5 min readApr 12, 2026 05:08 PM IST
First published on: Apr 12, 2026 at 05:08 PM IST
The Islamabad talks between Iran and the United States had all the ingredients of a deal doomed from the start, yet there was hope that the two sides would be able to arrive at a modus vivendi to stop the hostilities, given the destruction and loss of lives in the past month. Iran’s leadership has been successively decapitated, and Washington has spent close to $30 billion without an end. Iran is battered, yet ideologically resistant, and the US is heading towards the midterm elections with an inflation rate of 3.3 per cent, the highest in nearly two years. Most urgently, the choked traffic through the Strait of Hormuz underwrote the urgency for diplomacy between the warring sides. Amid this, Pakistan became the uncanny arbiter and its diplomacy culminated in talks in Islamabad, even if it delivered a failure.
Any successful post-conflict exit strategy should have at least one or more warring parties demonstrating a willingness to concede, and that in turn usually flows from power asymmetries between the parties. In the US-Iran war, power asymmetry until now has largely failed to be a decisive factor in compelling either defeat or compliance because the frameworks for combat differ. The US is driven by an excessive use of force doctrine, while for Iran, it is a question of ideology, resistance, regime survival and pride rolled into one. Furthermore, both Iran and the US headed to the talks in Pakistan with maximalist demands, making an off-ramp look impossible, besides the fact that both sides continued to claim victory over the other.
Going into the talks in Pakistan, the Iranian demands in the 10-point agenda outlined a position of either a victor or a compeller through its continued control of the Strait of Hormuz. Perhaps only two of the demands laid out by Tehran appeared within the realm of possibility under the current circumstances – the removal of some international sanctions on Iran and the release of frozen Iranian assets. Needless to say, the remit of these concessions would have been decided by what the Americans got in return. Every other demand was virtually impossible under the present scenario, most prominently the withdrawal of the US military from the Middle East and continued Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz. The question of the Iranian right to enrich uranium, which became the apparent final nail in the coffin of a potential deal before the war, is one that is now entrenched and hyphenated with the idea of Iranian sovereignty, especially after the US-Israel attacks.
There were enough signs of an unravelling deal even before the two parties arrived in Islamabad. Iran conditioned the talks on a cessation of Israeli strikes on Lebanon, as well as the unfreezing of Iranian assets held overseas before the war. While Trump may have used his leverage with Netanyahu to intermittently halt strikes on Lebanon, the release of overseas assets was too large an ask as a precondition. And for Israel, this may represent its last opportunity to escalate before a lasting peace, if such a thing remains achievable, as also a point of difference from Washington.
Perhaps the only good thing to come out of the Iran-US talks is the climb-down of both parties from a tone that evoked open hostility to one that is merely accusatory. Iran has accused the US of looking for an excuse to leave the talks, hinting that Tehran may still be open to negotiations, while J D Vance departed with an apparent final offer on the table for Iran to consider. Meanwhile, the transit of two US naval vessels through the Strait of Hormuz for demining operations, even as talks were ongoing, is a sign that both Iran and the US, and indeed the wider region and the world, now face the prospect of mined waters in the Gulf. Demining efforts, both on land and at sea, are likely to prove among the most challenging undertakings in restoring normalcy of traffic and security in the Strait. What consequences this holds for oil and energy markets remains to be seen.
Wars often play out differently from how they are initially imagined or strategised. The Russia-Ukraine war, the Gaza conflict, and now the Iran-US-Israel war have all demonstrated that reality frequently diverges from what the conflicting parties have prepared for. Most importantly, they have shown that restoring the status quo ante is a chimaera. The best outcome at the moment one can hope for is an uneasy peace, shadowed by the undertones of unresolved conflict.
The writer is Deputy Director, Strategic Studies Programme, ORF
(Left) Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif meets with Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in Islamabad; Sharif shakes hands with US Vice-President JD Vance. (Reuters photo) 
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