BRICS has long been a platform for major non-Western nations, the demandeurs of a greater voice in a fairer, more representative international order. That advocacy remains legitimate. But as India prepares to host the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi on September 12-13, an expanded BRICS faces scepticism about what it can deliver. When BRICS emerged in 2009, globalisation rewarded efficiency, supply chains and trade. Geopolitical rivalry, technological competition, sanctions, supply-chain disruptions and climate shocks have now made resilience as important as efficiency. Today’s world, therefore, demands organisations that provide practical solutions while articulating shared interests.
Reflecting this shift, India’s BRICS presidency has focused on reforming global governance, strengthening the New Development Bank (NDB), expanding local currency use, promoting digital innovation, and advancing health, energy and food security. It has taken the BRICS conversation to over 60 cities through more than 100 meetings. Its success, however, should be judged not by the number of its preparatory meetings or which leaders attend the New Delhi Summit. The anticipated presence of leaders like Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, Lula da Silva and Masoud Pezeshkian adds heft. Still, its significance lies more in whether BRICS can turn such participation into cooperation that builds capabilities and translates shared interests into tangible outcomes.
A challenge before BRICS is maintaining cohesion as a larger, more diverse group. It now accounts for 45 per cent of the world’s population, 37 per cent of global GDP (PPP), and a substantial share of global energy production, critical minerals and manufacturing. Its expansion has added complexity, evident when BRICS Foreign Ministers (FMs) meeting in New Delhi in May 2026 failed to issue a joint communiqué over differences between Iran and the UAE on West Asia. It concluded instead with a Chair’s Statement. A similar deadlock occurred at the 2025 BRICS FMs meeting in Rio de Janeiro over language on UN Security Council reform.
BRICS enlargement has made consensus harder. Still, every Summit so far has produced a Joint Declaration, typically by watering down or removing contentious formulations to project unity. Consensus, however, should not be the benchmark of BRICS success.
BRICS defines itself not in opposition to the West, but as a non-Western forum. It brings together countries seeking greater strategic autonomy and a more representative international order without becoming a rival ideological bloc. Its members differ in political systems, strategic alignments and economic priorities, but its value lies in demonstrating that practical cooperation remains possible despite geopolitical disagreements. Its credibility will rest less on whom it opposes than on what it delivers.
Pairing advocacy with capability-building should guide the BRICS agenda. It should centre on seven priorities: Strengthening existing BRICS institutions; deploying validated technologies across the Global South; turning resilience into practical cooperation; deepening energy and food-security linkages; resisting coercion in trade; sustaining momentum for reforming international institutions; and implementation of measurable targets.
Strengthening the NDB, its key institutional achievement, must remain a priority. Its next phase should finance strategic infrastructure: Logistics corridors, electricity grids, digital infrastructure, climate adaptation and critical minerals, while supporting technology diffusion across the Global South. For developing countries, climate finance must support adaptation, resilient infrastructure and clean industrialisation as much as emissions reduction.
A concrete initiative would be a digital BRICS Technology Cooperation Exchange: A clearing house matching validated technologies from any BRICS member with the development needs of any Global South country. NDB financing, where appropriate, would move BRICS beyond declarations toward scalable, transaction-based partnerships, deploying practical solutions rather than merely exchanging best practices. India’s record illustrates the potential. Over the past decade, its portfolio of scalable technologies spans digital public infrastructure, vaccines, climate-resilient agriculture, satellite services, clean energy and water, all in high demand across the developing world.
Turning resilience into practical cooperation is another priority. The BRICS goal should remain monetary diversification, including reducing dependence on the dollar, while a common BRICS currency remains a distant proposition. Wider use of national currencies in trade, settlement and NDB lending, alongside interoperable payment systems, would reduce transaction costs and strengthen financial stability.
A pragmatic approach should also guide cooperation on energy and food security. Recent crises have exposed vulnerabilities in energy, fertiliser, food, shipping and critical minerals. Given complementary strengths, cooperation on supply chains, agricultural research and maritime logistics would strengthen capabilities.
A growing concern is the normalisation of “forced trade”, reflected most prominently in the use by the US of unilateral coercive measures. These include secondary sanctions, punitive tariffs, export controls, technology-denial regimes, financial coercion and the weaponisation of supply chains as instruments of statecraft. BRICS has also opposed the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), arguing that unilateral climate measures should not be allowed to become protectionist trade barriers. It should also articulate a positive economic agenda for the Global South that rejects such coercion without becoming a geopolitical bloc.
The case for UN, IMF and World Bank reform remains compelling. Yet meaningful change depends on political decisions far beyond BRICS. Its role should therefore be to build wider coalitions around specific reforms and keep up the pressure for change. Reform momentum must be sustained.
BRICS has never lacked ambitious declarations; it has lacked implementation. It should promote measurable targets, annual reviews, wider stakeholder engagement and transparent monitoring. Institutional consolidation will prove more valuable than proliferation.
The measure of New Delhi’s BRICS presidency will be whether its initiatives retain momentum after the chair passes to China in 2027. In a world shaped by resilience, technology and strategic competition, advocacy alone is no longer sufficient. BRICS must evolve beyond primarily a grouping of demandeurs to show that the Global South can also build, finance and deliver its own effective solutions. Starting that transformation could be the lasting legacy of India’s presidency.
The writer, a former diplomat, was India’s ambassador to Russia
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