Opinion New Delhi desires a multipolar Asia — Beijing does not

But what the Modi-Xi meeting also made evident was that as opportune as this moment is, neither side is likely to concede on their core demands. For starters, Xi continued to emphasise that the boundary question is not the whole story of the India-China relationship, and must be kept in its right place, not be hyped in importance. For Modi, however, peace on the border was put across as an “insurance policy” for good India-China relations. Clearly, each side accords differing degrees of importance to the complete resolution of the boundary question.

Going back to the recent meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar in New Delhi, it did not seem from the Chinese readout and the broadly agreed-upon conclusions that there was a softening from the Chinese side on the boundary issue. Prima facie, the “Early Harvest” proposition agreed upon by both sides seems to be a major softening from the Indian side, which had distinct opinions on the resolution of tensions from China, but none of which in the past few years had revolved around a fast-track settlement starting with the Sikkim sector of the LAC. Voices from the military leadership in India even argued that New Delhi should first propose restoration of the status quo ante in Ladakh and Galwan Valley regions, and subsequently move on to de-escalation and de-induction. After the Wang-Jaishankar meeting, however, the MEA press release stated that “de-escalation” and “delimitation” (settling some non-contentious stretches of the border on the map) as opposed to “de-induction” (permanent removal of troops) were discussed, which may be a signal that India is taking it slow and slightly reversing its 2020-22 all-or-nothing stance. The Chinese still continue to withhold granting India any clearly specified concessions because for them, tensions on the border are a leverage — like a burning pot they can reduce and enhance the heat on when they deem necessary.

Then, there is a distinction in each side’s vision for the regional order. In his post-SCO press briefing, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri stated that both Xi and Modi agreed that a multipolar Asia must be at the heart of a multipolar world. And yet, Beijing’s transcript of Xi’s remarks during the meeting highlights that he spoke only of creating a “multipolar world,” “democratised international relations,” and “peace and prosperity in Asia and beyond”. It is clear why New Delhi desires a multipolar Asia and why Beijing does not — the latter desires that it be the only metaphorical tiger on the hill. But for the former, parity in the regional order is an essential component of creating peace and prosperity in Asia.

Even during the meeting between Wang and Jaishankar, it was clear that regionally, Beijing cannot fathom granting New Delhi an equivalent status — hence, the lack of a mention of the Great Bend Dam and its implications for lower riparian states, or of countering terrorism, in the Chinese readout. The divergences on said issues, as well as the existence of structural differences in how the two sides envision ties (as evident, for example, in the divergent “mutuals” the two sides wish to focus on), explains why it’s not so easy for the New Delhi and Beijing to just be friends. But because of a clear power differential favouring the latter, and the fact that India can’t wish away its biggest neighbour and one of its biggest economic partners, one can also understand why New Delhi is now trying a softer approach.

Finally, the Tianjin Declaration, which condemns the April 22 terrorist attack in Pahalgam, depicts a turnaround in language from the Qingdao SCO Defence Ministers’ Meeting, held just a few months ago. It is certainly important given that Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh had to refuse signing that meeting’s conclusion document, because of its condemnation of the Jaffar express and Khuzdar attacks in Pakistan, but not the heinous attack in Pahalgam. New Delhi, too, seems to have conceded to condemning the attacks in Pakistan, for reasons probably revolving around tensions with the US and likely as a tit-for-tat for the inclusion of Pahalgam.

Why this is pertinent to the India-China dynamic, is because countering cross-border terrorism emanating from Pakistan is something New Delhi seeks Beijing’s support for, and yet, it is not a priority for the latter given its “iron-clad” friendship with Islamabad. In narrative, this Declaration may act as a platform for New Delhi to go back to, when emphasising China’s acknowledgement of the Pakistan problem. Yet, there should be recognition that what India experiences vis-à-vis Pakistan is not the same as what Pakistan experiences domestically vis-à-vis (and allegedly) the Baloch Liberation Army. And so, for Beijing to actively engage in countering terrorism emanating from Pakistan alongside India, it must first acknowledge Indian sensitivities vis-à-vis Islamabad and not put them on the same platform as domestic attacks in Pakistan. That may perhaps also open New Delhi up to acknowledging Chinese sensitivities on say, the Dalai Lama issue or Taiwan.

The intended outcome for New Delhi, going forward, should be to achieve a state where neither does India find itself unjustly disadvantaged against China, nor should it return to a juncture where dialogue with Beijing was all but severed. For this purpose, both sides must pursue a cost-benefit analysis.

If China genuinely desires mutual development and multilateralism, it should acknowledge India’s concerns vis-à-vis Pakistan and help balance out the trade asymmetry, in addition to pursuing boundary negotiations in good faith. If India genuinely desires stability in its ties with Beijing, it must make concessions on delimitation and ease access for Chinese investors. Because of divergent visions and policy agendas, the two sides can seemingly never form a truly meaningful friendship, but can still continue to carry on with business to ensure one less problem in an otherwise tumultuous world.

The writer is staff research analyst, Indo-Pacific Studies Programme, the Takshashila Institution, Bengaluru