Terror upswing in Jammu – the path to counter Pakistan’s proxy war

This is unlike the approaches to both urban and village hideouts in Kashmir, which have been difficult to maintain and sustain after the NIA’s spectacular success against terror funding. We experienced mountain hideouts earlier in Hilkaka on the Pir Panjal in 2003, and in the Hafruda and Rajwar forests in the Valley. Reportedly, a trickle infiltration over a delayed period could have led to the build-up of reasonable terrorist strength in the Jammu division hideouts. Very little information about them exists on the intelligence grid. A basic support system probably exists, with paid over-ground workers (OGWs) available to stock the hideouts and provide some sustenance in areas where the terrorists operate.

While tackling the insurgency in Kashmir, perhaps we kept our responses limited to these being threat-based and threats in Jammu did not become so evident. Two questions arise here. What are the primary and subsidiary aims of Pakistan in activating Jammu at this juncture? How can these be countered in conceptual and specific terms?

My assessment is that Pakistan’s primary aim is the reactivation of an effective proxy war in all of J&K, notwithstanding the abrogation of Article 370. The activation of Jammu is a matter of convenience so as not to lose any further relevance and keep elements in Kashmir equally motivated by supposed success in the Jammu region. The subsidiary aim remains the targeting of the impending assembly elections and creating the conditions to keep them from happening. A cursory analysis of both leads us to the conclusion that, so far, we have only seen some of the extent to which Pakistan may go to achieve its nefarious ends. It’s difficult to determine the level of risk that Pakistan is willing to undertake in the execution of its aims. However, considering its political, economic and internal security situation, it is unlikely to take a higher risk. Yet, with Pakistan, the multiple layers of strategic decision-makers, apart from the elected government itself, make unpredictability an effective weapon.

In view of the above, a full-spectrum counter strategy — with a few specifics related to the context of the situation in Jammu — needs to be considered. It should start with active diplomacy to convey to Pakistan and to the international community the risks involved in the re-activation of the proxy war in J&K. It should be clear that the onus of conventional conflict initiation, if it erupts, lies on Pakistan. India has to communicate internationally that Pakistan’s nuclear response threats will not deter it from securing its interests. It’s important to convey that the parameters of strategic patience on India’s part are in the grey zone and specific Pakistani actions testing these could incur a very high cost. Strategic red lines in such an environment of mistrust are dangerously blurred. The influential big powers need to sensitise Pakistan’s political and military leadership. Past failures in this arena must be disregarded. Now that India’s stature under NDA 3.0 is of a higher order, a fresh effort is needed.

Politically, the Indian government’s decision to conduct Lok Sabha elections in the Valley, the high turnout and the general enthusiasm witnessed all over the Union Territory, should all clearly convey that there is a need for early assembly elections to take forward the ongoing integration of J&K. There are arguments against doing this in the prevailing environment of apparent insecurity in Jammu. My contention is that we conducted elections in 1996 even with the threat of a very low turnout. It was acceptable to us and it helped the wider perception of India internationally too — that it is a working democracy and is fair towards people caught in the turbulence of a proxy war. In 2002, a year when 1,650 terrorist-related incidents were recorded, assembly elections were conducted — and successful ones at that. It is important to stay the course. We have conducted elections under much more trying conditions and can frustrate all anti-national elements ranged against this process. Postponement by a month or two, to a time conducive from a climatic angle would, however, always be acceptable and the Supreme Court would probably go along with it.

Militarily, the turnaround in the security situation awaits one big successful operation. We can be confident it’s not very far. With additional forces being deployed, proper orientation of troops must be carried out, especially in dealing with the civilian population and other forces such as the J&K Police. Although some may not be so inclined, I firmly believe in a larger operational “sweep and churn” of Pir Panjal South to disturb and destroy logistics and hideouts with the neutralisation of those terrorists who come in contact. Technology and the Special Operation Group’s intelligence capability must be fully exploited. Poonch, Surankote and Rajouri have already been stabilised and focus should not shift from there while Reasi, Doda and Kathua are addressed. None of this is alien to the Army and JKP. At tactical levels, a focused return to basics will stand units in good stead.

Lastly, let the media hold its horses and not pressure either the government or the Army. Counter-proxy war is a game of patience, and setbacks are inevitable, as are successes.

The writer is a former corps commander of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps