Opinion Left’s engagement with Sabarimala in Kerala is not opportunism, it is part of a longer attempt to democratise religion

However, recent years have marked a departure from this pattern. Since the Supreme Court’s Sabarimala verdict of 2018, questions of faith and religion have moved to the centre of both public debate and electoral calculation. The court’s decision triggered a sharp ideological divide: The communist parties, along with Dalit organisations, took a strong stand in favour of women’s entry into the temple. In contrast, the RSS, BJP, Congress, and dominant caste bodies such as the Nair Service Society (NSS) launched mass mobilisations against the verdict.

The 2019 parliamentary elections were widely seen as a referendum on Sabarimala. The Congress, which even promised an Achara Samrakshana Bill to protect temple customs, swept the polls, while the LDF paid the price for its principled stand, reduced to a single seat. In the years that followed, questions of faith receded as survival and public health took centre stage during the pandemic. By 2021, the LDF had regained ground, securing a historic return to power with an even stronger mandate than in 2016.

As the next election approaches, however, one is seeing a return of questions of faith, primarily around Sabarimala, but this time, triggered by the state government’s move to organise a Global Ayyappa Summit through the Travancore Devaswom Board, aimed at promoting Sabarimala as a global pilgrimage centre. The summit, held on September 20, brought together around 3,000 participants from various states and countries and discussed the government’s master plan for the development of pilgrimage tourism and infrastructure. The Chief Minister, in his inaugural address, spoke at length about Sabarimala’s tribal origins. He emphasised the shrine’s syncretic religious ethos and its deep connections with nearby Muslim and Christian shrines, framing the event as an attempt to globalise Sabarimala’s transreligious spirituality.

Despite the government’s careful presentation of the Global Ayyappa Summit as an administrative initiative, it has drawn widespread criticism. Many see it as the LDF’s bid to repair ties with Sabarimala and pursue Hindu consolidation before the elections. Critics have also pointed to the support the government sought and received from the NSS, which had spearheaded the agitation against women’s entry, and from the SNDP Yogam, whose leader is known for anti-minority remarks. This has been read by many as a decisive shift by the Left to appease “Hindu believers”—a form of “state-driven Hinduisation” or even “Left Hindutva.” This author begs to differ, as such criticism overlooks the Left’s long and complex history of engagement with religion.

Is the Left Becoming Hinduised?

Contrary to popular perception, religious groups and organisations have always exerted a significant influence on Kerala’s politics, albeit rarely in overtly divisive forms. Their influence operated through samudayika (communitarian) associations that negotiated with the state for resources, recognition, and representation — often in tension with the class-based mobilisations led by the communists. The Church, the Muslim League, the NSS, and the SNDP Yogam all opposed the early legislative reforms of the first communist government and jointly spearheaded the Vimochana Samaram (Liberation Struggle) that forced it out of power. This enduring tension between class politics and communitarian politics became a defining feature of Kerala’s political life, gradually crystallising into its bipolar coalition system — the CPI(M)-led LDF representing the former, and the Congress-led UDF the latter.

Though these boundaries remained porous, they proved remarkably stable electorally. Yet this did not prevent the communists, especially the CPI(M), from engaging with various religious and community organisations. The party’s reach among Muslims and Christians was limited by the authority of religious institutions and the perception of communists as “godless.” But the Left built a far more durable base among Hindu caste communities, particularly the lower castes. This was achieved not only through the idiom of class, but also through a sustained and critical engagement with religion—its faith, practices, and institutions.

As scholar Nirmala V. U. has shown, this relationship unfolded along two tracks: From above, through legal and administrative reforms enacted via state power; and from below, through dialogues with socio-cultural organisations, the secularisation of rituals and festivals, and even the unionisation of temple employees. While the first has a long history, the latter gained traction in recent years, shaped by the party’s dual encounter with rationalist groups—who dismissed any engagement with religion as ideological compromise — and Hindu nationalists, who have turned temples into political sites. In response, the communists have often attempted radical reinterpretations of religious symbols and deities, particularly Ayyappa, a move echoed in the Chief Minister’s recent speech at Sabarimala. The communists in Kerala have long engaged with lower-caste religious practices such as Theyyam, locating in their ritual defiance and moral world a vocabulary of equality and resistance. Their long-standing association with Parassini Muthappan, a major non-Brahmanical shrine in north Kerala often referred to as a “communist god,” reflects this.

The Global Ayyappa Summit represents a continuation of this complex trajectory of Left engagement with religion rather than a sudden or opportunistic shift. While the government’s immediate aim may be to reopen channels of dialogue with believers and community organisations, it is also a response to the increasing influence of the Hindu Right within temple politics, particularly in Sabarimala. Notably, the summit framed Sabarimala as a transreligious spiritual centre that belongs to everyone.

Walking a Thin Line

In recent years, the CPI(M) has pursued a renewed engagement with community leaders, extending beyond Hindu caste associations to include Christian churches and Muslim organisations. For instance, the influential Samastha has differed publicly from the Muslim League on issues like Waqf Board appointments and opened direct dialogue with the LDF. While such interactions are politically significant, they also call for deeper ideological reflection. EMS Namboodiripad consistently articulated a nuanced understanding of community associations, distinguishing between their “progressive” and “reactionary” tendencies and advocating alliances accordingly. It is this differentiatory approach that appears to be missing in the Left’s current mode of engagement, risking ideological ambiguity and exposing it to charges of political short-sightedness.

More crucially, the Left needs to reignite its engagement from below rather than above. Studies show that the rise of Hindutva in Kerala is not fuelled by grand ideological battles, but through its presence in everyday life—social service, temple affairs, spirituality, and domestic spaces. The communists’ work in these arenas, aimed at the everyday secularisation of religious and domestic life, has steadily declined, as current strategies rely mostly on state-led engagement through the Devaswom boards.

Contrary to what critics claim, there is a need to re-engage with Hinduism, particularly to transform its social and moral terrains from within. This engagement must continue to democratise and secularise religion while preserving the ideological critique—an approach that once underpinned the cultural rootedness of the communists in Kerala but is now increasingly in decline.

The writer is assistant professor, NLSIU