Opinion Israel’s October election complicates Gaza roadmap
While Netanyahu has avoided criticising Trump’s plan, his far-right coalition partners have been quick to dismiss an IDF withdrawal, stating their avowed policy of Israeli settlements
The movement of Gazans through the Rafah border crossing into Egypt, its only outlet to the outside world, remains severely restricted. Since the war in Iran began in February this year, the world has largely lost its focus on the devastating situation in Gaza.
Though a ceasefire has been in force since October 10 of last year following the 20-point Trump peace plan, a continuous, low-intensity conflict has persisted in Gaza. Additionally, while the supply of food and medical aid to Gaza has increased significantly, virtually no progress has been made on reconstructing housing or rehabilitating water, sewage, and electrical infrastructure, largely due to Israeli restrictions on the entry of industrial equipment.
Further, the movement of Gazans through the Rafah border crossing into Egypt, its only outlet to the outside world, remains severely restricted. In addition, Israel has expanded its physical occupation of Gaza’s territory from the 53 per cent agreed upon under the ceasefire framework beyond the Yellow Line to more than 60 per cent today.
While Hamas has managed to retain control over the 40 per cent of Gaza’s territory where more than two million residents are concentrated, it remains under severe financial strain. The collapse of the local economy and the shutdown of smuggling through the Egyptian tunnel network have dried up its internal revenue generation. Simultaneously, external funding has ground to a halt; its chief patron, Iran, is consumed by the war with the US, Hezbollah’s operational capacity in Lebanon has collapsed, and traditional donors like Qatar have been applying massive diplomatic pressure.
Left unable to pay the salaries of its cadre and with its heavy weapons stockpiles depleted by sustained Israeli attacks, Hamas has been forced to concede. It has handed over local governance to the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) early last month, as envisaged in the Trump 20-point peace plan. However, Israel has continued to block the entry into Gaza of the NCAG, a body consisting of 15 apolitical Palestinian technocrats approved by the Board of Peace (BoP).
To break the deadlock, Hamas agreed last week to surrender its heavy weaponry under the 15-point ‘Roadmap for Completing President Trump’s Comprehensive Gaza Peace Plan’ negotiated by Egypt, Qatar, and Turkiye. The Roadmap was further detailed at a press conference in Washington by the US Administration as well as officials of the BoP.
Besides elaborating how Hamas’s disarmament of its heavy weaponry and decommissioning of its military infrastructure will be linked to a synchronised, phased withdrawal of IDF and clarifying that no Palestinian weapons would be transferred to Israel or to any non-Palestinian entity, the Roadmap also contains some concessions to Hamas. It will be able to retain privately owned firearms to be registered and licensed by NCAG, in addition to the retention of some of its police officers in the new setup, subject to vetting. The Roadmap also clearly states that NCAG will be the sole authority responsible for administering Gaza.
President Trump broke the news of Hamas’s agreement to disarm late last week as a major victory, two days after his meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu in Washington. While Netanyahu has avoided criticising the Roadmap, his far-right coalition partners have been quick to dismiss an IDF withdrawal, stating their avowed policy of Israeli settlements in Gaza.
Just before the visit of Netanyahu, the Israeli cabinet approved deployment of a 200-strong International Stabilisation Force (ISF) envisaged in the peace plan to placate Trump. Israel qualified the offer that the troops will be limited to those countries that have normalised relations with it. Uganda and Morocco are stated to be ready for such a deployment.
As per the terms of the Roadmap, both Hamas and Israel are required to agree on the specific details of sectoral demilitarisation and the corresponding IDF withdrawal within a two-week time period. Israel is also required to withdraw from the additional areas it has occupied beyond the Yellow Line at the end of the two-week window. In addition, as mentioned before, the NCAG, which has been waiting in Cairo for about six and a half months to enter Gaza and assume governance, has still not been given the necessary clearance by Israel.
Further, significant open issues remain such as the formation of the International Verification Committee (IVC), which is tasked with certifying the sectoral demilitarisation of Hamas to pave the way for the corresponding IDF withdrawal. Also, the requirement that member nations contribute $1 billion to secure a seat on the BoP appears to have made no meaningful progress.
Any immediate progress seems highly unlikely as elections are scheduled for October 27 in Israel. Netanyahu is trailing behind the opposition in the opinion polls and is also facing intense internal threats from his far-right partners. Having failed to prevent a potential agreement between the US and Iran, it is almost impossible for him to agree to specific territorial withdrawals at this juncture, as he will not like to project weakness to the electorate.
Netanyahu was also hoping for Trump’s solid endorsement during his recent trip to Washington, but did not succeed. He contented himself with emphasising that it marked his seventh meeting with the President in a period of just a year and a half. However, an explicit Trump endorsement closer to the upcoming election cannot be ruled out.
Thus, while Hamas’s agreement to disarm and relinquish the administration of Gaza represents critical milestones that place significant pressure on Israel to reciprocate, subsequent progress is expected to be rather slow.
The writer is former Ambassador of India to Egypt and former Permanent Representative of India to the Arab League
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