Multipolarity is gaining salience around the world. It has been on the agenda of developing countries since 1955, when the Asian-African Conference was held in Bandung, Indonesia (April 18–24). Seven decades on, the relevance of its equal-power-distribution concept is being acknowledged even by proponents of unipolarity, reflecting an understanding of a world in profound transition. In the early days of his administration, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called unipolarity “an anomaly” and “a product of the end of the Cold War.” He also signalled that the world was “going to reach back to a point where you had multiple great powers in different parts of the planet.”
These words found some resonance in India, with External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar highlighting that the move to multipolarity “is something that suits India” and “requires greater collaboration”. However, the Europeans have not found much meaning in it, with the Munich Security Conference Report 2025 deliberately misinterpreting the term and replacing multipolar with “multipolarised” — a divided world.
Whichever way it’s viewed, there is clearly a dramatic shift from how the world organised itself over the past 80 years (1945–2025), when managing interstate relations among great powers, middle powers, and the rest followed a rulebook. Unipolarity and bipolarity were reflected in the formation of NATO in 1949 and the Warsaw Pact in 1955, with the US and the Soviet Union leading two rival camps of formidable political, economic, military, and nuclear capabilities. However, the idea of bipolarity was put on hold after the Soviet Union lost the Cold War in 1991, making the US the unchallenged pole. Many experts predicted that America’s unipolar moment would last indefinitely, but this belief was quickly disproven — within a decade — by the 9/11 attacks and China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), with US support.
Unexpectedly, a new bipolarity began to emerge with the gradual rise of China — one of the original participants in the Bandung Conference. In the first decade of the 21st century, under the guise of “globalisation”, where the flow of goods, investment, and people created economic interdependence, China took political and strategic steps to position itself as a second pole, in competition with the US. By 2013, China’s foreign policy, led by its Belt and Road Initiative, had found friends in unexpected places — from South America to Africa and Eastern Europe.
Several other power poles also began to gain strength: Russia, India, Brazil, South Africa, Mexico, and Indonesia, along with powerful regional groupings such as the EU, ASEAN, and the African Union (AU). The four successive G20 presidencies held by developing countries starting in 2022, and the AU’s elevation to equal membership, diluted the G7’s dominance in the global order. Multipolarity had extended its reach.
The ongoing Trump presidency has upended long-held definitions. Interstate relationships are changing at an astonishing pace — none more so than those within NATO and the US-Europe partnership — due to Trump opening direct negotiations with Putin to end the Ukraine conflict. The US shifted from being Ukraine’s most significant strategic partner to a mere mediator. Trump remains confident he can do business with Putin, offering a basic and straightforward rationale: “If I thought Putin wouldn’t keep a deal, why would I conclude one with him?” Even the venue for G7 mediation has changed—moved to West Asia, with Saudi Arabia taking the lead as host. In this emerging multipolar world, are nations now expected to rely on a leader’s word rather than on formal interstate arrangements?
However they are understood, such developments undermine the “rules-based order”, where respect for territorial integrity or compliance with international law can be suspended at will. The US president’s statements on integrating Canada as the 51st state, buying Greenland, taking over the Panama Canal, and the “Riviera plan” for Gaza have caused new turbulence, the outcome of which remains to be seen. The evolving US policy toward China and the emergence of a new US-China equation will further shape the contours of multipolarity.
Europe has been observing these shifts, and countries like Germany are seeking alignment with some of the original Bandung pioneers — many of whom are now emerging middle powers. These nations embody the pragmatism at the heart of multipolarity and differ from the G7-style “do-or-die” alliances in their partnerships and agreements. A case in point is India’s position on de-dollarisation: It has no current interest in it, as many problems in South Asia stem from the scarcity of dollars. As Jaishankar remarked, “Just because there is multipolarity, it does not have to translate into currency multipolarity.”
The consequences of the ongoing polycrises are increasingly visible in capitals around the world. New definitions of interstate relations, new behaviours, and doctrines are taking shape. India will do well to seize this moment and translate its multipolar intentions into reality by leading the effort to craft and practise equitable new rules that reflect the Bandung principles in this emerging global order.
Kripalani is the Executive Director, and Ambassador Bhatia is the Distinguished Fellow for Foreign Policy Studies, Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar highlighted that the move to multipolarity “is something that suits India” and “requires greater collaboration”. 
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