6 min readFeb 26, 2026 08:27 AM IST
First published on: Feb 26, 2026 at 08:27 AM IST
In a welcome departure from past trends, the Union Budget 2026-27 has significantly bolstered its national security framework with a record allocation of Rs 7.85 lakh crore (approximately $86.7 billion), representing a robust 15.19 per cent increase over the previous year’s estimate of Rs 6.81 lakh crore ($81.2 billion). The primary engine of this growth is a 21.8 per cent surge in capital outlay, which has risen to Rs 2.19 lakh crore to accelerate military modernisation and the procurement of next-generation platforms like fighter aircraft, submarines, and drones. Notably, the government has intensified its Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative by earmarking nearly 75 per cent of this modernisation fund for domestic procurement, while simultaneously boosting the revenue budget to Rs 3.65 lakh crore to ensure higher operational readiness and logistics following Operation Sindoor.
India’s defence spending has inevitably drawn some accusations abroad that New Delhi is fuelling an arms race in Asia. The charge is familiar: Any significant Indian military modernisation is cast by some as destabilising, provocative, or jingoist. But this framing gets the story backwards. India is not out-muscling anyone. It is belatedly doing what any serious state must do when confronted with hard power realities. The recent surge in defence spending is not escalation; it is deterrence consolidation — a long-overdue effort to close glaring gaps, reduce vulnerability to coercion, and ensure that the outcome of a future crisis is not determined by whichever adversary fires the first shot.
For years, India has lived with a dangerous mismatch between its strategic ambitions and its actual military preparedness. The deficiencies have been documented by parliamentary committees, military chiefs, and independent analysts. Fighter squadrons have dwindled to levels far below sanctioned strength. Naval assets are overstretched across an expanding maritime theatre. Air defence coverage remains patchy. The Army continues to rely on legacy platforms that were outdated even before the last decade of border tensions. These are not marginal shortfalls that can be glossed over with rhetoric. They are structural weaknesses that directly shape the calculations of adversaries who watch India’s choices far more closely than our critics do.
Deterrence, after all, is not a matter of slogans or sentiment. It is a material condition rooted in capability. An adversary is deterred only when it believes that aggression will fail or cost more than it is worth. When a state underinvests in its own defence, it does not buy peace; it invites coercion. India’s recent spending surge is therefore not a sign of belligerence but of responsibility: A recognition that credible deterrence cannot be built on hope, nostalgia, or the assumption that past restraint will automatically guarantee future stability.
This recognition is especially urgent because India’s security environment has grown more complex. Pakistan’s military posture remains tightly coupled to its nuclear strategy, designed to exploit any conventional imbalance. Its tolerance for risk, particularly under domestic political strain, is not something we can prudently bank on. China, meanwhile, has spent two decades modernising its forces, expanding its naval reach, and hardening its positions along the Line of Actual Control. The 2020 Galwan crisis was a reminder that Beijing is willing to test India’s resolve and exploit any perceived weakness. More troubling still is the growing diplomatic and military coordination between China and Pakistan — a two-front dynamic that India has long worried about but now confronts in increasingly tangible ways.
Add to this the geopolitical uncertainty unleashed by Donald Trump’s Washington, whose global commitments are subject to transactionalism. India has no interest in being dependent on the whims of any external power, friendly or otherwise. Strategic autonomy, if it means anything, requires credible national capability. A country that cannot defend its borders, protect its sea lanes, or absorb the first blow without collapsing into crisis is not strategically autonomous; it is merely exposed.
India inhabits a region in which our adversaries are alert to perceived weakness. Underinvestment creates the worst of both worlds — louder alarms without stronger locks. A weak India would encourage risk-taking by those who believe they can coerce or punish New Delhi at acceptable costs. The purpose of India’s current defence spending is to avoid that trap. It is to ensure that no adversary believes it can achieve a quick, decisive advantage, the belief that has historically triggered wars. It makes clear that coercion will not work, that aggression will not succeed, and that any conflict will be too costly to contemplate. This is not about matching China ship for ship or missile for missile. It is about plugging known gaps, modernising outdated systems, and building the resilience necessary to prevent crises from spiralling out of control.
A more secure India ensures a more stable Asia. That is the simple but often overlooked truth. Stability does not come from wishful thinking or moral exhortation. It comes from capability — and from the quiet confidence that crises can be managed. The defence budget is a course correction. It is not escalation; it is insurance. It is the minimum required for a country with India’s geography, adversaries, and responsibilities.
If India does not get its defence right — if it continues to underinvest, delay, or defer — we risk increased insecurity without the stabilising effect of real capability. The real danger is not that India is doing too much. It is that, for too long, we did too little.
India’s recent defence surge is not a sign of militarism. It is a sign of maturity — the maturity to recognise that peace is preserved not by the absence of arms but by the presence of credible deterrence. Deterrence consolidation is the foundation of stability in a region where the margin for error is shrinking. India is finally taking real responsibility for its own security.
The writer is MP, Lok Sabha, and chairman, Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs
A more secure India ensures a more stable Asia. That is the simple but often overlooked truth. Stability does not come from wishful thinking or moral exhortation.(Illustration: C R Sasikumar) 
Share
