Days after leaving Afghanistan after the Taliban walked into Kabul on August 15 last year, President Ashraf Ghani surfaced in the United Arab Emirates. Eleven months later, almost to the day, Gotabaya Rajapaksa of Sri Lanka became the second South Asian leader to flee his country. He chose to fly east to Singapore, after a 36-hour halt in the Maldives.
Singapore is not the first country that comes to mind as a safe haven for political leaders seeking exile. Unlike the UAE, which welcomed Ghani on “humanitarian grounds”, the government of the city-state put out a terse statement as Rajapaksa landed, as if to convey its discomfort. “Singapore generally does not grant requests for asylum,” the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, nor had Rajapaksa asked for it. He had been allowed on a private visit.
When leaders go into exile, why do they choose to go where they go? The question has been interesting enough for academic study. Abel Escrib`a-Folch and Daniel Krcmaric (Journal of Politics, Vol 79, Number 2, 2017) studied the destinations of 98 fleeing “autocrats” between 1945 and 2008. They found that they were more likely to go to countries that were strategic allies, former colonisers, important trade partners, or neighbours. The last was particularly so for those ousted suddenly, as in a coup, as advance planning is not possible in such cases. Most are less likely to seek out democracies. And the numbers have been falling because more nations now worry about their credibility in giving safe haven to unsavoury characters.
But here’s the thing: according to the authors, the more quickly such leaders find that safe haven, better the chances for peaceful transition back home, which is why influential players use their heft to find them a secure landing. Escrib`a-Folch and Krcmaric give the example of Syria, where at the end of 2012, it was believed President Bashar al-Assad would leave, and was said to be “looking for a way out”.
A diplomatic scramble to find an exile destination for Assad failed. European powers said there was “no way” they would have him. Not having “a credible exit option”, the authors assert, is why “Assad unsurprisingly decided to continue the conflict”, one that is still ongoing.
An oped writer in The Washington Post contrasted Syria’s fate with Tunisia’s, where the dictator Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali fled early to Saudi Arabia, enabling a peaceful transition in his country.
A conflict that is a proxy war between “great powers” does complicate exits for all. Gotabaya’s case is clearer. On July 9, the day protesters overran his residence, it was obvious he would never be able to return to office.Yet he set July 13 — four days away — for his resignation. He left Sri Lanka for Maldives that day, but still refused to resign, reluctant to give up his presidential immunity until he found a safer place.
Maldives Speaker Mohammed Nasheed, who played a significant role in Gotabaya’s exit, either by himself or at the behest of bigger players, captured the incentive theory well with a tweet on July 14 — after Rajapaksa landed in Singapore and had quit: “I believe the President would not have resigned if he were still in Sri Lanka, and fearful of losing his life. I commend the thoughtful actions of the Govt of Maldives.”
It is still not clear if Gotabaya will remain in Singapore or is scouting other options. West Asia, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia, has been the favourite destination for such leaders.
Thaksin Shinawatra, former Thai prime minister, chose Dubai after his ouster. In 1998, Benazir Bhutto withdrew to Dubai. Nawaz Sharif went to Saudi Arabia after being ousted in a coup by his army chief General Pervez Musharraf. And in a reversal of fortunes, Musharraf himself has lived in Dubai since fleeing the democratically elected Sharif government in 2016. It helps, of course, to have personal ties with influencers. Sharif’s exit from Pakistan to Jeddah at the end of 2000 after spending a year in prison was negotiated by the Lebanese leader Rafic Hariri.
Unlike dictators, elected leaders seem to develop an irresistible urge to return home. The results are mixed. Ghani is not a politician at heart, so he may not try this. But Bhutto returned in 2007, enticed by a deal with Musharraf drawn up by British and American interlocutors, but with so many loose ends that her assassination was in many ways foretold.
Unwilling to be benched during what was a Pakistan in transition from military rule, Sharif too decided to return in September 2007, only to be dramatically deported by his bete noire Musharraf and accused by the Saudis and Hariri’s son Saad (Rafic had died in 2005) of violating the secret “terms of his exile”. (Years later the same Saudis were revealed by Wikileaks to have told the Americans that Sharif had not violated any agreement). Assisted by the Pakistan Supreme Court, Sharif returned again later in 2007. A decade later, after being removed in a “judicial coup” and spending months in jail, Sharif left Pakistan once again. He has not yet given up hopes of coming back.
Gotabaya does not have the political courage of a Sharif or a Bhutto, or even for that matter, a Musharraf, to test the field again. And unlike the Pakistani leaders, he now evokes revulsion even among his one-time fans. His life in exile may not be one of comfort either. For sure, he will not be able to hold court like Sharif does in London. The Tamil diaspora may want to see him punished for alleged war crimes. Like Musharraf, he can at best hope to be forgotten like a bad memory. Or he may hope to find insurance through family left behind in Sri Lanka – brothers and veteran politicians Mahinda and Chamal, and the next generation of Rajapaksas, who in turn are studying the return of the Marcos next-gen in the Philippines.
Write to the author at nirupama.subramanian@expressindia.com
Nirupama Subramanian writes: It is still not clear if Gotabaya will remain in Singapore or is scouting other options. West Asia, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia, has been the favourite destination for such leaders. (AP/File) 
Share
