Opinion Israel-Iran conflict: Why the world can’t afford a blocked Strait of Hormuz
While the UAE and Saudi Arabia have invested in new pipelines to allow some quantity to bypass the Strait, other countries (Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Iran) have no alternative routes
If Iran blocks the Strait through any of the above-mentioned options, it could yet paint Israel as the villain jeopardising the global economy (AP06_16_2025_000035A) Israel has widened its attacks from Iran’s military commanders and scientific personnel, nuclear facilities, and military targets, to oil facilities and civilian infrastructure. Subsequently, reports emerged of some Iranian legislators suggesting the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, with Sardar Esmail Kowsari, a member of Iran’s Parliament and Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), warning that closing the Strait “is under consideration and that Iran will make the best decision with determination.” If Iran does that, it will severely impact global energy transit, container trade, and the world economy.
Nearly half of global oil and gas reserves are located under or around the waters of the Persian Gulf. The Strait of Hormuz, located at the southern end of the Persian Gulf, connects the latter to the Indian Ocean through the Gulf of Oman and the Northern Arabian Sea. Nearly one-fifth of all global oil shipments and most of the LNG produced by Qatar, which accounts for about one-third of the global total, pass through this Strait. While the UAE and Saudi Arabia have invested in new pipelines to allow some quantity to bypass the Strait, other countries (Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Iran) have no alternative routes. This makes the Strait of Hormuz the world’s most strategically important choke point and critical to global energy supplies.
Iran sits on the northern side of the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman, with Bandar Abbas (also attacked by Israel) being one of the main ports opposite the Strait. Although the narrowest part of the Strait of Hormuz is about 33 km wide, the shipping traffic corridor is merely nine kilometres wide, with the UN International Maritime Organisation’s Traffic Separation Scheme mandating two 3.2 kilometre-wide shipping lanes, one each for incoming and outgoing traffic. Passage through the Strait is regulated by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982.
Since the Musandam Peninsula (a northern extension of Oman located near Dubai, Sharjah, and Ras Al-Khaimah) is under Oman, the waterway is split into Iranian and Omani territorial waters, meaning the shipping lanes fall under the jurisdiction of either Iran or Oman. However, there are eight major islands in the Strait, of which seven (Qeshm, Hormuz, Hengam, Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa) are controlled by Iran.
While both Iran and the UAE claim sovereignty over Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb, Iran has maintained a military presence on these islands since the 1970s. Further, Iran’s Navy has access to the Persian Gulf from bases at Bushehr, Bandar Abbas, and Chah Bahar. In sum, Iran has the ability to wield substantial influence on passage in the Strait, with the only exception that the headquarters of the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet and the headquarters of the US Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) are located at Manama, Bahrain. Both play a key role in safeguarding maritime traffic through the Strait.
Given the overall military force symmetries, five main options appear to be available to Iran: Utilize armed speedboats to harass and disrupt maritime traffic; employ armed drones to target specific ships; saturate the Strait with anti-ship mines; target transiting super-tankers with its anti-ship missiles in order to sink a few at strategic points to block the Strait; and use its four Russian-origin Kilo-class and between 19 and 23 midget submarines to target maritime shipping.
While Iran’s military has been practicing all these options since the “Tanker War” and has often threatened to shut down the Strait, it’s never acted on it. Even during the Iran-Iraq War (including the Tanker War), or when tensions between Iran and the US-Europe peaked in 2012, Iran threatened the same but the Strait wasn’t shut down.
For nearly 30 years, Israel has repeatedly claimed that Iran is only months or years away from developing nuclear weapons, despite Iran being a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (Israel is not) and its nuclear facilities being open to the IAEA (Israeli ones are not). On June 12, the IAEA’s 35-member Board of Governors declared Iran to be in breach of its non-proliferation obligations for the first time in almost 20 years (19 votes in favour, three against; 11 abstentions). And on the same day, Israel escalated a geopolitical issue into a serious conflict with potentially critical ramifications for the oil-and-gas producing Middle-East nations, and regional and global economies.
Notably, Article 56 of Additional Protocol-I and Article 15 of AP-II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions specifically prohibit attacks against nuclear power plants. The IAEA, too, has repeatedly declared that such attacks are prohibited under international law.
If Iran blocks the Strait through any of the above-mentioned options, it could yet paint Israel as the villain jeopardising the global economy. It could take weeks or even months to clear the Strait of mines and/or sunken ships. While no one can second-guess what decision another nation will take, there are a number of factors that Iran would consider before exercising the option of closing the Strait.
Firstly, any attempt to shut the Strait will likely draw in the US military, which is capable of progressively neutralising most Iranian anti-ship missiles after an initial exchange. Iran doesn’t want the US military to act.
Secondly, Japan, India, South Korea, and China are heavily dependent on West Asian oil. Given the stalled state of the Chabahar port and the IMEC corridor, India would be especially affected. Iran may not want to upset China, India and South Korea. The Middle-East remains a key supplier even for Europe, given its reduced import of Russian energy.
Finally, Oman controls the southern half of the Strait. Iran may want to avoid a rift with Oman or other GCC nations. Closing the Strait would also hurt Iran’s own energy exports and revenue.
The writer is a retired Brigadier from the Indian Army
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