Opinion After Operation Sindoor, India’s Afghan reset and the Pashtunistan question

The issue of Pashtunistan became crucial in 1953 when Premier Daoud Khan sought military support from the Soviet Union and financial backing from the United States. The National Awami Party and the Awami National Party, led by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, played significant roles in the Frontier Province. However, Afghanistan’s alignment with the Soviet Union strained its relationship with the US during the Cold War. Interactions between American diplomat Angus Ward and Daoud were marked by tension and mutual disrespect.

In 1951, when Afghanistan requested military assistance, Washington imposed strict conditions, including a $25 payment, public disclosure of arms deal details, independent transport arrangements through Pakistan, and a halt to efforts to establish Pashtunistan. In October 1954, Secretary John Foster Dulles advised Afghan envoy Kabir Ludin to disregard the Pashtun issue, copying the Pakistani Ambassador on this communication. This breach infuriated Kabul, as it not only rejected their appeal but also appeared to favour Pakistan in the contentious dispute over Pashtunistan.

Pakistan actively undermined US efforts to support Kabul, collaborating with the CIA to provoke local rebellions against the Daoud administration. In 1953, Vice President Nixon urged Daoud to set aside the Pashtun issue, and by 1956, during the SEATO conference, the US officially recognised the Durand Line as the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

As tensions escalated, the Afghan Loya Jirga sought military support from the Soviet Union, which endorsed Pashtun autonomy, as highlighted by Nikolai Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev’s commitment during their visit to Kabul in 1955. In contrast, China sided with Pakistan, although Ayub Khan Achakzai maintained ties with the Chinese Embassy in Kabul.

Strangely, India limited its involvement to broadcasts in Sindhi, Pashto, and Balochi through All-India Radio, often neglecting the Baloch and Pashtun issues, except during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani conflict. Indian diplomats, lacking insight, approached the Pashtunistan issue from a Western perspective, fearing that unrest could invite Soviet intervention.

New Delhi’s role in establishing a Tibetan government in exile for the CIA was significant. Yet, it chose not to support the United Pakhtoonistan Front (UPF), initiated by Mehr Chand Khanna, the former Finance Minister of NWFP, in 1967. The Pashtunistan campaign intensified after the Red Shirts’ Surkh Posh initiative, led by Wali Khan of the National Awami Party in Peshawar, Charsadda, and Mardan. Importantly, no Afghan government has ever recognised the Durand Line, a view widely shared by the Afghan people.

In 1976, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto suggested that if Daoud Khan accepted the line, National Awami Party leaders could be released, but this remained unresolved after both leaders were ousted in the late 1970s. In the 1990s, the PDPA asserted that Afghanistan’s territory extended to the Indus River. Both Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani also firmly rejected Pakistan’s claims, reinforcing Afghanistan’s stance on its territorial integrity.

The Pashtunistan issue is gaining traction, with rising unrest in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), fuelled by a narrative of “oppression” by Pakistan. Manzoor Pashteen, leader of the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement, is urgently calling for an end to Pakistan’s control in KP. Moreover, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) cross-border raids have become a serious threat, leading to extensive Pakistani military airstrikes on its hideouts in Paktika and other provinces.

Once aligned with al-Qaeda, the TTP now champions a Pashtun nationalist agenda, with leader Noor Wali Mehsud committed to resisting Pakistan’s military until the region achieves independence. The TTP’s attacks now increasingly resemble those of the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA).

Since the Taliban fell out of Rawalpindi’s control, Pakistan’s efforts to undermine Pashtun nationalism are faltering. The ISI is certainly creating factions within the Taliban ranks, but the regime in Kabul remains hesitant to confront the TTP, fearing its potential alliance with the more dangerous Islamic State in Khorasan (IS-K).

A recent shift in Washington’s stance, alongside Operation Sindoor, signifies a pivotal change in India’s Afghan strategy. The Taliban’s condemnation of the April Pahalgam massacre highlights Kabul’s departure from cooperation with Rawalpindi.

With the US remaining pro-Pakistan, India must develop a robust Afghan policy that goes beyond humanitarian aid. This policy should address the Pashtunistan issue and reassess the contested Durand Line. Uniting the 50 million Pashtuns across the Durand Line could help reduce regional tensions, combat terrorism, free Balochistan, and potentially restore Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and Gilgit-Baltistan to India, marking a pivotal policy shift for New Delhi.

Engagement with Kabul, regardless of the regime, is a strategic advantage to India’s interests across Pakistan, Central Asia, China, Iran, and Russia. Moreover, Turkey’s use of Pakistan to counter India in Eurasia further complicates the geopolitical landscape.

The writer is an expert on Eurasian Affairs