Opinion SHANTI Bill is India’s second shot at nuclear energy leadership

The Bill is pragmatic about who builds. It envisages the involvement of both the public and private sectors. However, this is not an unrestricted opening. It is an invitation to build domestic capability within a state-led system. It draws a sovereignty boundary by excluding foreign-incorporated companies as licensees. The most sensitive parts of the fuel cycle such as enrichment and spent fuel management including reprocessing remain exclusive to the central government. That balance, open where it helps and restricted where it must be, is the right instinct for a cautious expansion strategy.

Institutionally, SHANTI separates roles more cleanly than the current architecture. Licensing remains with the government, while safety authorisation sits with the regulator, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), on an enhanced statutory base. A stronger regulator that can set standards from design to decommissioning, inspect emergency preparedness, and undertake public outreach is an essential step forward. The success of this upgrade will depend on capacity, not just clauses. AERB will need more specialised inspectors, quicker rulemaking, and the confidence to enforce compliance without fear or favour.

Liability remains politically contentious. If something goes wrong, who pays, how much, and how quickly do victims get compensated? India’s 2010 law carried a strong moral impulse, shaped by the experience of the Bhopal gas tragedy, that victims should not be left helpless and suppliers should not escape accountability.

Global nuclear commerce, however, usually channels liability to the operator, backed by insurance and state support, because without predictability, private finance retreats and suppliers hesitate. SHANTI tunes India’s framework to global practice and keeps the overall accident ceiling at 300 million SDR (Special Drawing Rights). It narrows the operator’s right of recourse mainly to what is written into contracts, or to intentional wrongdoing. It shifts a share of responsibility beyond the operator’s cap to the central government through a Nuclear Liability Fund, and points to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC) for supplementary funds if claims exceed that level.

In a key policy shift, the Bill treats terrorism as a sovereign risk. It excludes operator liability for nuclear damage caused by terrorism and places liability on the Centre in such scenarios. The policy intent is to ensure victims are not left in limbo when an uninsurable event occurs. The political price is clear, too. If the state assumes the role of the last-resort payer, it must also be the visible enforcer of rigorous security discipline, preparedness, and accountability.

SHANTI moves away from a single prominent operator cap in the previous legislation and grades operator liability by category of installation. The policy logic is understandable since not every facility poses the same risk, and mature systems do differentiate by class. But any reduction for any class will be criticised as dilution 15 years after Parliament set a clear benchmark in 2010. Guardrails in rules can fix this. No category should drop below a minimum without a regulator-certified rationale. An annual public statement on the liability fund could help citizens understand how compensation would be financed.

On the victim’s side, SHANTI broadens what counts as nuclear damage. It includes long-term health impacts, economic loss, environmental restoration, lost income from environmental use, and the costs of preventive measures. It also creates a claims pathway with defined timelines and quicker disbursement once money is deposited. Speed matters almost as much as quantum. A slow compensation system, in practice, amounts to a denial of justice.

One of the Bill’s most forward-looking provisions is intellectual property. SHANTI creates a special inventions regime and amends the Patents Act to allow patents for nuclear energy-related inventions. This matters because nuclear power is not only reactors. It is also materials, robotics, safety software, specialised manufacturing, and radiation applications. A healthier IP environment can pull Indian firms into that supply chain and create skilled jobs that last decades.

SHANTI has a foreign policy payoff. By bringing liability and compensation closer to international norms, it can help turn India’s civil nuclear opening, especially with the United States, from a strategic promise into real projects. It also strengthens India’s leverage to work with multiple partners rather than being tied to a single supplier.

Today, no country can scale nuclear power alone because supply chains, safety standards, and liability protections are global by nature. Scaling at speed needs cooperation across borders. For 15 years, India has lived with a civil nuclear bargain that could not be fully implemented. SHANTI integrates India more firmly into the mainstream, on terms India can defend. India does not need a perfect nuclear law. It needs a credible one. SHANTI is directionally bold. It gives India the opportunity to move from debate to delivery, and from being an outlier to becoming a credible nuclear builder.

The writer is former permanent representative of India to the United Nations, and dean, Kautilya School of Public Policy, Hyderabad