5 min readJul 31, 2026 03:53 PM IST
First published on: May 20, 2025 at 11:28 AM IST
It seemed like the rerun of a film first released eight years ago. Less than four months into his first term, Donald J Trump made his first major international visit to Riyadh. There were, however, substantive differences. In 2017, the trip was a precursor to what became a US-supported quarantine of Qatar, an attempt by Saudi Arabia and the UAE to punish Qatar for its cordial relations with Iran and for supporting Ahmed al-Sharaa’s Nusra Front jihadists in Syria. This time, he visited Qatar and the UAE, after meeting with Sharaa, the new Syrian president, in Riyadh. What a difference eight years make. And eight years ago, Trump travelled to Israel. Not this time.
The three states Trump visited play a vital role in sustaining global energy markets at stable prices. In return, Trump gave them his silence on their record of human rights abuses. That will remain so long as they purchase US arms and invest in America, though the trillions Trump touts will remain elusive. Similar astronomical pledges made in 2017 never materialised. What matters to Trump, however, is not how much they actually invest but what he can claim.
Iran was on Trump’s mind — that has not changed. In his first term, however, Trump denounced Barack Obama’s nuclear agreement for its failure to curtail Iran’s malign activities across the region. But now, as his administration began negotiating with Iran officially through Qatar, he has reduced his demand to one: That Iran should not produce a nuclear bomb. This is a tectonic shift that may well yield results.
Of course, Iran’s regional strategic posture today is very different from 2017. Two of its allies, Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, are still fighting, but Israel has substantially degraded them. Their respective leaderships lie decimated. In addition, Iran sustained its most severe blow in the loss of Syria. Its long-term ally, Bashar al-Assad, fled to Moscow as his forces underwent a Blitzkrieg-like collapse, allowing Sharaa to capture Damascus. Moreover, armed attacks between Iran and Israel — the first time they have fired on each other directly — demonstrated Iran’s vulnerabilities.
This was the region Trump inherited. Recently, in response to provocations in the Red Sea, Trump ordered strikes on another of Iran’s regional allies, the Houthis in Yemen. That led to a ceasefire between the two sides, one that has held. Trump has also been pressuring Iraq to dissolve the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq. While it remains to be seen whether the Iraqis have the strength to do so, the militias remain Iran’s last line of diminished defence outside Iran itself.
Iran is thus reeling from a series of defeats and is now at its weakest point since the ceasefire ending the Iran–Iraq war in 1988. From an American perspective, the time seems ideal for negotiations. Most intelligence services believe that Iran has mastered the nuclear cycle and is already a nuclear threshold state, but there is no real evidence that it is actually building a nuclear bomb. It may realise that there is very little benefit that the possession of an actual bomb adds. If that is true, Iran may well be willing to freeze its nuclear programme in its current state. For Trump’s part, the return of Iranian oil to global markets would constitute a measurable downward pressure on oil prices — a congenial consideration for Trump and the US economy. This time, Trump may well succeed in entering into an improved nuclear agreement with Iran, something that was elusive once he withdrew from the previous one in 2018.
Unlike in 2017, Israel was not on the itinerary in 2025 — surprising for a US president. There is talk of Trump’s frustration with Benjamin Netanyahu, who has been relentless in deliberately targeting Palestinian civilians in Gaza and blocking humanitarian relief. All this has proven embarrassing to Israel’s partners in the Arab world, even freezing Saudi Arabia’s normalisation with Israel. He may well think Saudi–Israeli normalisation will achieve this dream. It is unlikely he will do it, but he could secure a unique legacy by reversing Joe Biden’s veto of Palestinian statehood and admission into the United Nations. Trump will not be facing an American electorate again and has nothing to lose by taking this dramatic step. And he could thereby give cover to Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler, Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, who earlier this year stated the Kingdom will not normalise relations until Palestinians achieve statehood. The new Syrian leadership, as well as other Arab states, might well then join in the normalisation process. That would allow Trump to secure a lasting legacy in the region and on the world stage.
The writer is the Michael A and Laurie Burns McRobbie Professor in Global Strategic Studies and is Professor of Central Eurasian Studies at Indiana University, where he is the Founding Director of the Centre for the Study of the Middle East. He was Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations from 2004–2010
This shift in the AI paradigm positions the Gulf states — Saudi Arabia and the UAE, in particular — in a central role in the emerging global compute ecosystem. 
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