Opinion One year of India and Trump 2.0: A balance sheet
It does not show a partnership in steep decline, nor one enjoying effortless growth. Instead, it reflects a relationship that has become more hard-edged and realistic
After one year, the balance sheet of Trump 2.0 does not show a partnership in steep decline, nor one enjoying effortless growth. Instead, it reflects a relationship that has become more hard-edged and realistic As the world enters the second calendar year of the Trump 2.0 era, New Delhi’s diplomacy with the US reads like a ledger of hard-won gains, bruising differences over trade, and cautious hedges. President Trump’s return to the White House has upended the traditional predictability in US-India engagement, prompting India to recalibrate its strategic compass while navigating the “America First” playbook in trade, geopolitics, and regional security.
Despite early expectations of a Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) with the ambitious bilateral target of US$500 billion, trade and tariffs quickly became the fault line as Washington revived its doctrine of “reciprocity” and India was cast as a difficult and protected market. This narrative translated into higher tariffs and sustained pressure to open politically sensitive sectors. India was singled out for additional tariffs for importing Russian oil, even though China, Turkey and European countries have continued to buy oil from Russia. India has kept channels open for negotiation, signalled willingness to address specific concerns, but has drawn firm boundaries around agriculture, dairy and regulatory sovereignty.
Crucially, trade turbulence did not engulf the entire relationship. Defence and security cooperation continued with remarkable steadiness, underpinned by institutional frameworks built over two decades. Joint military exercises expanded, intelligence coordination deepened, and defence technology cooperation moved forward with little public drama. Cooperation in emerging fields like semiconductors, artificial intelligence, clean energy and space has continued to expand. Much of this progress is driven by private industry and sub-national actors, creating layers of engagement less vulnerable to political turbulence. Innovation-driven initiatives linking defence start-ups and private industry gained traction, reinforcing the sense that strategic collaboration has acquired a life of its own.
China has loomed large over the relationship, shaping both convergence and anxiety. Trump 2.0 has produced a paradoxical approach towards Beijing. There has been sharp rhetoric on trade and technology, combined with signals of interest in stabilising the broader relationship. For India, this ambiguity has been unsettling. Any US accommodation with China that sidelines regional security concerns complicates India’s strategic environment. New Delhi’s response has been to quietly reinforce its own regional diplomacy, deepening ties with ASEAN, Russia, the EU, the UK, the Quad partners, Indian Ocean states, key middle powers of the BRICS and G-20 groupings, and even recalibrating ties with Beijing.
South Asia has presented another delicate test. Trump’s renewed engagement with Pakistan and the crypto and mining deals involving his family revived familiar sensitivities in New Delhi. India chose not to overreact, reiterating its long-standing concerns about cross-border terrorism, followed by Pakistan as a state policy, while ensuring that bilateral ties with the US were not held hostage to Islamabad’s re-entry into American regional thinking. US policy towards Iran has added another layer of complexity. Trump’s uncompromising stance and encouragement of protestors for regime change in that country have further narrowed India’s already constrained engagement with Tehran, affecting long-term connectivity and energy considerations.
One of the most politically sensitive pressures of Trump 2.0 has come from migration policy. Tightened scrutiny of work visas, higher costs for employers, and uncertainty around student visas have directly affected Indian professionals and students. This has injected a human dimension into bilateral tensions. For India, mobility is not peripheral; it is central to the social and economic fabric of the relationship. New Delhi has consistently framed talent flows as mutually beneficial, arguing that restrictive policies risk undermining America’s innovation ecosystem as much as Indian opportunity.
The US support for the Quad has fluctuated. Frictions over tariffs and trade have raised apprehensions in India that its relevance to the US under Trump 2.0 as a key pillar of the Indo-Pacific strategy may have diminished. India, however, will remain critical to US ambitions to diversify supply chains, secure the Indo-Pacific commons, and shape technology ecosystems aligned with democratic norms. There is no substitute for India’s scale, location and strategic weight.
After one year, the balance sheet of Trump 2.0 does not show a partnership in steep decline, nor one enjoying effortless growth. Instead, it reflects a relationship that has become more hard-edged and realistic. India has engaged with the US without illusions, prepared to cooperate where interests align and to resist where they diverge. The US remains an indispensable partner, but not an unquestioned anchor. By diversifying its external relationships while keeping Washington closely engaged, India has negotiated Trump 2.0 with caution and composure. The relationship may be noisier and less sentimental, but it is also more grounded; shaped not by expectation, but by calculation.
The writer is former secretary (East) and has served as the Indian ambassador to Italy, Thailand, Oman and Poland
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