Alignment and convergence of interests in the Indo-Pacific region led to the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in 2017, popularly known as the Quad, comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. After substantive preparatory work by officials from the four countries and a ministerial meeting in 2019, the first Leaders’ Summit was held in March 2021. It signalled a major policy initiative by the group to uphold a rules-based regional order and to promote peace, stability, and prosperity through collective action.
Less than a decade after its revival, the Quad now finds itself on life support, primarily due to its de-prioritisation so far by the Donald Trump administration in its second term. While there were some indications earlier that the next summit may be held at the end of 2025 or early 2026 in India, the lack of interest from the US became evident from mid-2025 onwards. New and unexpected tensions in the US-India relations, the US warming up to China and signalling a new conception of a future international order, and President Trump’s upgraded priorities in the western hemisphere and the Middle East became other contributing factors.
The Quad has so far held six leader-level summits — four in person and two in virtual mode — with two summits each in 2021 and 2022, and one each in 2023 and 2024. It started with broad-based objectives focused on maritime security and the delivery of public goods, setting up three working groups at the first summit. Several additional working groups and domain-specific partnerships were added at subsequent summits. A vision statement was issued at the fifth summit in 2023.
Despite divergent approaches, China has been a constant theme from the viewpoint of deterrence and resilience. Over time, the Quad statements gradually became more specific and pointed towards China. Initial references remained generic, like opposing coercion, but later talked about standing up to the militarisation of disputed islands, maritime militia, and aggressive actions of its coast guard. Maritime Security has been a key pillar and central theme throughout, with initiatives like the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), joint exercises, the incorporation of non-traditional maritime security threats, cooperation among the coast guards, and the Maritime Initiative for Training in the Indo-Pacific (MAITRI) programme. Under critical and emerging technologies, work progressed on technology standards, supply chains, 5G, open RAN, and semiconductors. The initial working group on vaccines during the Covid pandemic was later changed to a broader health security partnership. The climate working group, also set up at the first summit, aimed at coordination at COP summits, with subsequent initiatives including green shipping network, clean hydrogen partnership, and the Q-CHAMP (Quad Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package) programme.
The Cyber Working Group launched at the second summit was later upgraded to a Cyber Security Partnership. A Quad satellite data portal was launched, with space situational awareness cooperation added in due course. Under infrastructure, a coordination group was started. Further, partnerships for cable connectivity and resilience, ports of the future, and HADR were announced.
The progress by working groups and partnerships has varied, ranging from fair to negligible. This is in part due to the Quad spreading itself too thin over a very wide canvas of activities. Its impact on curtailing China’s coercive and aggressive actions cannot be quantified, nor can it be completely dismissed. On another level, it has helped propel some bilateral partnerships within the group. It has also sought to align its approaches with ASEAN frameworks, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), the Pacific Island Forum (PIF), and other regional players, especially in the maritime domain. By design, the Quad has not been a player in the western Indian Ocean region.
The 10th Quad foreign ministers’ meeting held in Washington DC on July 1, 2025, attempted to reframe the overall Quad agenda under four heads: Maritime and international security, economic prosperity and security, critical and emerging technologies, and humanitarian assistance and emergency response. It also announced a Quad critical minerals initiative. On the ground, activities of several working groups continued in 2025, but a rapid deceleration in momentum and enthusiasm was unmissable. During the last year, the US signalled lower emphasis on the centrality of the Indo-Pacific region, with indications that it may prefer to approach the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean with separate and distinctive strategies. It has also stressed the need for “burden sharing” by allies and partners, especially in hard power deterrence. This has influenced fresh commitments from Japan and Australia, along with South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan.
At the same time, it appears that the US has assessed that India can make meaningful contributions only in the Indian Ocean region. From an Indian perspective, the last 16 months have thrown up bigger challenges, including the US tariffs, realignments, and narratives in the aftermath of Operation Sindoor, the severe adverse impact of the war in the Middle East, and Russia and Iran-related sanctions by the US. Despite these difficulties, India has continued to proactively support the initiatives of the Quad. It sees the value this group brings to the region, but should be able to adapt if this partnership remains relegated to low priority.
While there have been several changes in the geopolitical environment since 2017, the broad strategic rationale behind the Quad remains strong. China continues to focus more on political economy and less on addressing the implications of an increasingly fragmented and uncertain international system. Beyond security concerns, its great leap forward through industrial scale, pole position in supply chains, and leverage in resources and input materials is being sustained. It is progressively creating material structures to enhance its ability to dominate across domains, while seeking consequent subordination of others in the region. Any inertia in collective efforts to provide alternatives would only hasten the Chinese dominance in the region and beyond.
The Quad was never meant to contain China, but to safeguard against ongoing and potential unfair practices and coercion. A responsibly managed US-China competition under the rubric of the recently announced “Constructive Strategic Stability” and the objectives of the Quad cannot be seen as mutually exclusive. While the former elevates China to a peer status with the US and seeks to avoid competition turning pernicious and causing extensive economic damage to each other, the latter enhances soft power deterrence and resilience against coercion. At the same time, stability and rule of law in the region are critical as the global community has no bandwidth left to absorb another shock.
When the Quad foreign ministers meet next week in New Delhi, the key question on the table should be the future direction of the group. By current indications, support is likely for reenergising its momentum. If that becomes the chosen path and if all members agree on the enduring value of this grouping, the Quad’s agenda can be trimmed, sharpened, and made more outcome-oriented. Increased quantification of targets under various pillars would be desirable, with reassurance for other countries in the region that it will also continue to work for the common good. The next logical step would then be to announce the plans for the leaders’ summit. On the other hand, a message of neglect or gradual abandonment will prove that the Chinese were right when they had famously stated in 2018 that the Quad is a “headline-grabbing idea…that would dissipate like the sea foam in the Pacific or Indian Ocean.”
The writer is former Commander-in-Chief of Western and Southern Naval Commands, Indian Navy
On Monday, India announced that Australia will be part of the Malabar Exercise in November, making it the first military exercise between all countries that make the Quadrilateral grouping, better known as Quad. 
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