and Kolhapuri Chappals. This judicial gridlock intensified in 2021, following the abolition of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB). Since then, the aggrieved parties, such as unorganised, seasonal farmers seeking urgent injunctive relief, have been forced to endure lengthy legal battles in civil courts, effectively pricing them out of defending their own heritage.

Enforcement Gaps

Beyond the courtroom, the GI Act suffers from several legislative ambiguities regarding the definitions of “authorised users”, “producers”, and “inspection structures”, creating core tension between the Act’s design and its practical application. Also, it makes the establishment of inspection bodies optional rather than mandatory for the applicant. Without strict, ground-level validation, the enforcement of the GI tag becomes ineffective.

Consequently, an estimated 40 million kg of counterfeit Darjeeling tea is sold worldwide — 10 times the actual production. In Varanasi, unmonitored machine-made imitations from Surat displace authentic weavers. Adulterated Alphonso mangoes and “testing centres” for Kashmir saffron that exist only in name complete the picture.

This vulnerability is compounded by an information vacuum; around 78 per cent of certificate holders do not know how to leverage it to secure better pricing, and only 42 per cent of the GIs have authorised users. This means 58 per cent of GI tags exist only on paper, with no individual producers legally authorised to use them.

Studies conducted by TERI reveal that a GI-tagged product commands a 20-30 per cent premium. However, farmers of Malabar pepper and Vazhakulam pineapple saw no increase in income post-registration. Around 80 per cent of Indian farmers fall prey to intermediaries, trading hubs, and exporters. As a result, only 10-15 per cent of the actual premium trickled down to actual producers. By comparison, in the European system, the actual producers easily receive 50-60 per cent of the premium. Indian farmers receive less than a third of the economic reward achieved by their Western counterparts.

The Path to Reform

The system needs to be corrected by taking into account the European Union’s state-led administrative model. India must transition towards a state-led enforcement mechanism in which the underfunded producers are not made to police markets for infringement under Section 25 of the GI Act. Such reforms include establishing GI Enforcement Cells within state agricultural departments, and installing an Online GI Monitoring Cell utilising domain-name alerts and geo-blocking to combat online counterfeiting.

Structurally, the state should back collective producer groups to promote collective bargaining power, and extend the benefit-sharing system between the marketing bodies and the actual tilling farmers, backed by centralised promotional funding to prevent premium drain.

Essentially, the Delhi High Court in the Pisco Dispute (Chile vs. Peru) stated that it is not a race for commercial “prior use”. Therefore, homonymous GIs can harmoniously coexist through regional prefixing. This will remedy a common GI challenge. India must reform its GI framework to ensure it protects the soil and the hands that till it. Or Rajasthan’s cumin farmers will not be the last to lose their heritage to a hollow shield.

The writer is a lawyer